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FAITH IN LITERATURE 
A study of some critical writing in the 
field of Theology and Literature from 
1950 to 1982 
This thesis investigates some of the connections between the two 
disciplines of Theology and Literature. It asks, for example, What is the 
relation between the kinds of faith characteristic of each? 
It begins with an overview of some of the major critical writing in 
this field since 1950, especially in the anthologies edited by Abrams 
(1958), Scott (1964) and Gunn (1971). The thesis also draws on the 
Journal of the American Annual Conference of Christianity and 
Literature. It contrasts the conservative and liberal perspectives of 
Leland Ryken and Giles Gunn and identifies where each characteristically 
places value and weight in the debate. It examines sympathetically the 
theories of Giles Gunn and Frank Kermode concerning the place of an 
existential faith in literature, and the function of literature as a source 
of personal and social meaning. It investigates the various elements of 
narrative which by their very form have religious or theological rever-
berations. It concludes with a critical study of Bellow's Henderson the 
Rain King as a way of earthing the analysis. 
The thesis begins as an exploration but soon identifies as of most 
interest those ·arguments which give literary method a place within the 
whole sense-making experience of man. The theological interest of the 
thesis is probably in the hermaneutical function of literature for the 
individual and for society, and the discovery, in literature, of faith and 
existential belief as an authentic response. 
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Prologue 
began work on this thPsis a.s i'l seC~rrh for intpgri'ltion. Havine in 
'-' 
some measure studied literary criticism and theology separately, I was 
aware that they often have concerns, insights and techniques in common. 
I wanted to investigate this perception, to test it and to articulate it, 
as it appeared to me .. was confirmed in this, and to some extent 
excited, in discovering that there had been a growing body of literature 
published, especially in America, with the same questions in mind. Is 
there something about story and the elements of narrative which is, in 
its very nature, theological? How does the world of meaning created by 
a work of literature relate to meaning within a confessional religion? 
How does our literary 'belief' in the world of a novel relate to religious 
belief and philosophical truth? What place has the imagination as a way 
6f knowing? Is there, in the vitality of the images of literature, a 
source of life for tired theological arguments? 
I did not know the quotation as I began, but Gunn's description of 
the literary experience seems to put a finger on the pulse of the issue; 
"We have been drawn into a mode of experience 
where, in all our unexpectedness, the act of 
belief suddenly becomes again an authentic form 
of response," (1) 
Literary faith and religious faith may be very close. To find the 
parameters and the heart of . this relationship is the burden of this work. 
· The shape of the thesis reflects more the exploration and evaluation 
of a wide area than the systematic presentation of a single idea, and 
yet, within such a general brief I have selected and pursued what I have 
felt to be. the most important issues and fruitful contributions. 
In the First Chapter I examine some of the seminal studies which 
reflect the emergence of critical interest in the relations of the two 
disciplines. In that sense the first chapter is an overview. I have 
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organised the material in five areas. The first two areas were~ perhaps, 
more intriguing to those who first worked in this field than to recent 
contributors, but with the other three they identify Jssues to which 
reference 1s made at various stages. These lay down essential found-
ations for the study. The fifth section of the first chapter raises the 
issue of the place of dogmatic religious faith in the literary enterprise. 
This I felt to be a way into the heart of the matter, and it became the 
point of departure for th~ following two chapters. 
Thus, Chapter Two is a comparison of the typically conservative 
religious perspective of Leland Ryken with the more liberal position of 
Giles Gunn. The two have characteristically different expectations of 
the' relationship of theology and literature, which can be summarised 
respectively as proclammation and search. My argument is that the 
liberal approach in which faith and meaning are to be discovered, and 
even forged, IS far more fruitful, and has more integrity, than the 
programmatic presuppositions of the conservative stance. 
However, the implications of this are pushed to the limit in the 
third chapter in a study of the work of Frank Kermode. There, the 
functionalism of literature, its ability to provide an idea of order and 
meaning in the absence of religious faith, and thus to involve the re-
placement of religious meaning by literary sense, this very functionalism 
is undermined by moral and theoretical considerations. We are thrown 
back part of the way towards Ryken's i'l priori faith by the ineitii:tability 
of our practice of hermeneutics, the need to understand by interpreting. 
Thus, Chapters Two and Three . pursue the heart of the relationship 
between the two disciplines and the powers appropriate to ·each. 
In contrast, Chapter Four investigates the various elements of 
narrative which by their very form have religious or theological rever-
berations, irrespective of the conservative or liberal assumptions of 
individual authors. Certain elements of narrative are correlatives of 
characteristics of religion, not necessarily stretching as far as God, but 
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nevertheless concerning belief. The material and argument of this 
chapter has a certain objectivity to balance the competing subjectivities 
of the pre.vious two chapters. 
The final chapter is concerned to test out some of the observations 
and theoretical arguments of the earlier work against a piece of fiction 1 
Saul Be11ow's Henderson the Rain King. There is a danger that abstract 
language can lose touch with its subject: it should be possible both to 
i11uminate a particular ·novel with some of the insights already discussed, 
and to give some weight to those theories if they are not disconfirmed 
by immersion in a piece of fiction. But it is not possible to prove them 
by such a method, and in that sense the final chapter is -a conclusion 
by virtue of confirmation and consonnance rather than by attempts to 
tie up all loose ends. It would seem that a survey such as this is 
unlikely to arrive at one single conclusion: the value will lie in the 
perspective gained and the weight of several arguments, some of which 
may be circular. hope that 1 in the final chapter, some of the argu-
ments of this thesis will achieve a "cash value"(2) in practical criticism, 
and that will be their strength. 
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Ch. I REGISTERING FAITH IN LITERATURE 
An overview 
The rise of the study of theology and literature has been part of 
that flourishing of interdisciplinary study that has taken place in America 
since 1960. In 1957 Abrams gathered various essays on the theme of 
literature and belief but the first anthology to attempt a wider analysis 
was The New Orpheus by Nathan Scott in 1964. Since then, other 
anthologies have been assembled to make the discussion more accessible, 
the Conference on Christianity and Literature has become much more 
than the marginal Modern Languages Association sub-group it was origin-
ally and the newsletter which Elva McAilaster circulated to teaching 
colleagues and friends has become the quarterly publication Christianity 
and Literature and a focus for teaching and writing interests throughout 
America. 
Many of the ideas and insights in this field of study are ancient 
and already well established. Giles Gunn, in the introductory essay to 
his 1971 volume Literature and Religion quotes the four literary approa-
ches which Abrams demonstrated in 1958. Plato and Aristotle considered 
the nature and significance of literature to centre on the world of the 
literary work and he calls that" orientation 'mimetic'. Sir Philip Sidney's 
'pragmatic' approach assumed that literature should imitate the possible 
more than the actual with the purpose of pleasing and ultimately instruct-
ing the audience. The Romantics placed fullest emphasis on the artist 
and the process of 'expression'. Fina11y, the moderns concentrate on the 
work itself, its 'objectivity' as a special kind of meaningful expression or 
the expression of a special kind of meaning. Each of these perspectives 
on the literary enterprise has its own implications for the nature of 
literature's relations with theology, and thus different theological ele,.. 
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ments have consistently been involved in the study of literature. But 
conscious study of this area has only been entered recently, partly 
because of the decline of religious certainty and as a result of the New 
Criticism's contracted critical endeavour "with its concomitant tendency 
to separate 'the values of art' from 'the facts of our existence in cont-
emporary society"'. ( 1) 
In the Preface to Literature and Religion Gunn describes three 
things that scholars and artists attempt in their study of literature and 
religion. They "account for relations in conceptual terms", they "explore 
them in the concrete materials in which they occur" and they "try to 
assess the effects literature and religion, when taken together 9 seem to 
have upon one another both in the abstract and in the concrete". This 
occurs from both sides. As Nathan Scott asserts in the introduction to 
his earlier volume, there is "nothing more repugnant to the Christian 
consciousness than the 'groupist' outlook and the mischief that is created 
in cultural life by a politics of exclusion" (2) yet Christian critics 
attempt to discover if there is the possibility of a Christian theory of 
literature. Others, m practical criticism, refuse to separate aesthetic 
preoccupations from their various existential and theological commitments 
and so exert pressure on the 'mystique' of the text which has governed 
the last thirty or forty years. The contributors to Christianity and 
Literature show the same broad variety of interest and approach, some as 
university teachers of English, some theologians, some parish priests and 
novelists. It is not surprising, then, that it is necessary to group our 
discussion of the issues that are emerging from this field of study accord-
ing to broad themes and not to attempt a linear analysis or to follow up 
every allusion as it occurs. Perhaps it is fitting that this is a character-
istically literary methodology (and there are, perhaps, theologians who 
would not find it unsuited to the development of religious insight). It 
must be emphasised, moreover, that the analysis which follows is a study 
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of some of the issues in this interdisciplinary field only as they are rep-
resented by some of those engaged in interdisciplinary study in the fieldi 
it is not a free-ranging study of the issues in themselves, for the field is 
very wide indeed involving the disciplines of literature, theology, philos-
ophy, linguistics, semantics, sociology, psychology, anthropology, history 
and theories of culture. In the bibliography to his 197 5 Horizons of 
Criticism Vernon Ruland has 365 authors and four times as many titles 
from the period from 1950 to the early 1970's. In the anthologies which 
have been assembled and in some of the major works much of this wealth 
has been assimilated from various perspectives and is implicit. Whilst we 
must be aware, therefore, of the widest implications our frame of refer-
ence is rather more modest. 
First in our thematic outline is the problem of belief which Abrams 
focussed in his own anthology. Although it has not been resolved the 
centre of discussion has moved away from this issue. Second, there are 
a number of attempts to create systematic or organic religious theories 
of literature focussed on the doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation or 
the sacraments. Third, the broadest category of work, in attempting to 
relate the two disciplines, is distinguished by its tendency to treat religion 
and literature respectively as something other than themselves, and thus 
effect an equation or at the least a relationship on what appear to be 
false pretences. Fourth, there is some fruitful attention to the implica-
tions. of symbolic and metaphoric modes of expression. Fina11y, the issue 
of 'normativity' is exposed. 
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a) The Problem of Belief 
The issue of belief, around which Abrams collected the essays m 
Literature and Beiief, artses because those who hold some religious 
beliefs as central and definitive are conscious of the need to explain the 
validity of literature which either expresses contrary beliefs or no beliefs 
at all. Why is a Christian interested in pagan literature? There is also 
the question Wallace Stevens set himself 'What is the nature of poetry in 
a time of disbelief?' 
There is unanimity in these studies that a work functions by its 
appeal to a common humanity. Abrams distinguishes between "overt 
assertions which we apprehend without consent as purely histrionic mom-
ents and built-in, common-sense and moral pre-suppositions from which, 
because they are essential to the work as a whole, we cannot withhold 
our consent without collapsing the poetic structure and draining it of its 
emotional power". (3) Douglas Bush argues that great works presuppose 
in their readers "a central and essentially ethical humanity which trans-
cends particular creeds a common base of human sympathies and 
values", (3) and Cleanth Brooks that a work depends for its success on 
shared "general human responses ... the pattern of human nature that 
exists within us". (4) Walter Ong draws attention to the author's voice 
whicr "expresses itself less in manifest doctrines than in the silent 
understructure of 
concludes that "in 
suppositions, norms and beliefs." (4) Nathan Scott 
this fallen world the only· workable requirement is not 
that of consent to the poet's doctrines but thqt of consent to. the poet's 
general view of life as "a possible view" such as might follow from an 
intelligent, sensitive and sober consideration of the facts of experience." 
(5) This perspective is effectively summed up in the final essay by Louis 
Martz on Wallace Stevens, a poet who· uses the meditative imagination to 
impose a structure on the universe, creating a value he does not find. 
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It is purely secular and naturalistic enterprise. 
The poem of the mind in the act of finding 
What will suffice. 
It is "the bold venture of a man in search of what will suffice 9 for whom 
'the human self', as he declared, seemed 'all there was"'. (6) 
In the opening essay of the collection Abrams reflects on the back-
ground to the problem. In The Republic of Plato poetry is asked to do 
· what philosophy does better, to give access to truth. The problem is 
that poetry is an imitation of what is already an imitation of the real 
Forms or Ideas. In contrast, in the eighteenth century it is science that 
is the major claimant to truth and in its own defence poetry falls into 
two' arguments; that poetry is a special emotive language used to express 
and evoke feeling and therefore is immune from the criteria of valid 
reference or of belief, or that poetry is an autonomous world of its own 
and therefore is immune from criteria of correspondence to our know-
ledge and belief about the world revealed by science. In the wake of 
Jeremy Bentham's "all poetry is misrepresentation" J S Mill defended 
poetry as an expression of feeling, the logical opposite of science. 
Science addresses itself to belief by presenting propositions to the under-
standing: poetry offers interesting objects of contemplation to the sensi-
bilities, which the reader accepts without belief for its emotional effects. 
Poetry therefore extracts from a conception known to be untrue the same 
benefits to feelings which would be derived from it if it were a reality. 
Thus, in defence against a prevailing positivism, Arnold could argue that 
poetry was able to take over the role of religion (whose facts were 
irrevocably challenged) in support of morality. Early in this century 
I A Richards could support this ernotive theory with a fully developed 
positivist poetics. The alternative view, that poetry is a world sui 
generis independent of correspondence to reality, is developed through the 
eighteenth century image of poet as creator of a new world not exhibit~ 
ing the truth of correspondence but of coherence. 
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Baumgarten related 
this created world to the real world by analogy. Poetry is thus able to 
evade the criticism that it is a language game insulated from life, which 
is not our experience of literature. The idea of an analogical relationship 
preserves the autonomy of the coherent world of the artistic work with-
out making it irrelevant, but the truth of the work is tied to its internal 
coherence and not to any correspondence with the real world involved in 
the idea of analogy. 
Today, contends Ab.rams, we are uneasy about art for art's sake 
since all poems have a structure of symbols, images and meanings which 
are governed by a theme which turns out to be a moral or philosophical 
commonplace able to be discussed independently of the poem. He quotes 
as examp'les 'union preserves the commonwealth and discord destroys it' 
of Troilus and Cressida and 'no-one is to be called happy until death' 
of Oedipus. This may seem shallow as an account of the two plays but 
that is a danger inherent in this kind of theoretical discussion. Abrams 
is actually trying to draw our attention to a divided premise, that liter-
ature engages the whole mind, including common-sense and moral beliefs 
and values derived from our experience of the world, and also that the 
poem is a self-sufficient whole read for its own sake as a poem and not 
as something else, independent of truths either moral or social which it 
might communicate. Though Abrams does not put it in this way, the 
essence of the issue is that literature must not be held to the rules of 
truth and language that apply to any other discipline (especiaJJy philos-
ophy) but it must nevertheless be acknowledged that it does deal with the 
same ultimate values and meanings that concern human beings. Thus he 
is able to claim that a poem makes a constant call on a complex of 
beliefs which are the product of ordinary human experiences of life not 
in propositional form but in unverbalized attitudes. In line with this 
rejection of the propositional he draws on Kant to argue that the function 
of art is not to persuade us to beliefs or actions but is to be a terminal 
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good. This distinction between literature which is intransitive and other 
disciplines which have an object and purpose we shall take up in discuss-
ing Kermode, who argues that the purpose of literature is not action but 
knowledge. Abrams contends that although the poet 1s not concerned to 
persuade us to take up positions outside the poem it 1s his constant con-
cern to persuade us to concur with the common-sense and moral positions 
presupposed by the poem and to acquiesce in the probability of the 
thoughts, choices and actions of the characters. These responses, however 
different from our responses in practical life, depend in great part on the 
beliefs and dispositions which we bring to the poem from life and which 
are the indispensible conditions for our aesthetic response. "The skillful 
' 
poet contrives which of our beliefs will be called into play, to what 
degree, and with what emotional effect." (7) Before a truly impassive 
reader (an audience from Mars) he would be helpless. If the artist 
succeeds we "so recognise ourselves and our lot in him as to consent 
imaginatively to his experience until it is resolved, in both artistic and 
human terms, in a way that is formally complete hence beautiful and 
intellectually and emotionally satisfying." (8) There is here, clearly, both 
an emphasis on the involvement of our own opinions and common-sense 
values, and yet a description of meanmg in literary terms. 
It is contended therefore that there exists a range of general 
human responses that may be separated from religious belief. These 
responses are indispensible to the literary enterprise. In using them 
literature achieves its own resolution in a manner appropriate to itself 
and not any other discipline. The resolution is achieved in terms of both · 
artistic (and beautiful) form and human, intellectual and emotional 
satisfaction. 
At this stage, the defense against the importance of differences of 
belief in literature seems to be that literature is not propositional. 
Nathan Scott argues that the poet is not an expositor, nor a Platonist, 
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nor an allegorist 9 nor a merchant in the business of ideas but a certain 
kind of technician or maker. Poetry does not involve the reduction of 
language to conceptual signs but captures attention intransitively to itself, 
functioning not ostensively but reflexively, not semantically but syntatic-
ally. The perception of meaning awaits not an act of comparison between 
component terms and external objects or events which they symbolize but 
"awaits an act of imaginative prehension that 
will focus upon the entire pattern of internal 
reference apprehended as a unity .... the 
living pattern of interrelated themes and 
resolved stresses the work contains". (9) 
Thus, retreat into a denial of reference outward (which we may 
call correspondence) and with it a concentration on internal coherence 
arises from a propositional conception of religious belief. This is very 
significant for two reasons. Firstly, it is open to debate amongst theol-
ogians whether religious belief is necessarily or predominantly or exclus-
ively propositional. Different theological and philosophical persuasions are 
involved here. But it is clear that the degree of embarassment caused 
by the problem of belief in literature depends on the degree of commit-
ment to a propositional understanding of religious belief. Secondly, prop-
ositional belief involves the literary artist in reference out of the literary 
artefact to problems, questions and methods which are more appropriately 
the province of other disciplines like philosophy and theology. These are 
questions, for example, of metaphysical truth and depend on methods, for 
example, of philosophical argument, with which the literary artist per se 
does not deal. Since the time of Plato the critic has recognized that 
literature does not use the methods nor perform the tasks demanded of 
philosophy. Propositional belief seems to require this of the literary 
artist. Therefore, in his attempt to escape this kind of involvement in 
alien disciplines, the literary theorist risks over-emphasis on the non-
referential, reflexive, special. kind of discourse that the literary enterprise 
entails. Like Nathan Scott he uses metaphors like "maker" and invents 
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terms like "Imaginative prehension" that will indicate a distinctively 
literary way of understanding. It is then his duty to give an account of 
how this distinctively literary discipline resolves the human elements with 
which it deals in a way that is as satisfactory in its own terms as the 
resolutions offered in their own terms by philosophical or theological 
discussion. But at this point he is severely embarassed by a dilemma. 
Either literature must retreat so far into itself as a non-referential, 
totally enclosed method that nothing can be said of it, or it must submit 
an account of the reference it makes to the human and religious matters 
which are its concern. To escape from belief understood as propositional 
by over-emphasis on the non-propositional nature of literature is not 
therefore to escape the problem of belief. 
The theorist has to acknowledge both the referential nature of 
language and the need, if a work is to be successful, to engage our total 
response to it as human beings with aU our presuppositions and beliefs. 
In these two issues we are necessarily involved in beliefs. The responses 
suggested in this collection of essays are, firstly, that referential though 
language is, it is renewed in the new context of the organic work of lit-
erature, and secondly, that though we must indeed be 'engaged' in a work 
if it is to succeed, that which is engaged is merely 'human' and somehow 
excludes belief. The first of these defences, that words have new signif-
Icances in the literary work, if it is understood radically robs literature 
of any meaning or significance and if it is understood more loosely it 
ceases to be a defence against the ubiquity of belief. The second argu-
ment hides behind the notion that belief is propositional to evade a closer 
definition of what these general human responses are and how they relate 
to belief (which is, surely, the original problem). 
In order to make way for the presence in literature of belief that 
may be called religious Nathan Scott is sympathetic to the views of 
J Maritain in Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry that poetic activity 
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does not begin until the poet permits himself to be invaded by the reality 
of things. Maritain does not make clear what he means by reality: it 
seems to be another of these special and rather mystical literary useages 
which in this case conceals the impossibility of excluding the beliefs and 
presuppositions of the one who sees, from the act of seeing. But he 
seeks to rescue literature from its impregnable isolation: it is not lang-
uage which brings meaning to birth but vision, the vision of a man. 
Henry James remarked that rea11y 7 universaHy, relations stop nowhere and 
the problem of the artist is to draw a circle within which they appear to 
do so. Thus the artist gives shape and significance to the primary data 
of experience only by virtue of his own vantage point; he gives a pattern 
of meanmg to contingency only in accordance with his fundamental, 
sharply felt insights into the meaning of the human story. Of course, we 
must not fa11 into the Intentional Fa11acy ( 1 0): what is important is that 
which is discovered in the work itself, where "the meaning of what we 
look at appears to be quite indistinct from the form in which it is pres-
ented to us". ( 11) This is because the poet does not expound a thesis but 
renders his vision of the human story, dramatizes it and makes it con-
crete. 
It is this element that he has ca11ed vision or belief that Nathan 
Scott wishes to suggest is the religious dimension of literature. It is in 
contrast to "any special iconic materials stemming from a tradition of 
orthodoxy" which might "be something peripheral and inorganic to the 
nature of literature itself". (12) He draws on TiHich's theory of the 
mutual immanence of religion and culture: "Religion is the substance of 
culture and culture the form of religion". ( 12) TiJJich also says that 
religion is "ultimate concern". Thus criticism is inevitably bound to iden-
tify the 'ultimate concern' at the centre of every work even if it is 
expressed in secular terms. Literary criticism is, therefore, ultimately 
theological. This is, of course, a very different understanding of relig-
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ious faith than the propositional or creedal perspective and we shall 
investigate some of the implications of this in Chapter 2. 
Ultimately, however, on the problem of beliefs Nathan Scott agrees 
in principle with Roy Battenhouse that "the artist who takes up his loca-
tion in Plato's cave has not the same chance as he who sets up shop by 
Christ's open tomb". (13) Yet, in practice, he agrees with Eric Heller 
that the dissociation of faith from sensibility "has made it impossible for 
most Christians not to feel, or at least not to feel also as true many 
'truths' which are incompatible with the truth of their faith". ( 1 3) The 
Christian reader will therefore respond with the same latitudinarianism 
as any other sensitive reader; he will require that the view of life of a 
particular novel or poem commend itself as a possible view, one to which 
an intelligent and sensitive observer of the human scene might be led by 
a sober consideration of the facts of experience. 
Thus the problem of belief has not been resolved. Clearly, only a 
humanist could find the retreat into generalizations about a common 
base of human sympathies and values to be anything other than the 
lowest common denominator. Human values include religious values no 
matter how loosely defined. However, the insipience of theology in liter-
ature may be approached from a different perspective. 
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b) Some Theological Models of Literature 
Dorothy Sayers argues ( l4) that whereas the work of art was to the 
Greeks a techne, a manufacture, the word that Christianity has given to 
aesthetics is 'creation'. God the Trinity creates through the Son who is 
continually begotten. Thus the artist "images forth" something which 
expresses that which it images forth, just as the Son is one with God and 
not only a copy of Him. Just as the Son is God so the poem ~ the 
experience - we cannot find out about the poem by researching the poet. 
Thus the act of the poet in creation is a Trinitarian one, of experience, 
expression and recognition. 
For two thousand years, she contends, we have been trying to rec-
oncile a pagan, Unitarian aesthetic with a Christian, Trinitarian and 
Incarnational theology: now we must recognise the religious origins of art. 
Two kinds of art are described by Plato and Aristotle, 'amusement-art' 
which is our experience of emotions without the appropriate event and is 
escapist, wish-fulfilment; and 'spell-binding-art' which seeks to produce 
certain behaviour without the appropriate experience and is magic or 
propaganda. These falsify consciousness: they are to art as the idol to 
the 1mage. We must begin, she asserts, from the Trinitarian doctrine of 
the creative mind and the light it throws on images. Art is one of the 
images of God - although we "see through a mirror darkly". 
Perhaps, in her emphasis on the essential oneness of the Trinity, 
Dorothy Sayers is trying to maintain some continuity between artist, 
work and audience in response to the prevailing critical emphasis on the 
autonomy of the work of art. However, she is unable to establish a 
direct correspondence between the poet, work and audience on one side 
and the Father, the Son and the Spirit on the other. For the poet to 
occupy the position analogous to that of God the Father in this Trinitar-
ian aesthetic she would at the very least need to develop a theory of 
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man deriving from the doctrine of Creation which would in some qualified 
way connect the creative powers of man made in the im3.ge of God with 
his Creator's continuing work of Creation. This she does not do. To 
establish a parallel between the Trinitarian position of the Son and the 
work of art she would have to take such account of the Son's utter dep-
edence on the Father that it is doubtful if any critic would recognise 
the resultant proposition about poetry. Even that critical theory which 
Abrams calls Romantic, which places so much emphasis on the poet, 
would have some difficulty in recognizing the work of art as both icon 
and substance of the artist. Dorothy Sayers would have special difficulty 
because she sees the work of art as an image of God: it cannot therefore 
also be an image of the artist, except in some extremely qualified way 
which would evacuate the co'l1parison of any force. Finally, she makes 
no indication of how the Trinitarian role of the Holy Spirit might illum-
inate the position of the audience or reader of a work of art. 
The image of a child has often been used of a work of art. This 
expresses both the parental origin of the work of art and its independence 
from the artist responsible for its existence. Similarly, the w.:>rd 'Son' is 
used of Christ to indicate his relationship with God the Father. But the 
doctrine of the Trinity, especially in the use of 'homoousios' and of 
'logos', establishes more identity between the Father and the Son than is 
usual between human parents and children. When Dorothy Sayers argues 
that "the P,oet reveals himself in the poe:n" she is alluding to the Trinitar-
ian relationship and not to the human one. In fact the human relation-
ship represents more accurately the degree of relationship between poet 
and poem. A poem is not autobiography: it may be about something 
quite other than the poet. Yet Christ, the Son, is, precisely, in the 
utmost entirety, about God the Father. Thus the poem is not to the 
poet what the Son is to the Father. 
Although there is no ontological parallel between the Trinity and 
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poetry she suggests what amounts to an epistemological Trinitarianism 
about artistic creativity. The words she uses are "experience, expression 
and recognition". In these words lies the contention familiar to many 
modern theorists of poetry that the poet does not know what his exper-
ience is until he first expresses it in words and then recognises it in that 
expression which has fixed its identity and meaning. There is no doubt 
that a comparison in these terms is much more defensible. However, it 
is not clear what the significance of it ts. She says we must start from 
this Trinitarian doctrine of the creative mind and the light it throws on 
images. Using Paul's words "we see through a mirror darkly" she seems 
to be suggesting the dark, merely reflected nature of the images which 
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arise from this poetic process and which, like our perception of Christ, 
are only partial. Thus, when she says "art is one of the images of God" 
she seems to identify the revelation of God in Christ and the revelation 
of God in literary images on the basis of this shared Trinitarian episte:n-
ology. Surely this is too insecure a foundation for such a far-reaching 
synthesis. Yet if this is not what· she means it is not clear what conclu-
sions may be drawn from her suggested Trinitarianism. Furthermore, 
there are many secular writers who do not fall into either of her rejected 
'idolatrous' art-forms (amusement-art which is escapism and spell-binding 
art which is magic or propaganda) but who pursue the :nost serious liter-
ary aims with integrity and who would strongly object to any literary 
theory that, against their will, organically co,mitted the:n to the creation 
of images of God and effectively involved the:n in the Trinity's self-
expression. 
Denis de Rougemont. seems hardly more successful in entertaining a 
partially Trinitarian theory based on his assumption that man is a 
'maker'. Art is part of this capacity and character, differing from 
other activities of man only in that its raison d'etre is to "signify organ-
ically and by means of its own structures". (15) Its purpose is medita-
tion. 
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He does not follow Dorothy Sayers in aligning the poet with God 
the Father by virtue of creativity. Indeed, he objects that it is only 
since the loss of belief in God the Creator that man has spoken of lit-
erary creativity: before that he engaged in 'composition'. Thus he con-
centrates on the work of art as what Sayers calls 'techne' and his theory 
displays all the marks of what she calls a Unitarian aesthetic. 
"It is impossible 'to deliver a message' in so 
far as we have. not mastered its means of expr-
ession to the point of being able to adapt 
them, to make them serve, to orient them - and 
this even to the last detail - in the direction 
and according to the sense of that which we 
wish to communicate". (16) 
There are two assumptions in this emphasis on craftsmanship. First, the 
artist is assumed to be in control, clearly perceiving what he wants to 
say and needing only skill and intention to communicate it. The message 
itself is not enigmatic and elusive and the act of communication is the 
artist's servant and in no way his master. Language is a tool only. Art 
is technology, the expression of man's control. It does not find out about 
the world for him. Any truth he knows is his by sovereignty of nature 
or by the grace of religious revelation. There is, here, little episte:nol-
ogical doubt and art certainly has no part in epistemology. It is one of 
the works of man, in Tho:nist terms a "virtue of the practical intellect", 
which is to reflect the religious truth of God. 
The second assumption, which is a corollary of the first, is that the 
truth of the message depends on the felicity of its expression. This view 
may be contrasted with that of Maritain quoted by Nathan Scott that 
technical expertise is less important than vision. This difference of 
emphasis is largely because de Rougemont assumes that man is in poss-
ession of a certain vision whilst Maritain argues that he is in pursuit of 
it. Thus, as de Rougemont says in his introductory remarks, art cannot 
have a mission; only man can have a mission. Art is therefore the felic-
itous expression of that mission. On the other hand, for Maritain art is 
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an agent of revelation, a vehicle of vision, an unveiler of truth. This is 
the widest of distictions about the nature of man, of art and of epistem-
ology that we shall discuss further in Chapter Two. 
De Rougemont distinguishes art from other crafts practised by man 
by the claim that it must signify, with the aim of meditation. This 
softens his emphasis on technical craftsmanship, but he is still far from 
Maritain's desperate dependence on creative intuition for insight. He is 
still close to Louis Martz' work on the poetry of meditation ( 17) which 
risks valuing poetry not in its own right but as so~ething else. Poetry 
is given religious significance by defining it in this case as meditation. 
But this is simply to play with words and the majority of healthy, robust, 
leading writers and critics would sim;Jly disown the redefinition. Never-
theless, if we separate de Rougemon't description of literature as "an 
oriented trap for meditation" from his assumptions about truth it is a 
useful statement. ( 18) 
To understand de Rougemont's general position in this way is to 
illuminate his gesture towards a Trinitarian aesthetic. Although only God 
creates ex nihilo he allows that the artist 'creates' in the sense of re-
arranging. This he sees as a parallel with the divine Fatherly love and 
action. Secondly, artistic expression incarnates certain realities and veils 
that which it expresses whilst manifesting it and being inseparable fro~ 
it. This catalogue of qualities establishes the parallel with the Second 
person of. the Trinity. Thirdly, the artist speaks of being inspired which 
is the peculiar characteristic of the • Holy Spirit. . This Trinitarianism is 
undeveloped and we cannot make too ~uch of· it except to point to the 
characteristic weakness of the perspective in the third parallel. He is 
happy with the notion of creation understood in a qualified way as re-
arrangement, and the image of Fatherly omniscience and omnipotence 
which his religious picture of God suggests allows for the uninhibited 
craftsmanship of a perfect design. It is an extension of this origin that 
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the work itself should, like Christ 9 be a perfect incarnation of what was 
to be expressed. But it is in the third element that he can only point to 
the use of the word 'inspiration' in both contexts without giving any 
account of the connection. The notion of poetic inspiration refers to the 
heightened vision in the artist that is responsible for the production of 
the work of art and it has traditionally been described in whatever meta-
physical terms are current 9 whether the muses and the gods or the levels 
of the subconscious. But in view of the account he gives of Fatherly 
Creation both divine and 9 by analogy, literary de Rougemont cannot 
develop an understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit on these lines. 
In this account creation and vision inhere in the Father who has no need 
of the inspiration of the Spirit (though, of course, there is a theological 
unity in the Trinity). Yet in literary theory the notion of poetic inspir-
ation exists solely to account for the gap between the author and the art 
he creates, whose vision, it is felt, does not inhere in him. Therefore it 
is not possible to develop a Trinitarian theory of inspiration that will 
complement what Dorothy Sayers would call de Rougemont's Unitarian 
aesthetic. will argue later ( 19) that the appropriate aesthetic function 
of the Holy Spirit in any Trinitarian theory of art is hermeneutical and 
not primarily to do with inspiration. Here, it is significant that de 
Rougemont can speak so loosely of the Spirit's function as 'inspiration' in 
the context of a view of art that comes so close to seeing it not as 
art but as something else. In su~mary he says 
-"art is an exercise of the whole being of man, 
no~ to compete with God, but to coincide better 
with the order of creation, to live it better, 
and to re-establish ourselves in it. Thus art 
would appear to be like an _invocation (more 
-often than not unconscious) to the lost har-
mony, like_ a prayer (more often than not con-
fused) corresponding to the second petition of 
the Lord's Prayer 'Thy Kingdom Come .• ' " ( 20) 
Art is, here, perilously close to becoming devotional prayer and de 
Rougemont, having so clouded the issue, is unable to pursue his Trinitarian 
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aesthetic: the whole of art (redefined as devotional prayer) is; in this 
vrew, about recognizing and w;Jrshipping God in Christ. Furthermore, 
since he shows only a token concept of uncertainty or darkness in the 
aesthetic (or spiritual) process he has little theoretical need of the Holy 
Spirit to i11uminate or interpret, and therefore no incentive to develop 
a fuHy Trinitarian aesthetic. 
In describing art as a virtue of the practical inte11ect de Rouge-
mont, like David Jones, gives us what Nathan Scott in his introduction 
ca11s a characteristic Roman Catholic synopsis of Aristotle and 1\quinasc 
That great metaphysical system is capable of accepting into itself and 
redefining anything offered to it. Thus Jones begins with the assumption 
that "man is a prudential animal whose nature is to practise an intran-
sitive activity to which adheres a gratuitous quality". (21) In short, 
man is a sign-maker. Clearly this excludes Positivist insights. The logic 
of develop-nent is equally uncompromising: a sign imitates so,ething, 
some reality, therefore something good, therefore something sacred - art 
is therefore a religious activity. This argument, like its companion 'm:m 
is a moral being, therefore a religious being' operates in a closed system 
and is not subject to anything outside of it. It relies on precise and 
specialised definition of the terms involved. But if we were to introduce 
anthropological or sociological evidence that many people show moral 
behaviour without any religious behaviour the system is endlessly able to 
assimilate it without essential change. The humanist in his turn would 
argue that 'man is a sign-maker' implies not that he is a religious being 
but simply that he is a human being: sign-making may be predicated of 
the human as we11 as of the religious. 
investigate presuppositions and terms. 
Therefore it is necessary to 
However, it is less the gesture towards a sacramental view of liter-
. ature than his ability to place literature within a larger religious context 
where it occupies a strictly defined role that distinguishes Jones' theolog-
ical approach to literature. It is this that is characteristic also of 
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W H Auden, though his argument is slightly different. Auden seems con-
cerned to separate what so many critics in this field wish to unite. To be 
able to hold, as he does, that "no artist qua artist can understand what 
is meant by 'God is love' or 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour' because he 
doesn't care whether men are loving or unloving" (22) is to separate the 
artist from the human. Yet he recognises that to the imagination the 
sacred is self-evident. As meaning and value are implied in the idea of 
'the sacred' we must suppose that he is distinguishing between what the 
artist does by virtue of the imagination (which can perceive value) and 
what he does apart from the imagination (which must be value-free). 
Perhaps, therefore, by 'artist' he refers to the craftsmanship of literature 
as distinct fro~ its conception. The imagination, he argues, is a natural 
human faculty and retains the same character whatever a man believes. 
Certain objects, beings and events arouse in his imagination feelings of 
sacred awe while others leave his imagination unmoved, To grasp clearly 
what Auden is saying we may imagine this faculty as a laboratory instru-
ment which every hu-:nan being possesses but which is tuned in each case 
to respond differently to the same range of stimuli according to the 
beliefs and presuppositions of each individual. As artist he is not cancer-
ned with what his feelings of sacredness ultimately signify: he considers 
that as man. Thus there can be no Christian art, in that Christianity 
cannot inhere in the nature of art, but only in the convictions of man as 
de Rougemont holds. An artist may work in a Christian spirit but his 
Christianity pertains to himself and not to his art. The division between 
the sacred and the nature of art is so strong for Auden that even overt 
Christian references in a work are questionable, for they 
"seem to assert that there is such a thing as a 
Christian culture, which there cannot be, Cult-
ure is one of Caesar's things the only 
kind of literature that has gospel authority is 
the parable, and parables are secular stories 
with no overt religious significance", ( 22) 
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Thus1 he says? the Incarnation of Christ, who cannot be recognized by the 
eye or flesh and blood but only by the eye of faith, has put an end to 
the imagination's claim to be the faculty which decides what is truly 
sacred and what is profane. 
Thusy in these extre:nely aphoristic pronouncements we appear to 
have a characteristically traditional Catholic conception of the literary 
process. Art is sim?lY craftsmanship, to do with executio:-~ and not con-
ception, inherently value-free and under the complete control of the man. 
Imagination is a neutral faculty to do with conception but tuned to res-
pond to stimuli in accordance with the beliefs and presuppositions of the 
man. Meaning, sacredness, truth, vision belong to the man quite indepen-
dently of the literary process. No knowledge or understanding can be 
gleaned from literature or the im3.gination: rather it is im?osed on them 
and forms them in a one-way process. There is a Pauline gulf between 
Caesar's things and God's things, between literature or culture and the 
truth, between the eye of the flesh and the eye of the spirit. As the 
paradigm of the parable illustrates literature :nay be used as a means of 
expression or as a teaching-aid but it contains nothing essentially Christ-
ian or valuable. 
Malcolm Ross and Allen Tate (23) understand the Incarnation quite 
differently. For Ross the Incarnation means that our frail flesh has been 
redeemed and existence has beco:ne inherently meaningful. O:..~r central 
Christian symbol is historical: thus the cosmic is absorbed into the histor-
ical and sacramehtalism 1 ·the presence of the divine in the human, bec-
omes the essence of Christian life and art and can exclude nothing of the 
chaos of modern secularism, Tate argues that the Incarnation affirms 
the world as an adequate theatre for God's Son and thus 'a glass of 
vision'. The essential stoutness and reliability of the finite world of 
contingent ·reality in this view legitimise the transaction in which the 
artist's im3.gination 'llingles with the world. The imagination which dis-
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integrates the image in illusory pursuit of the essence is a diseased im:=ig-
ination in need of the Christian's realistic attitude to Creation. This 
diseased 'angelic imagination' contrasts with the 'symbolic imagination' of 
Dante where wisdom is won through the analogical mind which apprehends 
the finite world as ultimately real. Tate's study of Dante focusses on 
the symbolic im::1gination which involves the bringing together of various 
meanings at a single moment of action. Thus Tate opposes Auden's sep-
aration of the Christian and the literary. 
"Catholic poets have lost the power to start 
from the 'common thing' : they have lost the 
gift for concrete experience. The abstraction 
of the modern mind has obscured their way to 
the natural order. Nature offers to the sym-
bolic poet clearly denotable objects in depth 
and in the round, which yield the analogies to 
the higher syntheses." (24) 
There are two assumptions in this perspective. It is believed that 
the Incarnation transforms the contingent world that Auden dismisses as 
Caesar's world into something inherently valuable and potentially meaning-
ful. The poet may examine it in its own right for what he :night find 
there rather than merely use it in antiseptic detachment. Yet this is 
not a total affirm3.tion of the world, for it is the specifically symbolic 
imagination which sees the significance that is incarnate in it. The 
symbolic imagination affirms the reality and authenticity of the contin-
gent fact but sees in it something which points beyond it. It is not 
dualist. A symbol is not an allegory: it is not intended to lose the ima.ge 
in the attainment of the essence. 
These two elements, the Incarnation and the symbol, constitute an 
alternative aesthetic. Contrary to 1\uden's belief poetry can be used to 
discover and explore the world as a theatre appropriate for spiritual 
knowledge. This risks the danger of pantheism, as if the Incarnation IS 
simply a reinforcement of the indwelling of God in '\lature that is one of 
the elements of a doctrine of Creation but is by no means exclusively 
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Christian. Yet Tate is using it in an exposition of Dante's specifically 
Christian poem. Thus it is a matter of perspective: a Marxist will create 
symbols that operate tn a Marxist perspective and a Christian will create 
symbols that depend on Christian faith. To link the Incarnation and the 
symbolic in this way is not to define a Christian aesthetic (as the Trinit-
arian aesthetic is exclusively Christian) but is simply to counter Auden's 
separation of spiritual knowledge and poetic exploration, and to affirm 
that the world (of contingency and of literature) matters in Christian 
terms. 
In the comments of William Lynch which support Tate against 
Aud,en we return to the general insights of the debate about belief. 
There is no such thing, Lynch argues, as a purely spontaneous,, auton-
omous literary image free from metaphysics and theology: Auden cannbt 
therefore separate the role of artist as craftsman from his convictions 
about value and meaning. Secondly, theology is not pejoratively transcen-
dental as Auden suggests, for the specificity of human experience and the 
'meaning' of it are not two different things; rather theology gets into the 
interior of our images. 
It cannot be said, however, that any of these attempts, different 
though they are, to see the function of literature within the framework 
of a theological model has any great theoretical integrity. But it is 
clear that there is enough of a problem involved and yet a sufficient 
degree of interconnection between the two diciplines to prompt substantial 
critical insights on the nature of the interconnection. 
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c) Mistaken Identities 
If we were to enquire how two similar but not identical entities 
might be reconciled within some coherent theory we might foresee cer-
tain dangers. We might suspect that the drive towards conformity would 
be capable of exaggerating the similarities and passing over the differences 
or even of redefining one of the entities in a way more favourable to the 
accommodation of both than a just appraisal would permit. It is not 
surprising 9 then 9 that we can assemble evidence of both these tendencies. 
Eliot is a seminal figure for many of the critics in this field, either 
in ?greement or in dispute. He falls broadly into Abram's mimetic 
theory in which literature represents less the actual wor'ld than a possible 
one and aims to instruct and improve. His general critical remarks are 
always subject to his sense of himself as a Christian: he writes for 
Christians. He makes his position quite clear when he says that modern 
literature has been corrupted by secularism and that it cannot understand 
the primacy of the supernatural over natural life. Thus as Christians we 
must allow for the difference between the view of life presented by 
secular fiction and our own view. Fiction affects us wholly as human 
beings; it is not vacuous and innocent entertainment. Indeed, the com-
mon ground between religion and literature is behaviour. Non-Christian 
novelists, he says, have sensitivity but little intellect. This is not intend-
ed as a gratuitous insult but is a sign of the dominance of a certain 
religious perspective as beyond dispute in a Christian: failure to see it 
and therefore to interpret correctly is a failure of intellect that does not 
prejudice the secular writer's ability to be sensitive to human experience. 
We ourselves, he says, need to distinguish between what we like and what 
we ought to like. Presumably the former is a product of sensitivity and 
the latter of interpretation and therefore of intellect. As human beings 
we .follow the line of least resistance: we are most impressed with what 
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we are previously prepared to accept and therefore there is no assurance 
that through literature we will become better men. Incumbent, therefore 9 
on all Christians "is the duty of maintaining consciously certain standards 
and criteria of criticism over and above those applied by the rest of the 
world! (25) 
But this is not simply a neo-Pauline exhortation to Christians to 
keep themselves unspotted from the world in splendid isolation, Eliot 
wants to insist that his view comprehends the whole of the literary ent-
erpriser. that "literary criticism should be completed from a definite 
ethical and theological standpoint". (26) Purely literary standards such 
as he faces from modern secular critics he admits may determine wheth-
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er literature is indeed literature, but the 'greatness' of literature cannot 
be determined solely by literary standards. He seems unwilling to accept 
the minority position of Christianity in modern society: he seems to 
envisage a Christian society in which all would conform to Christian 
theory. This is behind his desire for "a literature which should be uncon-
sciously, rather than deliberately and defiantly, Christian". (27) Only in a 
uniform society are its values organically integrated and unconscious: the 
more a group feels its separation and difference the more conscious and 
defiant its values become. Though the New Testament promises an 
eschatological society of complete and unchallenged Christian integrity 
whose values are so organicaJly integrated as to be unconscious it never-
theless envisages before the eschaton the need for proclamation and a 
defiant, distinctive, self-consciousness that is appropriate to. the conflict 
of good and evil, of light and darkness, of wheat and tares. Thus Eliot's 
comment, though he himself does not face its implications, raises the 
question of Christianity as proclamation. (28) 
What is the significance of the distinction Eliot makes between 
literary criticism and criticism from a definite ethical and theological 
standpoint which, he contends, should 'complete' it? Eliot's answer must 
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be that literature is not an autonomous thing, a world apart with its own 
system of meanings that are adequate in their own terms without refer-
ence to the world in which it functions. Rather it is a part of its 
nature and meaning that it is a part of the world. It is the critic's duty 
not only to test the generic integrity of literature but to place it against 
a scale of ethical and theological values. We might illuminate this with 
a simple but consonant analogy: the biological scientist's analysis of man 
as a certain species of animal must be completed by the theologian's 
analysis of him as a creature of God. Just as a particular specimen may 
not qualify, in respect of certain deficiencies, as generically human so, in 
respect of certain theological abnormalities, a particular specimen may 
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not qualify as 'a man, despite its biological perfection. The importance 
of this is that, in Eliot's view, just as the form of a work must meet 
certain criteria so the meaning must be measured against criteria: it is 
impossible that a work should be open-ended. A work may be perfectly 
formed, but it must also conform to the critic's "ethical and theological 
standpoint". One may call this 'programmatic criticism' and it has conn-
ections with our discussion of the problem of belief. 
Eliot's view is reinforced by W .K. Wimsatt's remark that the 
greatest poem for the Christian "will be morally right". (29) Wimsatt 
calls Dr. Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, mistaken in declaring 
"Hardy's great masterpiece, Tess" to be "among the worst books ever 
committed to paper". Poetic value and moral value, he argues, cannot be 
separated in this way. Eliot's theory of literature, then, in its aiiegiance 
to his Christian view of the world does not incorporate the secularity of 
our age. Literature must be defined in such a way that its meaning is 
no less a matter of realizing the perfection of 'Truth' than of its tech-
nical composition. Literature, in short, must conform: it becomes a 
handmaiden of religious life. 
In response to this Hillis Miller points to a vicious circle tn which 
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the problem of religious meaning involves the literary critic. On the one 
hand Eliot, m effect, substituted censorship for criticism tn his attempt 
to face the specifically religious content of literature. On the other hand 
a great work must surely be more than just one way of looking at things, 
which is the inevitably pluralist or relativist position of those who refuse 
Eliot's perspective. 
He asks where religious meaning lies in three critical approaches. 
Those who argue for the autonomy of the work of art contend that ·words 
assume new meanings in a poem. But, Miller objects, this reduces the 
poem to a vacant mirror of words in which religious meanmgs are no 
diff~rent from other meanings, whose only significance is the pattern they 
make within the work. There are also those who respond to this auton-
amy-critique by pointing to the non-musical referential character of 
words: they have a cultural history. These literary associations are, 
however, endless and eventually incidental. The work is then merely a 
symbol of the culture that generated it. Religious meaning in this pers-
pective is present as 'world-view'. This accepts a historicism that turns 
religion into something else: if the religious meanings are accidents of 
time and place, Miller says, of what interest are they? Though he does 
not put it in these terms Miller is dearly looking for a 'truth-value' to 
religious meaning rather than a historical or anthropological one. Finally, 
critics who focus on the author's experiences and training reduce religious 
meaning to the human dimensions of one individual: it therefore becomes 
merely a part of the pageant of human history·. 
"Any method of criticism which presupposes that 
meaning in literature is exclusively derived 
from the interrelation of words, or from the 
experience of a self-enclosed mind, or from the 
living together of a p~ople will be unable to 
confrrint religious themes as suth ••... Only if 
some supernatural reality ca~ be present in a 
poem, in a mind, or in the cultural expressions 
of a community can there be an authentic relig-
ious dime~sion in literatu~e. Only if there is 
such a thing as the spiritual history of a 
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culture or person, a history determined in part 
at least by God himself as well as by man in 
his attitude towards God, can religious motifs 
in literature have a properly religious mean-
ing". ( 30) 
Clearly, MilJer defines 'religious' in terms which go beyond anthropology 
or psychology to a supernatural history of God's activity. In short9 relig-
ion is about God acting9 not just about man thinking about God. 
This forthright argument preserves the identity of religion from 
erosion but it is not so blunt as to result in Eliot's self-conscious censor-
ship. It is possible from this position to fall into the barren circuity of 
Muir's argument. (31) Muir judges that modern stories have no endings and 
therefore no meanings because we have lost confidence in a transcendent 
reality. Normal human life, he assumes, has transcendent reality and 
stops short of meaning if it seeks meaning entirely in itself. Without a 
permanent background there is no whole picture of life: seen against 
eternity life is a complete story but against time it is unfinished. This 
argument is circuitous and barren; circuitous because transcendence is the 
problem at issue and cannot simply be assumed, barren because it dis-
misses anything which does not share the same conception as meaningless 
and worthless. 
Hillis Miller avoids this vicious circle by the interpretation of crit-
icism as an act of love. The critic does not relate to the work as a 
scientist to physical objects, he suggests, but as one man to another in 
love. "Love wants the other to be as he is in all his recalcitrant 
particularity". (30) Similarly, the critic introduces the work to his read-
ers as beloved, to let them meet it as it is, even though he disagrees 
with its 'meaning'. "Only in this way will those religious meanings which 
are in the work and not in the beholder's eye be made visible." (30) 
This use of 'love' brings to the act of criticism tolerance instead of 
censorship. It releases the integrity of the work from the opprobrium of 
partisan opposition, without blurring any gap that there might be between 
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the critic's belief and the work's meanings. 
This is something of a high point of discrimination and tolerance 
and serves as a contrast for the more partisan of Eliot's adherents. One 
of these, D S Savage, perhaps overstates his case when he argues that it 
is not technique but vision which transforms the raw materials of human 
experience into art, but his argument is a very reasonable interpretation 
of Eliot's position. The poet in this view becomes a 'seer' not a 'maker' 
and the test of art becomes less the perfection of form and content than 
the probity of vision. Literature is not, here, being treated as itself but 
as something else. The problem arises from the inherent Platonism of a 
commitment to a certain religious position. "All art", he says, "arises 
from the creative need to raise content into its proper form". (32) He 
goes on "Truth, the absolute, forms in every integrated work of art the 
invisible centre around which everything in it coheres and in relation to 
which it becomes a communication of value". (33) It is not difficult from 
this position to make the connection with religion - "orientation to truth 
is essentially a religious act" (34) and "Religious dogma, cult and ritual 
are the communal concretion and consolidation of man's transcendent 
apprehension of truth". (34) Literature is, surely, too closely associated 
here with religious truth to be true to itself. This is the fate of all 
those who build a theory on Eliot's foundations. 
Hillis Miller argues against religion understood in anthropological, 
historical or cultural terms on the basis that such a conception of religion 
is less than adequate. For Miller religion has some supernatural objectiv-
ity, which places him in Eliot's company, though he is rather more toler-
ant. But· what is the view against which he is arguing? 
Vincent Buckley emphasises the ·anthropological nature of liter-
ature. Thus he proposes that the discussion of religion and· literature be 
widened from the 'revealed' or the 'dogmatic' to the 'religious' or the 
'sacred'. He uses Moby Dick as an illustration of the kind of implicit 
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redefinition of God undertaken to render dynamic man's interaction with 
the forces that overshadow his life. In this perspective God is under-
stood as mysterious and 'the Holy' (35) and man's life is implied to be, 
in some sense9 sacred. To Buckley the 'religious' is not a strictly anthro-
pologica1 concept but a sense of man's life 
"bonded with forces in the universe which have 
their correlations in his own psychic life ... 
but which cannot be accounted for in terms of 
his psychic life, are in some sense superior to 
him, in some sense govern him, are manifest 
to him in terms of power and presence, and in 
some sense require of him adoration, worship 
and celebration". (36) 
This notion of the 'religious' therefore supposes some element of trans-
cendence. The 'sacred', on the other hand, takes place in the world of 
common experience, the profane, which experiences a movement to trans-
cend or complete itself but is never completely transformed by its sacred 
use. There seems to be a real difference between the contents of these 
terms, therefore, but Buckley intends us to understand in both of them 
the integration and continuity of the religious and the sacred with 
common human life, in distinction from the radically discontinuous nature 
of 'revealed' doctrine. He is then able to agree with Roethke (37) that the 
religious venture is implicit in the poetic act: poetry is "extending and 
completing in language a contact with the world which is religious in its 
nature". (38) He sets this basic anthropological argument in the perspec-
tive of a Christian debate about the relevance of the concept of the 
'supernatural', especially following J A T Robinson's association of demy-
thologization and desupernaturalism. With a glance at Bonhoeffer's 
"religionless Christianity" he asserts that Christian commentators are 
coming increasingly to suggest that the Incarnation has assimilated God to 
the historical process so that there is no world outside of history which 
can be the object of religious aspiration. 
The use of anthropological insights in this way serves to refine both 
concepts of religion and of literature. Religion is tied more firmly and 
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exclusively to anthropocentric perceptions in place of transcendental data, 
and lent all the religious functions which anthropology detects in man. 
But we may think that they have both become something other than 
themselves in the process. However, this approach makes much more of 
an attempt than anything on Eliot's side of the argument to come to 
terms with the rise of critical theology and the complexity of religious 
belief. 
It is this emphasis on the dynamic of faith, on the place of liter-
ature and its insights and methods in theology's own metamorphosis, which 
characterises R W B L'ewis's plea that we 'Hold on Hard to the Huckle-
berry Bushes'. By this he means th,at we should not organise works 
according to their degree of awareness of Original Sin as Randall Stewart 
does (39) before the work itself has been examined in its own terms, in 
its "actual ingredients and the inner movement and growth" (40) of its atti-
tudes and insights. This emphasis is designed to allow for the transform-
ation of Christianity, above all by the change of focus from elements 
which are propositional and doctrinal to those experiencial and religious. 
Lewis compares Emerson's transformation of the idea of evil to August-
ine's reformulation of it as non-being, an absence of good. But it was 
not conscious. 
"Emerson did not knowingly aim at the restor-
ation of anything: except of the soul's fresh 
and immediate perception of certain aspects of 
the universe, getting rid of the linguistic and 
institutional clutter in which those aspects 
had gone stale, and relating them anew to the 
i~stant of experience .... the voice of a man 
disentangling the Idea from the historical 
record of it ..• and arriving by mistake at the 
very heart of some ancient doctrine long since 
smothered by Calvinism". (40) 
There seems to be some confusion, here, between the idea of a writer 
exploring without preconditions the world his 'soul' perceives and the 
theologian (or even the historian) translating ancient religious dogma into 
modern idiom. The former is open-ended and creative, the latter is 
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bound by strict methodological rules. Furthermore, it may be that to dis-
entangle the Idea from its historical record is to substitute Platonic cat-
egories for properly Christian ones, for Christianity may be essentially 
inseparable from its story which is also its history. However, since he 
speaks of the author "arriving by mistake" at the heart of an ancient 
doctrine the metaphor of translation is inappropriate to describe the work 
. of the author, even though the critic may discern in the finished work a 
reformulation. 
There is, in Lewis, great confidence in the religious character of 
literature. He uses the same terms as Buckley. The religious sense is 
conv,eyed by "intensifying the human drama to the moment where it gives 
j' 
off intimations of the sacred". (41) But clearly, here, the religious or 
sacred is seen as an extension ('intensification') of the human; it has 
largely replaced doctrine which is seen as little more than the cultural 
expression of a previous age's religious experience. 
The essence of Buckley and Lewis here is that literature may ret-
ain its own disciplinary integrity, not being suppressed into servility by 
the weight of religious dogma but able to contribute to theology some-
thing that is.inherently of value and that theology actually needs. The benefit 
of this is that literature may be valued as itself, and Christian and non-
Christian critics may stand side by side in this: to treat literature as 
religion, on the other hand, is to deny the validity of the non-Christian 
critical stance. Thus Louis Martz draws a close analogy between p<;>etry 
and meditation which "points towards poetry in its use of images, in its 
technique of arousing the passionate affections of the wiH" (42) and "in 
techniques of self-dramatization". (43) Equally, for Eric Heller poetry is 
a vindication of the worth and value of the world, of life and of human 
experience: "At heart all poetry is praise and celebration", (44) Both of 
these are examples of perspective that treat literature as something else 
in establishing its religious signifi<:ance. Secular critics and artists are 
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excluded from this account. Buckley and Lewis, however, in granting the 
integrity of literature as literature, include the whole range of critical 
approaches in their own terms, although they may give a different value 
to the insights these approaches produce. Surely it is a crucial thing 
that in describing the relations of literature and theology the definition 
of literature involved should be one to which all those taking part in it 
can subscribe. 
The degree to which this requirement is violated is evident in 
Nathan Scott's confused and often contradictory essay. He begins with 
the nature of a poet. Abb~ Bremond in Priere et Poesie argues that 
poetry is a sort of mystical apprehension propelling the poet towards 
Transcendence, passing through prayer to the Divine Presence. This gives 
poetry significance only in its non-literary consequences, and falls into the 
Affective Fallacy of Wimsatt and Beardsley. (45) Nor is the poet an 
expert in vision. He is first and foremost a certain kind of maker: as 
Rosalind Murray expresses it, the poet "is never, in fact, saying 'Speak, 
Lord, for they servant heareth' but always 'Tell me something that I can 
make use of"'. (46) 
From the notion of poet as maker he attempts to outline what we 
might understand as the religious nature of the making. In the tradition 
of late Kantian thought (in E Cassirer, W M Urban, Susan Langer, 
P Wheelwright) the imagination reaches 'intentively' beyond experience to 
contemplate what that experience symbolises ·or means. According to 
Cassirer man is therefore the 'animal symbolicum', inhabiting not only a 
worlc! of facts but also· of arts, myths and religions "which give signifi-
cant forms to the mind". And yet to establish that man is by nature 
symbolic (that is to say, creates and recognises symbols) is not to ack-
nowledge any ontological status to the symbol but merely to give insight 
into the particular imagination of which it is an expression. 
Secondly, Scott argues that in revelling in the raw concreteness of 
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reality man encounters the 'otherness' of things wilich provokes the aware 
-ness of "being placed m a universe whose ontological amplitude does not 
already lie within the depths of man himself but entails, rather, dimen-
sions of Transcendence". (47) This appears to be a refinement of Platon-
ism, that otherness implies and evokes the Other. 
Thirdly, he emphasises the difference between scientific interest in 
generalities and poetic interest in the radically specific and individual 
only apparently to dissolve it with the contention that poetry eventually 
achieves vision of what Hegel called 'the concrete universal'. "It is this 
habit that poetic art has", he continues, "of dwelling upon the inter-· 
relationships, the clusters of analogy among things, that makes it essen-
tially symbolic". (48) Thus; for Scott, poetry (besides man) is by nature 
symbolic, and God is laid within man's grasp by the power of analogy. 
Furthermore, poetry shows "how deeply resemblance and analogy are char-
acteristic of reality itself". (48) Thus, even reality becomes, by nature, 
symbolic. 
He continues: "the ontological dimension in other words to which 
poetic experience belongs is the dimension of depth". (48) To know our-
selves 'spoken to' by that depth is very nearly to be in the situation of 
prayer. Thus it i~ evident that Scott can only acknowledge the religious 
nature of literature by evaluating it as something else. It is significant 
that he chooses Hopkins' understanding of 'inscape' to illustrate what he 
means by the dimension of depth. Hopkins' eyes are not uncommitted 
when he ·examines the phenomena of the world. He interprets what he 
sees but his interpretation differs from that of Sartre who looks . as 
· closely and deeply at contingency without approaching a state of prayer. 
Thus, when ·Scott calls the depth of perception involved in literature "a 
threshold" or "the borderland of something more" it is because he has a 
prior commitment to the existence of that dimension. 
In conclusion he contrasts the nihilism of the modern literary vision 
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with the Christian gospel where man is "trailing clouds of glory". It is 
to be suspected that he focusses on this aspect of Christianity to allow 
his earlier arguments about symbolism to have maximum effect. He 
refers to glory as a Creation ordinance because man is made in the 
image of God and, as Augustine has it, is turned towards God. Despite 
the contingencies of nature and the relativities of history, "through 
. reason and memory and imagination he can surmount himself and his 
world and is driven therefore by the inner dynamism of his nature to-
wards a transcendent norm". (49) Thus reason, memory and imagination 
are seen as the glory given to man in creation, making him in the image 
of God and being the source of his ability to perceive God. But in ref-
erring to 2 Corinthians 3:18 - "transfigured from glory to glory" - he 
employs also the idea of glory given in Redemption, for the passage to 
which he refers is focussed very clearly on the ministries of the Church 
and particularly of the Spirit in distinction from what existed before 
these ministries. Thus, when he says "to be human is, in short, in the 
Christian sense of reality, to be stamped by and bear the imprint in 
oneself of the glory of God" (49) he refers to man as understood in 
Creation and Redemption. It is hardly surprising, then, that when faced 
with modern literature Scott calls for a baptism of the imagination. 
Since he does not elaborate on it we must understand 'baptism' in its 
normal sense as an entry into the Church and into possession of the 
Spirit's perspective of glory. 
In summary, therefore,· Scott urges us not to "go back to religious 
dogma, nor to. submit to secular nihilism but to baptize the imagination 
to conceive the Transcendent afresh. If we take 'baptize' in its loosest 
sense as 'incorporate into the Church' then ·it seems that the imagination 
is to be given the task of providing a new substance to the Church's 
conceptions and faith. But we may ask by what token has the· imagin-
ation this power and how are the fresh conceptions of the modern 
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imagination to be reconciled with the historical nature of the faith? Has 
it not become a new faith? And has he not already argued that the poet 
is not to be understood primarily as an expert in vision? If, on the other 
hand, we accept the stricter understanding of baptism as defined in the 
liturgy or the confessions of the Church as entry into a historical Church 
and faith in which a real death and new life are experienced then we are 
. contemplating the gift to the imagination of structures and patterns with 
which to conceive (albeit freshly) whatever comes within the imaginat-
ion's grasp. But the imagination alone cannot be baptized: it is the 
whole man who becomes a Christian. Thus Scott appears to be proposing 
that, all men become Christians in order that literature may function as 
he has described it (which is the legacy of Eliot). 
We have here, then, a Christian theory of literature that satisfies 
the Christian. Man is a symbol-maker, the poet is by nature a symbol-
maker, symbols are at the heart of reality itself, and to the Christian 
they will be symbols of that Christian meaning to which he has commit-
ted himself. But to others, what symbols there are may have other 
meanings or none and there may even be no symbols at all but only con-
tingency. The poet is, indeed, therefore, a maker and not a visionary, 
for vision and interpretation are prior to the literary work. Literature 
may, indeed, as Scott suggests, be a confrontation with otherness, but 
whether it carries the presence of God, the Ultimately Other, or the 
simple nausea of otherness, is not the function of literature to determine. 
Nathan Scott's view is exclusively a Christian one, largely un-
acceptable to the rest of the literary community. . The value of· Hillis 
Miller's clear focus on the nature of modern literature is that it falsi-
fies nothing and excludes no-one but offers a possible ground of contact 
in the close proximity of the concepts of Immanence and Being. He 
begins by contrasting modern poetry with the dualism of Romanticism? 
In the latter the realms of heaven and earth, natural and supernatural, 
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are sharply divided, and man as subject regards everything else as the 
object of his mind's knowledge. The supersensible world is to be reached 
by bringing together subject and object in poetry. During the nineteenth 
century God seemed to have withdrawn and in the twentieth he seems 
to be non-existent. Man now gives his own arbitrary value to things and 
nihilism reigns. But if it is to be transcended man needs to leap into 
the concreteness of the world as into something he has not made. This 
requires an abnegation of wi11 that is an effacement of the ego to enable 
things to be as they are in the integrity of their presence. Involved in 
this is the abandonment of depth both spatial and theological and a dist-
anci,ng of mind from mind. This isolation of the ego makes the conflict 
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of subjectivities the theme of modern fiction and the gulf within the mind 
hides the deep, buried self. 
"The disappearance of dimensions of depth in 
twentieth century art provides special diffi-
culties for someone trained in the habits of 
Romanticism. An abstract expressionist paint-
ing does not 'mean' anything in the sense of 
referring beyond itself in any version of trad-
itional symbolism. It is what it is ... " (50) 
The new poetry, Miller argues, is "not ideas about the thing but the 
thing itself" (50), and the French 'new novel' has little psycholog-
ical depth. 
"If any spiritual power can exist for the new 
poetry it must be an immanent presence. There 
can be for many writers no return to the trad-
itional conception of God as the highest exist-
ence 1 creator of all other existences, trans-
cending his creation as well as dwelling within 
it. If there is to be a God in the new war ld 
it must be a presence within things and not 
beyond them", (50) 
The elision, here, of a literary preoccupation With Being and theological 
replacement of the propositional by the existential offers a common philo-
sophical vocabulary. The insights· of both disciplines are brought into 
contact in ways that do not falsify them but offer the possibility of 
mutual comprehension. and contribution. 
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d) The Interpretation of the Syrnbol 
We have already noticed in Nathan Scott how the Christian critic 
can make use of the idea of symbol to construct a Christian account of 
literature. From a conservative angle Preston Roberts attempts to relate 
the function of the symbol with the central dynamics of his Christian 
faith. He describes a symbolic nature as the primary feature of a 
Christian play. Resisting exclusive realism on one hand and exclusive 
aHegory on the other a Christian play "presents what is actual in this life 
with what is possible for it" (51) in "a real fusion and discrimination of 
events and meanings in such a way that the meanings of this life are 
represented as iJlustrated within the events of this life and in such a way 
that the events of this life are presented as exemplifying the meanings 
of this life". (51) Greek dualism is overcome by 
"the radical character of God 1 s Immanence and 
Transcendence; by the radical character of 
man's freedom, guilt and sin; and by the radi-
cal character of the redemption and damnation 
which occur within life and history. A harmony 
between the events of life and the meanings of 
life is possible in principle by virtue of 
God 1 s immanence, is sometimes lacking in fact 
by virtue of man's capacity for guilt and sin, 
and yet is realized in fact at certain points 
and moments by virtue of that redemption which 
can come of conjunctions between the transcen-
dent working of God 1 s grace and man's faith" 
(51) 
There is a danger, here, that the doctrine of the sy.mbolic 
nature of literary reality will give the dogmatic Christian a key to 
interpret every literary work in terms of his own metaphysical or spirit-
ual system, thus losing ,the integrity of the work. Roberts is clearly one 
of those whose literature is not epistemologically a, part of their theol-
ogy: theology for him is a body of doctrine which has certain implications 
for· the literary discipline but remains autonomous. Thus he argues that 
a Christian tragedy is both possible and necessary, possible because there 
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is no inner contradiction between Christian theology as a kind of story 
and dramatic tragedy as a kind of literary form, an9 necessary because 
there is no other way by which Christian theology and dramatic tragedy 
can rise to their full and proper heights. "Dramatic tragedy deepens the 
deeper side of Christian theology, and Christian theology deepens the 
deeper side of dramatic tragedy". (52) Clearly the relationship between 
the two dicip1ines9 one of deepening, confirms them in what they already 
are but is given no opportunity to develop them beyond that nor to 
change them. However, he is certain that they are so complementary 
as to make it impossible for either to achieve its own fulness except with 
the other. Thus literature is set unhesitatingly in a metaphysical doctrin-
al hinterland and theology is tied to the use of the creative imagination. 
Yet it must be said that on the one hand this kind of 'programmatic' 
literature which he outlines in detail becomes something of a blue-print 
that threatens to stifle that very creativeness· without which literature 
cannot 'deepen' theology, and on the other hand the creative imagin-
ation's part in theology is so limited to 'deepening' and not exploring 
that it can give little of its immense promise to the theological enter-
prise. 
This approach does not only risk distortion of the literary work but 
it is forced methodologically to ignore that modern literature which 
resists symbolism in an attempt to describe mere contingency. For Tom 
Driver, however, the symbolic has been utterly lost in our society. It is 
not only that our cultural fragmentation precludes the social cohesion of 
common values, symbols and myths that can produce the shared response 
0 
that is at the heart of drama but that between a prevailing positivism 
arid its counter-tendency of ethereal spirituaJity (which is fantasy) we 
have lost the middle ground in which the actual world bears symoolic and 
;analogical meaning. Thus, the play, in which the symbol is a nec:essary 
eleme'rlt of the. form, yields .to the novel whose form red!J~es the sytnbolic 
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to the casual. The theatre is no longer in the Greek sense the 'Place of 
Seeing', a Temple, but has become a shop. 'Authentic existence' tends to 
mean only that of the individual, now. For its part theology has pushed 
history towards myth when there is no adequate way to understand myth 
philosophically. All of this is the background to what Driver calls the 
loss of the histrionic, by which he means plot, story, character, finite 
. space and ritual form. Yet for Driver the very 
"roots of theology lie in the Biblical witness 
to the divine activity and in the religious 
experience of the community of faith created 
by that activity. Thus both the Biblical and 
the ecclesiastical understandings of god have 
largely been shaped by elements that are if not 
identical with the histrionic at least parallel 
to it and consonant with it. Since modern 
experience is increasingly out of touch with 
that histrionic quality the principle concepts 
of theology are gradually eroded of their cog-
nitive content". (53) 
He is thinking of such concepts as creation, sm, incarnation, redemption, 
salvation and providence which were never oriented to scientific modes of 
understanding but to anthropological ones, relying on 
"man's sense of himself as an occupant of 
space, an actor in ritual, one capable of going 
out of himself by imaginative reach and return-
·ing to himself by the incorporation of his 
imaginative adventure. The loss of the hist-
rionic creates a quandary for theology because 
it tends to render of no credit the content of 
the theological vocabulary and syntax". (53) 
Here, because theology ·is conceived as an unchanging datum, being 
tied to certain concepts and vocabulary, Driver is very gloomy about the 
possible continuance of theology and of drama and even of man himself. 
But change need not imply evaporation: there seem to be two broad 
metaphors employed to manage it creatively. The first is of translation; 
in which the essential content remains the same but is communicated 
freshly. The second is evolution, in which even the content may be 
transmuted in accordance with certain rules of continuity. The former 
tends towards absolutism and idealism, the latter towards functionalism. 
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In the former art ranges from decoration to interpretation; in the latter 
it may have an epistemological function. Beyond the metaphor of evol-
ution is the finding of 'what wiii suffice' which may pay little attention 
to what has gone before. 
Both Roberts and Driver~ then~ see the symbolic nature of literature 
as the point of connection with theology. One is hopeful in consequence 
and the other despairs, but neither establishes a satisfactory relationship 
between the two disciplines. There is, however~ a more positive method 
which considers the nature of human thought and experience. IngJi James 
and Walter Ong iHuminate the concept of 'person'. James argues that 
the Greek mind was biased to the universal, to ousia, but that in the 
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first four centuries of Christianity there developed a greater understand-
ing of 'person'. This personal experience requires dialogue because it is 
a mystery. It eludes monologue~ labels and clear rational discourse and 
needs metaphor~ analogy and paradox~ qualities that had seemed to the 
Greek mind a dangerous perversion and failing of language. "The old 
Rhetoric treated ambiguity as a fault in language and hoped to confine 
or diminish it; the new Rhetoric sees it as an inevitable consequence of 
the power of language and as an indispensible means of most of our 
important utterances". (54) A poem is autonomous~ he contends, because 
our deepest experiences are profoundly personal and can only be embodied 
in the oblique, indirect methods of imaginative literature: literature is 
autonomous, then, in the same way that a person is autonomous. 
Walter Ong is anxious to balance the modern focus on the auton- · 
omous work of art itself with a personalist suggestion, since, he argues, 
a work frays out in many ways into personalities; characters are psycho-
analysed, autobiographical elements are detected, works are grouped 
together, creative periods are categorised. The critical activity, he sugg-
ests, is dependent on the person-to-person situation since man's deepest 
orientation is personal. This is clearly the surfacing of a submerged 
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Christian a priori in Ong's position: man cannot give himself in love 
except to a person. A literary work, he contends9 is not only an object 
but a surrogate for a person - "anything that bids for our attention in an 
act of contemplation ts a surrogate for a person". (55) He goes on, "in 
the last analysis, as a matter of full, serious protracted contemplation 
and love it is unbearable for a man or a woman to be faced with any-
thing less than a person". (56) 
It may be that this· concept of person, especially in this exalted 
tone, is one of those ideas dear to Christian history and doctrine but 
which finds less than total acceptance outside, for it is part of the sug-
gestion or assumption of some modern art and criticism that this personal 
dimension is absent. Thus the rule of contingency exiles the concept of 
'person': contingency rules precisely because 'Person' has been lost. 
Implicit in Ong's position, therefore, is the assumption that a literature 
of contingency is less than the fullest that literature or man himself can 
achieve. 
What neither James nor Ong has quite pointed out is that literature 
is not only an act of contemplation but of imaginative empathy. I be-
come Othello for a while in some sense, so that any existence he has is 
within me. That communion is an interpersonal one and needs the per-
sonal language James speaks of. To that extent Ong does not require an 
a priori assumption about man's deepest orientation being personal since 
the literary enterprise itself functions on the personal level. Ultimately, 
then, it is pre-eminently James' notion of the language that is appropriate 
to the personal that survives from this potentially. theological insight. It 
has very great significance for theology and for literature: theology· may 
not escape the kind of ambiguities and paradoxes which literature may 
present to it and literature cannot hide in a doctrine of autonomy from 
the religious significance of human words and meanings. This was the 
conclusion of our discussion of the problem of belief. 
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in the light of these insights on the language appropriate to the 
concept of 'person' we may move to the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and 
in particular to hermeneutics. He reflects on the phrase 'the symbol 
gives rise to thought' from the position of a philosopher. Philosophy is 
not possible without presuppositions and a radical beginning in philosophy 
must be won. Thus it has recourse to the archaic, the nocturnal, the 
oneiric as the birthplace of language: we start from the fulness of our 
language as heirs of philology, exegesis, phenomenology of religion and 
psychoanalysis of language. Thus, as we use the symbol as a starting-
point for our thinking, if it is not an allegory we shall need an interpret-
ation that respects the original enigma of the symbols and begins from 
there to form the meaning in the full responsibility of autonomous 
thought. There exists nowhere a symbolic language without hermeneutics: 
though the immediacy of belief in the symbol has been lost we aim at a 
second naivety, which is that by interpreting we may hear again. "Thus 
it is in hermeneutics", Ricoeur argues, "that the symbol's gift of meaning 
and the endeavour to understand by deciphering are knotted together". (57) 
The hermeneutic circle is the religious one, that we must believe in order 
to understand and understand in order to believe. On the one hand the 
interpreter never gets near to what his text says unless he lives in the 
aura of the meaning he is inquiring after. As Bultmann says, all under-
standing, like all interpretation "is continually oriented by the manner of 
posing the question" (57), is always directed by a prior understanding of 
what it pursues. The presupposition, therefore, of all understanding is 
the vital relation of interpreter to the thing about which the text speaks. 
This is not psychological coincidence but 'kinship of thought' with the 
thing in question. On the other hand, being can no longer speak to us 
under the form of pre-critical, immediate belief but only as the second-
ary immediacy of hermeneutics, as post-critical equivalent of pre-critical 
hierophany. 
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It is possible, Ricoeur argues, to remain within the symbolic mode 
as comparative phenomenology does and understand symbols through 
symbols. This breaks with "explicative and reductive" thinking in its dis-
covery of the multiple intentions of each symbol, the analogies between 
myths and rites and the levels of experience unified by the symbol. 
Eliade's work functions in this way, placing the symbols in a whole which 
is homogeneous but vaster and which forms a system. However, in such 
understanding of symbols in symbols the question of truth is unceasingly 
eluded. 
"Although the phenomenologist may give the name of truth to the 
inte~nal coherence, the systematicity of the world of symbols, such truth 
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is truth without belief ... from which one has expelled the question: do I 
believe that? what do I make of these symbolic meanings, these hiero-
phanies? That question cannot be raised as long as one remains at the 
level of comparativism, running from one symbol to another, without 
onesself being anywhere It has been necessary to enter into a pass-
ionate, though critical relation with the truth-value of each symbol". (58) 
Thus the mythical space is read from a certain point of view, it is an 
'oriented space'. 
The philosopher, however, seeks to transcend this adoption of one 
point of view, to begin to think no longer ~ symbols but with the symbol 
as starting point, as a wager that greater understanding will be achieved 
by symbolic thought. Creative interpretation of symbols does not simply 
increase self-awareness since every symbol is finally a hierophany, a 
manifestation of the bond between man and the sacred. The symbol 
therefore speaks to us as "an index of the situation of man at the heart 
of the being in which he moves, exists and wills". (59) Thus, 'know thy-
self' does not primarily refer to structures of reflection (self-awareness) 
but to structures of existence (being). (59) 
It is clear that Ricoeur is not speaking here primarily of literature 
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but of a certain approach to philosophy. Nevertheless, there are certain 
important elements of the analysis that may contribute to our understand-
ing of the literary enterprise. The first might be addressed to those who 
argue that it is possible by literary skill and vision to pierce to the 
objective essence of things independently of beliefs and presuppositions. 
Ricoeur argues that presuppositions are implicit in language itself and in 
the seeing eye. Secondly, we cannot have symbolic language without 
hermeneutics: that which concerns the kind of meaning and significance 
which symbols carry only releases its meaning by interpretation. Further-
more, though within the work the symbol may relate to the symbol in its 
own, terms we must enter into a passionate, though critical relation with 
the truth-value of each symbol. We read from a point of view: For us 
it is an 'oriented space'. Thus we must reject phenomenology, which 
arose to combat explicative and reductive thinking, and which set symbols 
in a vaster system without taking a stand in relation to them. Literature, 
therefore, both in the writing and the reading is 'oriented': just as 
Ricoeur's symbolic thought is a wager that he will achieve greater under-
standing through symbols so literature is a hypothetical mode (60) which 
does not take any particular points of view as absolute, indeed, seeks to 
refine and exchange them, but cannot function absolutely without them in 
what Ricoeur calls "the exile of the remote and disinterested spectator". 
(58) Rather, as Ricoeur suggests in his title, the symbol, or we might 
add literature itself, gives rise to thought, which is to say that the ac:t 
of reading or hearing or seeing, which has its own character and method-
ology, finally stands in relation to other non-literary human elements and 
methodologies: as a literary experience Ka~ka's The Trial evokes for me 
the depths qf existential guilt but, as relate it to many other of my 
experiences of despair, anxiety and fear, it helps me to know better the 
meaning of sin. The Christian and the non-Christian critic may therefore 
make exactly similar readings of the novel and yet interpret it in relation 
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to different assumptions, for though literature is read as itself it can 
never contain its own meaning exhaustively but must be interpreted by 
that which is outside it. 
Finally, two elements of Ricoeur's analysis support this analogy 
with literature. Firstly, he says we need to respect the original enigma 
of the symbol and not treat it as allegory. This is the essence of liter-
. ary understanding. Secondly, the need to believe in order to understand 
and yet understand in order to believe is equally descriptive of the 
literary process. 
In speaking of symbolic meaning, however, the concrete that refers 
away to religious significance must not establish a Platonic dualism bet-
ween the ideal world of forms and the real world. Christianity empha-
sises the redeemed or redeemable nature of a11 contingency: natural life 
matters. Something is a symbol, therefore, not in virtue of what it is 
alone but in virtue of the eyes that see through a certain perspective of 
faith and are prompted to 'thought'. 
This focus on the hermeneutics of the symbol is taken up by 
Hopper. He reflects on what the breaking of the conceptual mirror of 
the West might involve. Despite what he calls the charismatic dead 
weight of scholastic, supranaturalistic literalism of language and method 
in the early work and influence of Barth he argues that theology has been 
edging into Auerbach's 'figural interpretation' and that where symbols 
function hermeneutics becomes important. He cites Carl Michalson's dis-
cussion (61) of whether theology is really the hermeneutical analysis of 
being or whether such an ontological hermeneutic is unsuited to a radic-
ally historical faith because in theology the· question of the historical 
form of God's word will be given priority over the question of its being. 
But, Hopper contends, we are speaking metaphorically of 'historical form' 
and 'God's Word', for otherwise we would still be thinking scholastically, 
literalistically, metaphysically. The failure of our formulae, he suggests, 
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releases us to retrieve Being. What kind of language IS appropriate to a 
fundamental ontology but a language that does not commit objectific-
ation? Thus he is led to assert the primacy of metaphor - "Everything' is 
only a metaphor; there is only poetry" (62) - which, from a propositional, 
metaphysical point of view, implies that the nature of reality is hidden 
and must be grasped in perspectival and contextual modes, mythically, 
metaphysically and symbolically. 
Two paradoxes flow from this. Firstly, according to Dilthey every 
part of a work requires the whole to make it intelligable, yet the whole 
by which we manage the interpretation of the parts must itself be built 
up by careful scrutiny of the parts. Secondly, according to Heidegger, 
"Any interpretation which is to cbntribute understanding must already 
have understood what is to be interpreted". (63) Thus the truth that 
must be unconcealed is structurally rooted in the understanding which 
interprets. 
There are two implications that arise from this argument. To 
model theological hermeneutics on literary hermeneutics in this way does 
not escape the idea that although the truth is intrinsic to and inseparable 
from the metaphors which contain it it cannot be 'unconcealed' except by 
an act of interpretation. Secondly, that interpretation is an active not a 
passive process, a constructive participation in the creation of meaning 
which is subjective as well as objective: literature is only 'true' for me 
as it finds an answering spark of assent within me, and religio·us faith is 
a laying of hands to the plough. This is the substance of Trinitarian 
episte"mology, that God is indeed intrinsically in Christ, but we need the 
Holy Spirit to reveal it to us before we can see it. There is a circular-
ity to this process that answers to our understanding of how, in response 
to literature, we both contribute to the literary enterprise and receive 
from it, we bring our knowledge of how things are in the world and we 
have that understanding enriched and extended. 
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Thus investigation of the symbol has involved analysis of the nature 
of our knowledge of ourselves and of our world and has therefore empha-
sised the role of the reader or audience in the literary process. But the 
great advantage of the perspective is that the literary work is allowed to 
be itselfj and that the same theory of literature that satisfies the Christ-
ian critic does not alienate the secular critic. Furthermore9 it emphasises 
. the importance of literature to theology not as an expendable appendage 
of illustration or amplification but as a human way of knowing. 
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e) The Implicit 'Normativity' of the Christian Perspective 
Finally, we may consider ·Amos Wilder's contribution as in many 
ways an excellent summary of some of the concerns of this debate, but 
ultimately as an example of the Achilles heel of the issue, the 'normat-
ive' Christian perspective. 
He assumes that aU artistic assessments have presuppositions and 
that a Christian criticism can only be like a Marxist or some other criti-
cism distinguished by its perspective. On the other hand he hopes that 
the current interdisciplinary exploration might encourage the Church to 
shake off asceticism and bad taste, to alert it to modern letter~, to 
enable it to repossess its religious tradition and to renew its language. 
Contemporary culture relativizes critical orthodixies, he argues, opening 
interpretation to interdisciplinary resources and 
"a total anthropological and linguistic 
approach. Literary criticism has had to take 
account of new explorations of the whole 
phenomenon of language, not only in the 
global sense of comparative literature and the 
history of genres, and not only in the socio-
psychological dimension of the study of myth 
and symbol, but more fundamentally in all that 
has to do with the correlation of language ~nd 
reality". (64) 
In this crucible of language and sensibility we must examine present 
witnesses, he suggests, but not in isolation from the past. In the 
end he says, returning to his original comments, we judge as we 
see things, and as a Christian it is necessary continually to repossess 
what it is to be a Christian without abandoning it. The tension for 
the Christian critic is therefore on one hand not to violate proper method 
by a prior dogmatic, and on the other to maintain a cutting edge and 
not to be unsure of his base. The heart of Wilder's argument is that life 
attitudes cannot be separated from aesthetic judgements. For our part 
we must engage with the language of our contemporaries; for it is not 
enough to have a stance or perspective. On the other hand, 
although the Christian view of the world carries assumptions that are 
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widely held to be incredible today, such matters cannot be excluded 
as extra-aesthetic unless we give the arts that autonomy which only ends 
in the arts being credited eventually with a sacred character. "Life and 
language", he argues, 
"at whatever level cannot finally evade or deny 
the dimension of the sacred aesthetic 
criticism cannot stop short of a total critic-
ism and such ultimate sanctions should be as 
explicit as possible". (65) 
In his reading the Christian will ask first, of course, is it adequately 
rendered? But he will also recognise what faith knows from its extra-
aesthetic wrestling. 
The implicit normativity of a Christian perspective, however, be-
comes evident when Wilder stresses the Christian contribution to literary 
criticism of a wider context than the contemporary alone. A Christian 
necessarily looks backward into history for the source-facts of his faith 
and though Wilder urges him to repossess his faith in the face of modern 
questions it is clear that this involves continuity with the past and not 
renunciation of it. It is with this perspective that Wilder faces the rad-
ical innovation of modern criticism and suggests the Christian virtue of 
continuity. It is organic to his perspective, but it may not be so for his 
non-Christian contemporaries for whom the view that the past is a dis-
torting and stifling consciousness may be both cogently and sincerely 
argued. Wilder's presupposition about continuity rules out a certain exist-
entia! perspective which may be both sensitively perceived and inherently 
valuable. But this is Wilder's confession of presupposition, which, he 
claims, a Christian will necessarily assume: "There are, more permanent 
aspects of man than are evoked in our modern classics". (66) Involved in 
thi~ confession is the conservative critical stance that though fashions of 
criticism "may see the writing on the wall at the feast of Belshazzar 
they are not able to decipher it". (66) But Wilder does not allow the 
possibility that it may be less the ability to decipher that is lacking than 
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the ability to find a certain interpretation valid or the willingness to 
accept it. Thus9 like so many Christians in this field 9 he confuses a 
difference of vision with a failure in technique. 
Wilder is very ready to argue that life attitudes cannot be separ-
ated from aesthetic judgement although he does not make clear what the 
nature of the connection might be. Does he 9 for example, accept the 
terms of Eliot's judgement that literature must first be analysed as liter-
ature before criticism is · 'completed' by religious and moral discrimin-
at ion? Does what Wilder calls aesthetic judgement include the religious 
orthodoxy of a work or is a religious assessment something that super-
venes upon an aesthetic analysis? This kind of distinction is suggested 
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by Wilder's comments that the Christian will ask, first, if it is 'adequate-
ley rendered' before including his extra-aesthetic insights. Yet it is diffi-
cult, if life and language inevitably involve the sacred as he claims, to 
see how literary adequacy and religious probity can be separated even 
procedurally. 
It is important in this area of discussion to appreciate quite how 
vital a part is played by the idea of literary autono~y. "Literary criti-
cism has its own sophisticated and scrupulous procedures; yet all such 
rightful autonomy can only be penultimate". (65) Critic after critic in 
this field attacks this idea of literary autonomy for two reasons, both of 
which Wilder adequately voices here. Firstly, in principle it is irreligious 
and idolatrous: it ends in literature "being credited after all with a relig-
ious or sacred character". (65) Secondly, it excludes the .kind of refer-
ence out of the literary work to non-literary standards of judgement on 
which those who wish to acknowledge some a priori religious faith dep-
end. Yet what this argument with the spectre of poetic autonomy fails 
to perceive is that those who make a gesture towards autonomy are 
attempting to escape precisely this subjection of literature to external 
standards of truth and value that prevents it from realising its new, 
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developing 9 epistemological function. In fact 9 existentially, those who 
make a gesture towards autonomy are attempting what theology under-
stands as a leap of faith to 'find what wi11 suffice' which, it i's felt 9 can-
not be achieved except in freedom from 'programmatic' thought. Wilder 
himself at the end of his essay outlines the programme: 
the Christian critic "assigns purpose and mean-
ing to the human story and is confident that 
grace operates in the most baffling labyrinths 
of the indiv~dual or of societies The 
Christian reads human experience and judges the 
monuments.of time in terms of the Biblical epic 
and its vision of providential strategies". 
(67) 
He even acknowledges the charge of dogmatism that this might provoke 
but 'proposes to "blunt the charge by moving the discussion to the literary 
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level and by invoking the evidence precisely of the supreme literature and 
literary forms provided by the charters of his faith". (67) But this does 
not blunt the criticism. The 'autonomists' are not unable to appreciate 
'programmatic' literature: they are simply unconvinced by it. Thus there 
are two kinds of sacredness and religious awareness at issue; one is that 
which is anthropo1ogica11y inherent in man's (literary) exploration of the 
meaning of his life and the other is the sacredness of the religious system 
to which a Christian gives a11egiance. It is supremely important that the 
difference between the two should be grasped for there are two things 
that can be said of it. Firstly, non-Christian literature and criticism is 
not a failure of technique but a difference of vision, and therefore its 
literature and criticism are not per se deficient; despite what Christians 
would sometimes like to think literature is not "by sovereignty of nature" 
Christian. Secondly, literature functions differently in each case; for the 
"Christian" it tends to be decorative and must be only an adjunct to his 
faith which serves, 'deepens' and completes it. For the 'autonomist' lit-
erature is for finding out about the world and about man, it is a danger-
ous quest that may lead anywhere. It has not lost contact with the 
world, for that would make it meaningless; it has simply set no limits to 
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what it might discover or to the rules according to which it can conduct 
the exploration. 
This is a very crucial contrast, but as the inverted commas show it 
is unsatisfactory to characterise the opponents with these simple labels. 
In our next chapter we shaH attempt to clarify what is involved. 
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Ch. 2 FAITH IN THE SEARCH 
Conservative and Liberal perspectives 
Three times in Chapter One we became aware of the conflict 
which forms the subject of the present chapter. With reference to the 
problem of belief we saw that religion may be thought of in proposition-
al or creedal terms on the one hand and in terms of 'ultimate concern' 
on the other. ( 1) This distinction is reiterated when those who value 
literature primarily for its technical excellence oppose those who value 
its vision: the former assume possession of religious truth and the latter 
intend pursuit of it. (2) Thirdly, the dispute concerning the autonomy 
of literature is aroused by the same tension: is literature religious only 
according to the degree of its conformity to a particular 'programme' of 
belief or is it free from such constraint? {3) 
Clearly there are a number of different ways in which we can 
formulate the distinction in a preliminary manner. On the one hand 
there is the specificity of dogma (which may or may not be proposition-
al). Religious identity here is defined by the confessional model as 
aUegiance to the truth of a metaphysical system. Such allegiance is 
given on the basis of a 'leap of faith' which invokes a mystical shield 
against the perplexing demands of the mind to understand. However, it 
is precisely these demands which motivate those on the other side of 
the divide. For them, whatever the 'leap. of faith' might be it cannot 
be an evasion of the need for a continuous, systematic world of meaning 
governed by epistemological integrity and inteUectual good faith. In 
this view literature Is a way of knowing, and potentiaUy a handle on 
truth: in the other view it is merely an appendage of illustrative or 
amplificatory value, for there are two worlds, the Christian and the 
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pagan, and literature, being 11 one of Caesar's things11 (4), is per se of 
more value as beauty than as truth. Thus the dogmatic Christians 
possess their faith and the humanists desire to repossess it. There is, of 
course, rigour on both sides. For the former it is a confessional rigour 
whose strengths are clarity and confidence and whose weakness is the 
naivety of its methodological assumptions. For the latter it is an epis-
temological rigour whose strength is the integrity of its continuous 
system of meaning and whose weakness is the perpetual inclination to 
minima1ism. 
Of the books which have been published in 1979 and 1980 only 
Gi1ys Gunn's The Interpretation of Otherness and Leland Ryken's 
Triumphs of the Imagination are works of theoretical and inter-disciplinary 
analysis but for our present purposes they are most useful. Both writers 
stand on opposite sides of the issue we are considering here and being 
prominent protagonists of the American scene they are able, in these 
two recent books, to represent contemporary concerns not only with 
accuracy but with rigour and feeling. 
Ryken's book may best be described as a handbook, not sustaining 
a single thesis but attempting to counter-balance what he feels are pre-
dominantly liberal contributions to the inter-disciplinary debate. It 
addresses the general Christian reader rather than the specialist and 
Ryken displays something of Eliot's sehse of being the representative of 
a certain religious community. In the context of the American debate 
this is significant. The separation of Church and State in America 
drives confessional theology outside the state system of education and 
university courses therefore tend towards liberal and humanist perspect-
ives. Coupled with this there seem to be a large number of fundament-
alist or Evangelical Christians who view the educational enterprise with 
skepticism and yet enroll for at least a part of their studies on courses 
which promise some apparently familiar religious content. (5) Those 
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who teach these courses thus face special problems that we might not 
share in Britain. Furthermore, the Annual Conference of Christianity 
and Literature was originally a very Evangelical news-sheet and is still 
considerably influenced by Evangelical university teachers. Ryken's 
contribution is therefore perhaps more important in terms of the 
American scene than it might seem to be in Britain. It tends to offer 
an account of the place of literature within a Christian's life rather 
than to occupy itself with the theoretical relationships between the dis-
ciplines of literature and theology. But it is important to understand 
that it is not only the ideas of the conservative wing which distinguishes 
the~ from the liberals but the form in which they express themselves, 
which is as revealing. Characteristically, the conservatives ask "how 
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should a Christian treat literature?" and the liberals "how are literature 
and theology related?" 
Ryken is critical of the lack of clarity in much modern theory 
because, of course, he is not sympathetic to the problems which draw 
the more liberal critics into complexities. He is also extremely critical 
of the neglect of the Bible as a source of Christian doctrine and as a 
guide to the uses of literature. He is comparatively certain of his text 
and its meaning whether it is Biblical or literary. His theology is based 
on a firm belief in the inspiration of the Bible and the authoritative 
status of its teaching considered in an uncomplicated, Evangelical sense. 
Because the Bible is his depository of truth he expects less truth than 
beauty from literature. He is concerned . to reject the equation of 
literature and religion on the basis of resemblances between them: both 
Christianity and literature point beyond the physical to a mystery· but 
literature is not therefore a religious exper-ience, both use signs and 
symbols but literature is not therefore a religious enterprise. He rejects 
the widespread use of the term 'sacramental' and with it the modern 
disposition to the widest possible definition of Christianity and literature 
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to include everything. He quotes Sallie TeSelle that neither the integ-
rity of art nor the specificity of Christianity is taken seriously in much 
of the present debate. Literature, he contends is not a means of 
salvation; it is for the glory of God and for fun. He criticises equally 
the modern concentration on the ideas or content of literature rather 
than on literary form and he finds himself most in agreement with the 
literary theory of Sir Philip Sidney as the foundation of a literary 
aesthetiq consequently he is equally content with T S Eliot. It must be 
said, however, that because of Ryken's polemical stance in the book 
and his commitment to the clarity of one comparatively dogmatic and 
cor;tfident theological position he is unsympathetic to much of the 
thought (and the questions behind the thought) of the current inter-
disciplinary debate. 
There are two things to consider when Ryken says 
"Christianity is a revealed religion based ult-
imately on the Bible, not on people's opinions". 
(6) 
The first is that theological use of the concept of revelation has real 
value and is acknowledged in some way by all those who from any pers-
pective call themselves Christian. Specifically Christian theology is 
oriented: it is not open-ended. The second is a question: how are we 
to separate the Bible from people's opinions? What the Bible says and 
its significance for us is not such a simple matter as Ryken's position 
implies and it is one of the grounds on which the liberals and conserv-
atives differ. It is also very clear that although Ryken stresses so 
heavily- the need to return to the Bible, when we examine the things he 
actually says about it we may find his position both superficial and un-
· critical. He notes that "the clearest evidence of the literary bent of 
Christianity is the Bible" (7) but when he goes on to argue its "pre-
occupation with literary form" (8) he offers no further evidence. The 
fact that it "contains numerous literary forms" is no evidence of 
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"concern with literary form". To the liberal the literary character of 
the Bible signifies something concerning the historical evolution of relig-
ious meaning and even its typical nature: to Ryken it is analogous to the 
lawyer's use of precedent. He goes on to argue that because Paul's 
letters twice (9) and the Acts once (9) use quotations from secular 
literature "the principle that emerges is that the Bible affirms 1 in a 
variety of ways, the value of reading literature". (9) This distillation of 
Biblical principles is1 essentially1 methodologically dishonest since it 
conceals the assumptions of the writer from the searching light of crit-
ical attention. "Whatever the literary problem might be''p reflects Ryken1 
"the Bible usually has something to say about 
it 1 whether direct! y or indirect! y 1 whether by 
doctrine or by example. The critic whose view-
point is Christian should not ignore one of the 
richest sources of answers about the theoretic 
problems of literature". ( 1 0) 
To substantiate this he quotes Roland N Hein's essay A Biblical view of 
the novel which in response to the question 'What has the Bible to say 
to me as a. reader of novels?' deduces five Biblical principles; the worth 
of the novelist's preoccupation with 'the real qualities of human exper-
ience' 1 his 'full and uninhibited probing of the meaning' of human exper-
ience 1 the Biblical archetypal pattern of spiritual quest (that is "all but 
inevitable in any narrative of serious purpose") that leads to illumination1 
solution or meaning within an imagined world, the need for the work to 
validate itself by its own data and finally, the example of Christ as 
'the perfect model for making moral judgements' about the truth or. 
falsehood of a nov.elist's speculations about moral and spiritual exper-
ience and man's relation to God. The first four of these are so general 
as to be unhelpful even if their biblical origins were to be adequately 
demonstrated and· the fifth is simply the dogmatic veto. The essential 
point is that though the distilJation of Biblical principles in this way 
seems to be based on argument it obeys no adequate rules of evidence; 
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there is nothing which might serve to disprove any particular conclusion. 
The epistemological naivety of this view is again apparent in 
Ryken's use of the word 'truth'. He acknowledges that all literature 
contains ideas 
"but only a small part of the corpus of liter-
ature contains truth. In other words most 
literature has not presented a Christian view of 
reality". (11) 
Here truth is ultimate, .absolute and dogmatic: few writers have proc-
!aimed Christian truth in literature and it is therefore not generally 
a source of truth. There can be no question of the literary vision per 
se piercing through to the perception of truth: truth is revealed Bibli-
cally. On the other hand there is another use of the word: the truth 
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writers give "consists of faithfulness to reality and human experience". 
( 12) As a professor of English Ryken is most anxious to safeguard this 
literary 'truth'. Yet the distinction between the truth of 1i terary obser-
vation and the truth of doctrine is more complex than he acknowledges. 
He is prepared to support the truth of the writer's observation of reality 
but to deny the truth of his world-view if it differs from Christian 
dogma. Yet there can be no neutral observation: the world-view, reality 
and human experience are inextricably bound together. Human insight, 
perhaps expressed in literary form, must either be potentially as truthful 
as religious doctrine and able to stand alongside it and perhaps qualify 
it or, if it must always remain subservient to dogma, it is Jess than 
truth. Literature, he asserts, "offers the possibility of enlarging our 
being" and "has a recognised power to embody universal human exper-
ience". ( 13) How is it that our being may be enlarged but our under-
standing of our religious faith be untouched? . If "great literature offers 
a heightened and clarified vision of reality"'(14) what of the vision which 
is at odds with religious dogma? He is able to acknowledge literature 
as "the most accurate index to human values, longings and anxieties that 
exists" ( 15) only on the basis of a distinction between objective and 
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subjective knowledge: 
"Literature presents reality, not as it object~ 
ively exists, but as it is of concern to 
people". (16) 
And yet it is the constant objection of the liberals that what objectively 
exists cannot be known as Ryken supposes except subjectively. Ryken 
comes close to the issue when he acknowledges that writers "do not 
simply present experience in an objective manner" (17) but have perspec-
tives, opinions and world-views peculiar to themselves. Thus, he argues, 
literature becomes a record of the world-views by which people have 
lived. 
"Such a perspective is important because before 
we can truly understand our own civilisation and 
culture, and even our own world-view, it is 
necessary to know how we got where we are". (18) 
But instead of reflecting on how historical perspective might begin to 
offer new ways of understanding one's religious heritage he preserves 
the absolutist isolation of religion and speaks only of increased ability 
to compare other views with the Biblical view and of a greater sense of 
discrimination. A Christian "world-view is given by God in the Bible" 
and 
"for a Christian, studying the important world 
views increases his sense of discrimination as 
he compares his own Christian world view with 
the world views of literature". (19) 
Thus, finally, 
"a Christian should place every work of liter-
ature on trial, with Christian principles serv-
ing as the jury". (20) 
Thus the naivety of the textual fundamentalist position seems to arise 
from an almost wilful epistemological blindness in matters of religion. 
Giles Gunn's book is one of, those against which Ryken would argue 
because it broadens the issues from theology and literature to religion 
and letters as a whole. Gunn traces and describes the development of 
the religious use of literature and enlarges on Abrams' four character-
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istic forms of meaning in literature. On this foundation he builds a 
relationship between the 'otherness' characteristic of the 'sacred' and 
that 'oth'erness' which literature mediates. By arguing that classic works 
of literature both reflect and form a culture he passes into the broad 
area of culture and mind. Classic literature provides an 'idea of order' 
which helps us to interpret our experience. Through our experience of 
the 'otherness' of great literature we are enabled to reinterpret our 
experience and ourselves~ This transcending of the self by the imagin-
ation of otherness can never save us, Gunn acknowledges, but it can 
make us a little more human. Thus he does not look for the same 
confessional religious meaning within literature that Ryken pursues. 
His theory might be called more organic: it is based on the hermeneut-
leal function of literature for the individual and within society, and it is 
strongly existential. "We are driven back", he concludes, 
"to that in both literature and religion which 
is prior to creed or conviction, to felt possi-
bility and the imagination of desire. Rather 
than arrivihg at something like an expressed 
article of faith or principle of doctrine we 
have been drawn into a mode of experience where, 
in all our unexpectedness, the act of belief 
suddenly becomes again an authentic form of 
response". (21) 
Gunn's opening assumption is that the common ground between 
religion and literature is culture: they are both forms of culture and 
they both use symbols. Clearly this is more 'scientific' than Ryken's 
approach since it is possible to investigate culture and symbols. This is 
important to the liberal who is strongly influenced by empiricism, scien-
tific method and. the need for safe· epistemological ground on which to 
construct hypotheses. Furthermore, Ryken pays no more than lip service 
to. the need for historical perspective, whereas Gunn, in his use of 
Nietzche's Use. and Abuse of History, develops a detailed and reasoned 
analysis of the varying stages of critical concern oVer the relation of 
theology and literature. Nietzsche's three forms of history, antiquarian, 
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monumental and critical, correspond in Gunn's analysis to three genera-
tions of criticism. The first consist of those antiquarians who indiscrim-
inately accept everything cultural as potentially of equal religious signif-
icance and their apparent opposites who preserve continuities by differ-
entiating orthodox inheritance from heretical accretion. The former are 
tbose liberal, pastoral critics who see literature as an index to the times 
and as a challenge to the churches to rethink by showing non-dogmatic 
forms of implicit religion outside. For them nothing human is foreign to 
religion. The latter are conservative, dogmatic critics who, like Ryken 
and Eliot, discuss the definition of a Christian literature and what 
literature Christians ought to read. According to Nietzsche this anti-
quarian perspective betrays a need for 'a rootage in the present which 
preserves the status guo through often indiscriminate veneration of the 
ordinary circumstances of past life. 
To avoid the danger of either extreme it is necessary to develop 
a method and a theological position which can make use of more supple, 
capacious and precise terms. In Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich Gunn 
describes this process. Niebuhr searched for political, social, ethical and 
religious realism to offset Barthian separation of the sacred and the 
profane. As theologian he was less concerned with the theological 
themes of Ryken's analysis (Creation, Atonement, Eschatology) and 
more occupied with practical concerns such as anxiety, the international 
balance of power, the dangers of national pride and the dialectic bet-
ween Jove and justice~ His apologetic intent was to show that the 
Christian faith provides a more adequate interpretation of the problems 
of existence than any other spiritual or religious tradition. His method 
was a cultural and historical analysis of man at war with·· himself. 
This apologetic concern to make clear that Christianity makes sense not 
only because of doctrinal consistency but because it addresses genuine 
human problems is coupled with a certain theologiCal insecurity and a 
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need to justify Christianity itself. Ryken's perspective could never allow 
such a possibility and therefore his historical perspective is condemned 
to wilful blindness on this issue. Niebuhr, however, and Gunn after him, 
face the 'truth' of reality that Ryken would like to espouse, and in the 
wake of the second World War they can face without precondition the 
question about where one might look for the conquest of evil by good: 
instead of telling what to think as Ryken would direct the theologian 
must explore how to think in the face of such overwhelmingly serious 
historical problems. For his part, Tillich posed this question about good 
overcoming evil in a distinctive manner: 
"In the midst of brokenness, distortion and the 
alienation of life where does one find 'the 
courage to be'?" (22) 
For him Christianity became relevant only in the language of classical 
philosophy and ontology: it is a translation for which Ryken never feels 
the need. Like Niebuhr Tillich's method is an analysis of culture as a 
source of theological insight on the basis that although theology alone 
has the answers it must listen very carefully to the questions that come 
from outside itself and attempt to respond in kind. 
This produced what Gunn distinguishes as a second generation of 
scholarship following the impact of Niebuhr and Tillich from 1940 to 
1965. It corresponds to Nietzsche's monumental stage of history in 
which men perpetuate apologetic and correlative models by· searching for 
I 
a usable past to shore up present ruins and reify elements of the past 
to lend greater force and meaning to the works of the present. Apolo-
getic critics demonstrate how ·faith and theology resolve the problems of. 
culture and literature and correlative critics interpret correlations bet-
ween faith and culture, theology and literature. The more liberal of 
these critics (among whom stands Amos Wilder) demonstrate how literat-
ure can inform our understanding of faith and modify and complicate 
belief. Nathan Scott has gone on to consider the demands made by 
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certain modern writers to be considered as religious visionaries~ our 
literary landscape often has a theological horizon because literature 
involves itself relentlessly with those q'uestions with which religious 
faith has traditionally dealt. In other critics like William Lynch the 
apologetic orientation has led to consideration of how theology can 
instruct the literary imagination in its place in the divine economy of 
salvation and redemption. More traditional critics merely use beliefs 
from the Judea-Christian tradition as a hermeneutical key to unlock 
the meaning of a variety of texts, figures and genres. This may be in 
terms of a concept or doctrine like providence, or a theological system 
like Augustinian piety in New England poetry, or a religious movement 
like lgriatian trends of spirituality in metaphysical poetry. Both emph-
ases risk theologiCal imperialism which values literature according to its 
'correctness', the usefulness of its testimony or its paradigmatic gestures 
and they risk historical and religious reductionism when, for example, 
Christ-figures and _atonements lurk around every narrative corner. 
Nietzche's third historical form is critical, born out of suffering 
and the need for deliverance: in the service of the future it questions, 
judges and even condemns an entire historical inheritance. This, Gunn 
suggests, is characteristic of the modern generation, and he describes 
five elements which determine its nature. Firstly, the neo-orthodox 
edifice of Protestant theology (by which he refers to Barth) has been 
replaced by <::ontending conceptual and methodological options: Process 
theology, Death of Cod and other radical theologies, theologies of liber-
-ation, of - hope, of black power, of feminism, of play,_ the Marxist-
Christian dialogue, the new hermeneutics, revived interest in theological 
phenomenology and anthropology, and the new analytical theology 
generated by the language philosophy of Ayer and Wittgenstein. Secom:Uy, 
there has been the discovery of an immense body of scholarship devoted 
to religious aspects of literature from Auerbach and Tillyard to Martz 
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and Wilson which has been fruitful and has made the field respectable. 
Thirdly, connexions with the new materials, concepts and methods of 
cultural anthropology, comparative philology, socio-linguistics, folklore, 
sociology, psychology, ethnology, archeology and semiotics have refocused 
attention on religion as a manifestation of the human race rather than 
as something mystical and supernatural. Fourthly, the old metaphysics 
of substance has lost confidence and credibility: allegiance to revelation 
has been abandoned in favour of radical spiritual honesty. This is the 
trend which Ryken would like to deny. Fifthly, parallel to the collapse 
of theological method and conceptions has come a similar transformation 
in ,literary theory and methods both in reaction against narrow Anglo-
American Formalism and as a result of new ideas and procedures from 
the Continent. Confessional barriers have been broken here too and 
the New Criticism's trinity of poetry, fiction and drama has been repl-
aced with the need to look at all forms from autobiography and history 
to the verbal units of myth and proverb. There is especial consciousness 
of the complexity of the relationship between text and reader in the 
plight of interpretation. As Gunn explains so cogently, the Romantic 
hope ·of sympathetically imagining our way back to the first reader's 
response or even the author's interiority has been destroyed by our 
techniques of accomplishing it. So subtle are our techniques that they 
emphasise the distance ·between us and the original and . some critics 
find a way out by· understanding not the text itself but the experience 
. it generates in the reader. However, it may be that the commitment to 
understand through interpretation is itself a form of belief, an att of 
faith, and we shaH return to this. 
This short summary of Gunn's historical perspective begins to fill 
in the details of the liberal stance, to lay out the building bricks with 
which such a critic must toil to build a cogent understanding. But it 
also demonstrates the nature, seriousness and integrity of the liberal 
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vision. Christianity and literature are elements of a changing world: 
the eye which interprets is itself the child of a particular culture. 
There is to be no avoidance of the fuUest possible examination of every-
thing that is open to the human mind, for i~ is all relevant and the 
greatest critical skill of all is that of self-criticism. The double vision 
of Ryken, Christian and pagan, is alien to this attempt to create a 
single, unified account. Ryken's vision is tied to the dichotomy inherent 
in his metaphysical creed: Gunn's perspective is bound to the unity of a 
single human understanding. 
This unified understanding is not the product of a historical pers-
pec;tive alone but also depends on an ability to examine in an almost 
empirical way (taking its example from the new sciences) exactly what 
is happening, not in order im'l1ediately to assess whether it is right or 
wrong according to an a priori measure but in order to enlarge and 
refine the understanding itself. Thus there is a great range of perspect-
ive to consider from the writer who intensifies his rendering of the 
human story to the point where it gives off 'intimations of the sacred' 
to the writer who makes a religious demonstration by putting his theol-
ogical case in the language of philosophy or literature rather than 
theology, and from the critic who assumes that literature is instructed 
by doctrine or doctrine 'fleshed out' in literature to the critic who 
treats literature as a 'metaphysics made sensible to the heart, expressing 
itself in images'. As a mirror to nature literature may be an index to 
cultural and religious distress, or in the perfection of its formal organ-
ization it may stand against our confused world as an alternative. The 
artist may sacrifice himself to his craft so that its meaning may live in 
a re-enactment of the crucifixion or he may so express his own person-
ality to the extreme as to demonstrate that religious truth is only 
revealed to man under the shadow of ultimacy. Or again he may simply 
pierce to the deepest sources of life as a spokesman for Being itself. 
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All these widely differing assumptions have intelligent and respected 
supporters and, perhaps in a zoological manner, they need observation, 
categorization and systematization. How else shall we understand if we 
cannot accept Ryken's assumptions? 
Gunn builds on Abrams' four categories of literary theory (23) 
because they systematically account for all the elements of a literary 
work, the artist, the audience, the work itself and the world the work 
creates. He examines the inherent possibilities and limitations of each 
orientation. For example, in the semantic orientation's use of symbol we 
come close to that unification of opposites of which the Incarnation 
spe,aks, and archetypes resident in concrete particulars are expressed 
through contextual language that is appropriately soft of focus, paradox-
ical and plurisignative. But the problem is to discuss religious motifs 
without either making literature a surrogate for philosophy and theology 
or reducing religion to any work's dimension of depth or seriousness. 
Having assessed the possibilities .;1nd limitations of religious meaning in 
each orientation he incorporates them into his single theory concerning 
the hypothetical nature of literature. According to this a novel starts 
from the empirical data of experience, and though we recognise that 
what follows is not 'true' it must resonate with our deepest sense of 
ourselves. Thus, with the imitationists it assumes that every work is 
unified by the presiding principle that gives the various parts their 
ordered coherence, with the pragmatists it asserts. that in creating a 
possible world more · than an actual one literature is critical of the 
established world, with the expressionists it· agrees that every work 
springs from or appeals. to our common humanitas thus asserting what is 
ultimately characteristic about life· itself, and with the objectivists it 
acknowledges that nothing in literature is rendered but in words which 
remain the most essential concrete element in every poem, novel or 
play. Essentially therefore great literature takes the known and pushes 
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it into the unknown, enabling us to think and feel other than as we do, 
to erect a larger context of experience within which we may define our 
own. Here is a unified theory, but is there something intrinsically rel-
igious about this conception of literature? Gunn suggests the spiritual 
significance of a work's "commitment to vital possibility", of "our deep-
est sense of ourselves" to which the work appeals for our assent, and of 
our experience of reality in literature as ultimate. But he is only really 
convincing when he describes the otherness which literature mediates. A 
scientist deals in facts, a philosopher in ideas and an artist in feelings, 
he argues. Thus the literary artist's appeal is not to understanding and 
belief but to the wonder, delight and pity of fellowship which evokes the 
solidarity of men. This, he contends, is the basis of the relationship 
between literature and religion. Is this, as Ryken would claim, minimal-
ism in literature and religion? Does not literature deal as much with 
our understanding as our feelings and is not the Christian faith more 
than human solidarity? Or is this merely a step on the way towards a 
redefinition of the concept of love for one's neighbour which forms the 
second strand of the Christian law? 
Gunn's argument, we recall, began with culture. Religion cannot 
be known apart from its various manifestations in history and culture 
and to understand it we must go beyond the religious texts to consider 
the particular kinds of sense-making involved. There :is little consensus 
on the meaning of the word religion: it may range from the 'other' 
which produces wonder (Leuuw), • the Holy derived from experience of the 
numinous (Otto),- Being (Maritain), to a feeling of absolute dependence 
(Schleiermacher), a capacity for concern or commitment (Tillich), a need 
for social stability (Malinowski) or some other subjective capacity 
(Eliade). These are _attempts to define religion by some property of 
human nature or experience. Gunn follows the anthropologists in looking 
for essences and patterns of_ resemblance, and concludes that what 
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typifies the experience of the sacred is the prior claim of 'otherness'. 
Thus there is a parallel between the otherness of the sacred and that 
otherness which literature mediates. It is largely existential: he argues 
that the author's ordering of our response to his work in terms of 
tension and release, involvement and detachment, movement and delay, 
sympathy and disapproval is analogous to a religious experience. The 
writer seeks to realign our affections, to reorder our values and give us 
a new heart, but the 'truth' he aims to uncover is something that has 
less to do with external absolutes than with the integrity of individual 
experience. Thus the two 'truths' to which Ryken refers are inverted in 
pri<;>rity. In Gunn's conclusion literature is religious not because of its 
I 
content but because of its form, not because it tells us something but 
because of the nature of the experience. Belief in the other "becomes 
again an authentic form of response". (24) 
Gunn's analysis, is, of course, only one possible assessment. We 
may think it weak in its sense of the religious: Gunn himself is modest 
about the transcendence of the perimeters of the self by the imagination 
of otherness. "Such knowledge can never save us but it can at least 
make us a little more human by teaching us how to respond both to the 
me we are not and to the me we are". (25) But in its method it is 
consistent. Thus it is the appeal to scientific method, the use of the 
insights. and techniques of many other disciplines, the capacity for self-
consciousness and . the need to define terms and justify judgements which 
characterises the liberal approach. ·And yet it is not the adoption ol a 
certain method alone which constitutes the essential difference ·between 
Gunr'l and Ryken. Ryken stands before the demands of an authoritative 
text and Gunn before the demands of a rigorous method: both have a 
degree of freedom to shape their conceptual universe and a . certain 
bondage· to the dictates of it. There is a prior disposition which makes 
each man able to accept and work within certain ·conceptual horizons. 
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The reasons for these initial alignments are certainly beyond this partie-
ular study. (26) Why men find such different positions satisfactory is 
perhaps the most interesting question of all, but we must confine our-
selves to an awareness of the range of possible positions, their peculiar 
logic and foundations and the points of contact of religion and liter-
ature within each perspective. Gunn has given us his 'hypothetical' 
synthesis of the mimetic, expressive, pragmatic and semantic positions. 
Vernon Ruland gives us an enlightening alternative. (27) 
In an attempt to achieve a balance between on the one hand the 
narrow doctrinal particularity of literature which deals only with Christ-
figvres, sacramental imagery and explicit theological . vocabulary? and on 
I 
the. other hand the vacuous universality of calling literature religious 
whenever it is serious or hopeful, Ruland adopts a functional definition 
of religion. He develops this from Otto's argument that explicit beliefs 
issue ideally in attitudes and behaviour marked by awe, commitment, 
moral seriousness, shuddering and ecstasy. Often, he argues, someone's 
politiCal ideology or characteristic moral style will function more as his 
actual religion than his nominal creedal positions will. Thus, he cone!-
udes, we may understand religion as whatever drive, credo or value 
system lies at the root of such recognizably religious behaviour. In 
this case the religious-literary critic cannot settle into a tidy conven-
tional slot alongside literature and psychology or literature and sociology, 
for religion ·is a quality, atmo$phere or texture in the total meaning of 
a work. 
Having made clear his own position Ruland describes four orien-
tations which characterise literature and religion. The Autotelist persp-
ec.~ive o"f disciplined textual . formalism, logical positivism and biblical 
fundamentalism focusses on the text irrespective. of its human situation. 
Whether we consider semiotic or Russian formalism, the empirical dgour 
of analytical positivism or Ryken's biblical dogmatism there is a very 
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narrow and precise validating principle in this perspective which in the 
service of clarity and purity of method excludes the contributions of 
external sense-making referrents and renders it impregnable~ isolated and 
potentially meaningless. 
The Humanist-Semiotic perspective depends on rhetorical 9 phenom-
enological and hermeneutical methods in investigating the text within its 
human situation. In this perspective the literary text is essentially a 
semiotic unit of discourse and therefore autonomous but it is organically 
related to the wider human tradition of literature and functionally relig-
ious experience. The critic must draw on the full resources of human 
knowledge to construct an ideal cultural tradition as a context in which 
to appreciate the text. Thus the rhetorical critic (among whom Ruland 
lists T S Eliot) listens to the idealized past and never tarries over 
textual details but seizes on the metaphysic of a work. The Phenomen-
ological critics see a literary work as a semiotic moment in conscious-
ness: a novel gains life in the consciousness and the critic must describe 
the transaction between the existent e}(perience and that new life in the 
mind. Thus the critic cocreates alongside the author, repossessing the 
work in an idiosyncratic way. Similarly, with reference to theology, 
rhetoricians and hermeneutists analyse religious meaning and phenomenol-
ogists use their own techniques to describe the content and structure of 
religious presuppositions. Thus, for example, Otto argues that interpre-
tation of a text does not proceed simply between the two points of our-
selves and the text but it constitutes a triangle: by means of the text 
we perceive the object which addresses the text as well as ourselves. In 
this perspective the text is still the important object of attention but it 
is acknowledged that understanding of it cannot be separated from a 
wider backgro4nd of human meaning. 
The OrtJ1o..:CulturaJ (lpproath focusses less on the text than on the 
human situation in hist<?rY, politics and eschatology. Historically, there-
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fore? a critic may research an author's notes 9 letters and influences and 
the wider milieu of his period. Politically? criticism may move out from 
the particular literary text to the far reaches of moral and political 
argument: art is a critique of va1ues9 a counter-proposal to life in the 
name of a deeper possibility. Thus Trilling asks of each work 'is this 
true? is this to be believed? is this to shape our future judgements of 
experience? 
"The judgement · of literature is overtly and 
explicitly a moral and intellectual judgement. 
The cogency 9 appositeness, the logicality, the 
truth of ideas must always be passed upon by 
literary criticism". (28) 
Theologically, this approach focuses not on the religious factor alone but 
on its congruence9 correspondence, conjunction and transaction with the 
world. It develops a coherence between human questions and divine 
answers. It may 
"remythologise theos as the innermost entelechy 
of culture and of all that is most genuinely 
human in human experience", ( 29) · 
Jaspers, for example, holds that reality itself is iconic Peter Berger 
describes our 
"shared symbolic universes, one of which is 
Christian" which function as "sheltering canop-
ies over the institutional order as well as over 
individual biography' by which we conceive of 
ourselves as part of a social history with a 
common past and anticipated destiny". (30) 
The objective human situation constitutes the validating appeal of those 
who work from this perspective. 
Finally, the Psycho-Mythic perspective focuses on the subconscious 
hl!man situ~tion, the chthonic depths· of the fuJI human myth, personal 
and collective. The Psycho-Mythic critic draws on psychology and anthro-
pology to explore the inner individual and social meaning of a work. 
Norman Holland describes three types of psychoanalytic criticism, criti-
cal autobiography which reaches towards the author's mind, character 
analysis which reaches towards the fictive character's mind and criticism 
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of affect which reaches towards the audience's mind. The basic quest-
ions of a psychoanalytic critic are 'What are my critical assumptions?' 
and 'Can I offer more than a common-sense humanist understanding of 
catharsis, negative capability, stock responses, irony and emotions like 
love and courage?' There are three varieties of mythic criticism; that 
which superimposes a myth to reveal unseen patternsy that which 
analyses overt aUusions and that which concerns itself with the uncon-
scious depths of collective memory. A theology of archetypal exper-
ience, for example, can distinguish 'belief' that implies a mature, 
authentic faith from 'belief' that disguises shaUow, neurotic attitudes: 
the religious dimension in this view can not be seen in isolation but only 
in a total human, functional context. The work of Freud and Jung is 
seminal to those in this orientation but they may go beyond the revela-
tory qualities of dreams and archetypes to Ricoeur's arguments for myth 
and symbol and the narrative quality of experience. Theologians of 
prophetic secularity and theologians of radical immanence are close at 
this point. Theos is, thus, remythologized within human consciousness. 
As we have seen with the example of Ryken the Autotelist pos-
ition makes it difficult to· relate the disciplines of theology and liter-
ature. Textual and methodological allegiances are too exclusive and 
dogmatic. But as Ruland's own position demonstrates the Psycho-
Mythic perspective is fully able to unite literature and theology in a 
continuous, unified theory. Ruland's four-fold analysis is so useful be-
cause it includes an understanding of the nature of the two things being 
related .·within any particular perspective. Since there may be a very 
great difference between the definition of God or religion in different 
perspectives this is valuable. Our initial distinction therefore between 
conservative and liberal has been modified and complicated but not 
denied. It remains the principles, assumptions and values to which 
appeal is made to validate an argument which prove decisive in the 
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conclusions of those who seek to relate theology and literature. 
In conclusion two things remain. We entered this particular 
discussion as a response to the distinction between literature which has 
a 'programme' to proclaim and literature which is part of a quest for 
meaning. (31) In the distinction between Ryken's understanding of belief 
as dogma and Gunn's existential understanding of belief as "an authentic 
form of response" this concern remains. There remains a fundamental, 
unbridgeable gulf between proclamation and search which corresponds to 
what we generally refer to as an open or a dosed mind. They are such 
different ways of seeing that they can never, as the proverb goes, see 
eye to eye. 
Secondly, Gi.mn's argument about culture and mind leads us into 
the subject of our next chapter: 
"Our writers help form what can be called our 
mind . in so far as they produce what can be 
called a classic. Our classics, in turn, 
create our m~nd and define it by shaping and 
colouring that numinoiJ!:) background against 
w~fch we draw such interpr'etive resources as''we 
have at our disposal for comprehending them 
Our cle1ssics create us, or, better, 
cre~t~ a common mind a~6ng us, n6l beca~s~of 
anytfiing they say about our experience but 
because of the light they cast it ih. That 
light IS 'the .. light . sheg by fhose paradigms •We 
not~only live by but live within. Ana w~ live 
within them. on):.y "so Jong aq w'e can. 9ee by them. 
Whatever their intent, their effect is . to 
illumine. our otherwise datker1ed and uncertain 
way through life by providing an "idea of 
order" which for the time being suffices." (32) 
Here, Gunn is suggesting the logical extension of the liberal position, 
though he himself does not pursue it. To become "more human" by "the 
imagination of otherness" is a stage on the way towards a kind of liberal 
salvation, but there is more to be explored. Whe11, however, we are 
drawn into speaking of classics and paradigms and the formation of a 
common mind or interpretive framework we are facing sql1arely the entire 
replacement of religious systems of meaning by a kind of literary sense. 
We must ask how this literary sense-making functions and to what extent 
it is an adequate substitute for that which it replaces? In these quest-
ions the work of Frank Kermode may prove as valuable to us as it has 
been to so many in this field who constantly declare their debt to him. 
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Ch. 3 FAITH IN THE INTERPRETER 
Hermaneutical Functionalism in Frank Kermode 
Kermode's work in The Genesis of ~ecrecy (and earlier The Classic 
and The Sense of an Ending) comes towards the end of a long career of 
detailed and wide-ranging literary criticism. In that sense he is very 
expert. But more significant even than that, is the secular perspective 
from which he is writing of precisely those concerns which Gunn raises 
but does not pursue, and this is significant and useful for our purposes 
for two reasons. First, it demonstrates how the liberal method of Gunn 
makes common cause with 'outsiders' as well as those of a religious per-
suasion in a way that Ryken could not tolerate. Second, it offers the 
benefit of theologically disinterested observations, though, as we shall 
see, Kermode is by no means detached and generally disinterested: 
despite the urgency and ultimacy of the search which he describes (and 
in which he is involved) he has no prior theological investment. 
In these three works Kermode's emphasis is on the functional sig-
nificance of literature. Literature is honoured not because of any claim 
to truth or vision but on the basis of its ability to construct an order 
that will make sense of an apparently disordered world. Thus it is 
related to real life by a kind of hermaneutical functionalism. In an age 
whose increasing secularism is nevertheless conscious of the religious 
nature of its sense-making precedents this modern, literary senSe-making 
may seem to be closely related to the ancient religious systems·. The 
question is, how shall we make sense of our world in the absence of the 
gre'at- reli&ious interpretations'? Inevitably we shall be involved in some 
kind-~of cc:mtin~ity with the p~st. 'We cannot simply start afre~h because 
we -are unable to find a neutral point: we must begih where we are and 
adapt our understanding. But what are the vehicles of continuity and by 
what rules shall we use them? 
In the first two of the four T S Eliot Memorial Lec'tures which 
comprise The Classic Kermode makes two observations on the problem 
of continuity. He takes as his point of departure what he calls "Eliot's 
myth of the Classic" ( 1) which entails the doctrine that 
"the ancient can be more or less immediately 
relevant and available, in a sense contemporan-
eous with the modern - or anyway its nature is 
such that it can, by strategies of accommod-
ation, be made so". (2) 
There are, he contends, broadly two ways of maintaining a classic's 
access to the modern mind. The first of these depends on philology and 
historiography which ask what the classic meant to its author and best 
readers and what it may mean to those who have the necessary know-
ledge and skill to regain that perspective. The second method is that of 
accommodation, that is, 
"any method by which the old document may be 
induced to signify what it cannot be said to 
have expressly stated". (3) 
The chief instrument of accommodation is the ancient skill of allegory: 
the other more scientific method is a later development. These methods 
are well known in the study of theology. Thus, by this identification of 
critical technique and procedure he demonstrates an alignment of classic 
texts both religious and literary. 
We shall return to The Classic and his specific conclusi.ons about 
continuity. For most of this chapter, however, we must carefully cons-
ider Kerlilode's earlier work of biblical and literary sense-making par-
allels, The. Sense of an- Ending, in terms of its replacement of religious 
meaning by literary sense. This is Kermode's most influential and rev-
ealing contribution, remarkable in its use of biblical categories as 
models and sources of meaning and in its grasp of modern biblical 
scholarship. It combines great breadth and range of thought with a 
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precise disciplinary integrity. As we examine his specific literary funct-
ionalism in detail we shall be able to evaluate both the basis of argu-
ment and the conclusions of this confessedly secular perspective. 
Originally in lecture formj Kermode's writing has such broad 
reference and such a cumulative and allusive method that it is some-
times difficult to be sure precisely what is being presented. His first 
chapter raises themes around the association of apocalypse and peri-
peteia. He uses a theological treatment of apocalypse, indeed of the 
whole Biblical corpus, as a model of what we might expect to find in 
the literary treatment of radical fictions in general. There seem to be 
two different uses of the literary term peripeteia. We might normally 
expect the word to refer to that reversal of outcome in the plot of a 
single novel or play which denies our expectations but satisfies us with 
its aestheticj dramatic9 artistic 9 moral or human integrity. But most 
often Kermode uses it in a derivative sense to describe that altered 
structure which we recognize as characteristic of the modern novel as 
presented to us· by Proust9 Camus or even Robbe-Grillet. There is a 
reversal in our expectation of the fictive form itself. This epocal 
change he is able to associate tellingly with parallel developments in 
biblical interpretation that focus the meaning of apocalyptic less on the 
future than on the present crisis of the eschantological moment. 
It may seem odd in the twentieth century to approach the constr-
uction of a literary theory through ·an obscure biblical genre. But 
Kermode's att~ntion is on the history 9 formation and .characteristics of a 
specifically Western consciousness. Perhaps because of the dominance· of 
the Christian faith in the West the linear structure of the Biblical 
narrative ha~ become deeply embedded ·.in our culture. He contrasts 
Homer's cyclical view of the world 9 in which episodes are related by 
corr'espondenc:e to a cyclical . ritual 9 with VitgWs Aeneas moving from 
Troy to an empire-without-end Romej which is closer to our apocalyptic 
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tradition. In this rectilinear model episodes are rela.ted internally and 
aJJ exist under the shadow of the end. He draws on the first chapter of 
Auerbach's Mim~sis: the story of Abraham is modified I.Jy reference to 
the whole plan from Creation to the Last Days. It is meaningful bee-
ause of its place in the sequence that leads from beginning to end. 
Thus Kermode contends that the Bible's harmonious? concordant model of 
history has become deeply embedded within our consciousness: to make 
sense of our span of life we need fictive concords with origins and 
ends. 
However? the most significant thing about the Biblical narrative is 
its concordance. Of course? there are many discordant elements within 
the Biblical texts? but it has always been the delight of Christians like 
Augustine to reconcile them? so that? paradigmaticaJJy, it may be 
assumed that the Christian story is one, single? exclusive and concordant 
whole. Apocalypse? on which Kermode concentrates, 'ends, transforms 
and is concordant'. The dissonance to which he points lies not in the 
narrative itself but in its understanding and interpretation. H~ goes 
into some detail to describe attempts both mediaeval and modern to tie 
the Apocalypse to a specific historical moment~ When these failed the 
Apocalypse itself was not discredited; new calculations were made. Thus 
he accumulates evidence of two things; what he understands as the 
inherent human need to create patterns with endings that may give 
significance to lives, and the human capacity to accept the disconfirm-
ation of apocalyptic without allowing it to be discredited. We are 
creatures, he says, who project arbitrarily chronological divisions onto 
history to help us find beginnings? and ends. Men 'in the middest', a 
phrase he takes from Sidney, mak.e considerable imaginative investment 
in ·coher~nt pa:tterns wh.ich by pr_ovjding· an end make possible a saJ~sfying 
"·~ ' ' c_ 
cqncordance. It is his argument that tnen _accepted this Christian 
p_attern for centuries and that now, in its iibsen,ce7 they need to create 
. -·'·'> -- . "'''.' ~, :::- . 
such patterns. The prime quality of the patterns is to be satisfactorily 
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concordant; it is only their application to a chaotic and fluid world 
which involves disconfirmation, though a disconfirmation that is neither 
discrediting nor dissonant. It is therefore clear that Kermode's subject 
is not apocalyptic in itself but the experience of apocalyptic. 
In peripeteia, he argues, we reenact the readjustment of the 
· expectation of the end that is so notable a feature of apocalyptic. A 
story that proceeds simply to an obviously predestined end is nearer 
myth than the novel or drama. Peripeteia is present in every story of 
the least structural sophistication: it depends on our expectation of the 
end.. We wish to reach our discovery by an unexpected route. However, 
Kermode's parallel with literary peripeteia must not be overindulged. In 
the case of apocalyptic it is the same ending which is t~ be applied at 
a different time or in a different way: in the case of peripeteia it is 
the same moment which sees a different ending. To that extent the 
parallel is no.t exact. Kermode himself, in order to give a definition of 
peripeteia sufficiently accommodating to the comparison he has in hand, 
is forced to reduce that rich literary device to a bland 
"falsification of expectation, so that the end 
comes as expected but not in the manner expec-
ted''· (4) 
The term itself comes from Ar.istotle who Jinks it with anagnorisis 
(discovery) as integral to tragedy and of major importance in the arousal 
of pity and fear, which is the assumed object of tragedy. In serving to 
bring about the ending it is deeply connected with meaning. The qualit-
ative gap between this and Kermode's use of the term ('a disconfirm-
ation followed by a consonance') is an indication of the alll!sive, non-
systematic nature of Kermode's argument and the singleness of his 
vision. He is determined to concentrate on the two things he has estab-
lished, the need for patterns with satisfactory ends, and an adherence to 
these patterns which in the face of disconfirmation asserts a continuance 
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of meaning and consonance< 
Kermode's second use of the term, to refer to a reversal in our 
expectations of the fictive form, is equally imprecise but allusively attr-
activeo There are conventional plots which hold to the established conv-
entions of the end, which Henry James describes as 
"a distribution at the last of prizes, pensions, 
husbands, wives, babies, millions, appended 
paragraphs and cheerful remarks". (5) 
This is an image of apocalypse. There are also what the clerisy call 
'major' novels which tend to vary the conventions and falsify our expec-
tations of the end. Robbe-GriJJet to an extreme degree and Camus and 
Sart~e rather Jess discourage our expectations from the start, demanding 
our co-operation in the discovery of meaning. Thus there is a changing 
relation between the paradigm and the text. By 'the paradigm' Kermode 
means to refer to our expectations of the linear form of the novel and 
the conventional apocalyptic ending which 'ends, transforms and is 
concordant'. Hence our experience in encountering modern fiction is like 
our experience of apocalyptic; the paradigm we have in our mind is not 
confirmed in the course of history or the course of the modern novel, 
but it is not therefore rejected. On the contrary, it is understood in a 
different way. Thus the old and the new are integrated in a developing 
perspective. 
However, this peculiarly Kermodian concept of perireteia 'is not 
the only way in which he is able to relate apocalyptic and · the modern 
. novel. He pays attention to the d~mythologization of theological 
apocalypse that has ·taken place since Bultmann. Naive apocalypticism 
has been modified under the pressur~ of new systems Of knowledge and 
technological and social change. Eschatology has substituted conscience 
for historical prophecy. We have reached the position of Jaspers who 
remarkeq that to Jive ts to live in crisis: in a worid which may or may 
not have a temporal end people see themselves much as Paul saw the 
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early Christians, men "upon whom the ends of the ages are come". (6) 
Theologically, therefore, we Jive in the crisis of the eschatological 
moment. The end has been brought into the present as depth. The 
imminent has become immanent. This, Kermode contends, is a parallel 
with the trend he has described in modern fiction, particularly in 
Camus, Sartre and Robbe-GriHet, a trend away from the paradigmatic 
fictive form in which the end that transforms and is concordant is re-
vealed literally at the end, a trend towards the moment of crisis in 
which the meaning of the end is felt in the present and our expectations 
are fulfilled in an unexpected way. In a second sense therefore 
Kern:ode is less concerned with apocalyptic itself than with our exper-
ence of it, in this case the use of a moder'n critical method. He ex-
pects to discover a parallel development in the literary treatment of 
radical fictions. He expects to see the meaningful concordance assoc-
iated with the end not in terms of temporal ends but in terms of crisis. 
This reflects a change in the structure of time and of the world and 
produces more complex plots. 
At this point we may pause and consider the main themes that 
Kermode has introduced. First, there is the historical perspective. Deep 
in our culture and in our consciousness, he contends, we need fictions 
with ends. This is the burden of his argument, which is developed and 
demonstrated in the rest of the book. But in this opening chapter it is 
introduced to us in a historical perspective. By drawing on our Western, 
Christian heritage, a past in which meaningful stories, with beginnings 
and ends,, were no elitist concern but related to the self-und~rstanding 
of a whole culture, he preserves the link between these stories and 
essential human meaning. The mediaeval society he describes looked on 
the apocalypse not as a fiction but as a divine prediction which could 
(and soon would) be literally fulfilled in the history of the world and its 
inhabitants. Just as Genesis described the 'historical' origins of the 
world Revelation described irt advance the 'historical' end of the world. 
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It was no fiction: it was religious belief held with such sincerity that it 
governed both the meaning and the actions of the human beings who 
Jived in the light of it. lrlaving set this scene, he is able, by neference to· 
theological demythologization~ which locates the significant reference of 
apocalyptic not in the predictable future but in the existentialist pres-
ent, to argue that modern fiction retains this ultimate~ meaningful 
· status. It is not a col~ection of fantasies, a series of narrative diver-
sions~ mere entertainment. It is that apocalyptic which we can no 
longer believe of the future but which is eschatologically realized in 
the present. We plumb the present crisis to discover its eschatological 
depths. Our fictions~ in which the past and the future, the beginnings 
and the ends, are extensions of the present, these very fictions which we 
can no longer regard as true in a simple mediaeval way, these -fictions 
are as definitive of the meaning of our lives as the anciently-believed 
religious apocalypse. 
Kermode does no more justice to the idea of eschatology than to 
that of peripeteia by concentrating on one aspect of it in this way, but 
here at least is an impressive (if incidental) attempt to establish system-
atic grounds for a relationship between theology and literature. It is a 
bold challenge to the theologian: if the 'end' is to be discovered or 
revealed in the crisis of the present what wiH the theologian say of the 
; 
novel which attempts to do this? Can he be content to say that it is 
merely a secular vision when it shares such a similar epistemological 
base? · Of course, it is a challenge froin an 'outsider' and a theologian 
might wish to refer to a paradigmatic Christian framework by which to 
interpret the present crisis. But it is his. argument that the ·literary 
paradigms are changed by interaction · with the ·.fictions which are suf.f-
icient to our changi_ng crisis~ and this awareness of the way that the 
application of the paradigm to changing circumstances ~ctually · modifies 
the paradigm is necessarily of real interest to· the theologian. However, 
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unlike Arnold, Kermode is not proposing that literature take over the 
role of religion in support of morality. Nor is he much interested in the 
social function of literature as a religious substitute. He is solidly 
secular, as he is proud to be in The Genesis of Secrecy, an "outsider". 
He is concerned with the structure of narrative meaning within the 
literary form. Apocalyptic ends, transforms and is concordant. These 
. are the characteristics of meaning that once resided in a religious, 
metaphysical system and now dwell in the literary form itself. It is 
because men, he contends, need these elements that the literary form 
which of its nature provides them is so significant. Thus, despite his 
bibli,cal subject, apocalyptic, and his theological argument, his reference 
I 
is wider, in The Genesis of Secrecy to the classical Hermes, and here to 
Alkmeon through Aristotle - "men die because they cannot join the 
beginning and the end~ What they, the dying men, can do", he asserts, 
"is to imagine a significance for themsel-
ves.... I qhall be talking not only about the 
peristence of fictions but about their tr\.Jth 
and also about th~ir decay. Th.ere is the . ques-
tion also of our growing suspiciouf? of fictions 
in general. But it seems that we stHl need 
them". .( 7) 
His criterion of truth. is clearly not religious but human - whether the 
fictions satisfy us. And thpugh he makes gen~ral statements about 
human nature and social or cultural history his focus is only clear on 
the literary form. He speaks not of man, the religious creature, nor of 
man, the. sociological animal, but of man, the reader of the literary 
text. 
The second major point to emerge from this opening chapter is 
that, in focusing on the narrative of the Bible which ends in Apocalypse, 
Kermode is. describing essenth1lly narrative meaning. There are, of 
course, other kinds of meaning. There is generically religious meaning, 
whether of creeds which are broadly rational af\d metaphysical, or of 
rituals which may be illuminated by the soeial sciences and anthropology, 
or even mystical meaning which epistemologkalty_ i~ essent1ally religious. 
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But whether credal, ritual or mystical, religious meaning is experienced as 
received, as given, as an 'input'. The meaning is not inherent only in the 
human situation to which it belongs: it has reference to something beyond 
as the fount and limiter of meaning. This is what it means to ca11 it 
religious meaning. 
Other kinds of meaning may be described in philosophical terms. 
These may have their origins in philosophical argument about knowledge: 
the logical positivists would accept only very limited meaning such as is 
consonant with mathematical proof or the possibility of empirical veri-
fication. Meaning is therefore limited in this instance by prior dogmatic. 
On the other hand it may be that philosophy is employed to give an 
account of something which has intuitive origins: existentialism grows 
from the experience of depth and authenticity, that wholistic moment of 
eternity in time, of piercing beneath the surface. Equally, it may be a 
Romantic or secularly mystical moment of intense feeling which gives 
meaning. It is not clear which of these categories is most appropriate. 
for the kind of ideological meaning with which a Marxist like Raymond 
Wi11iams measures in Modern Tragedy. (8) 
However, one of the most significant things about Kermode's book 
is that it describes a specifically literary meaning mediated through plot 
and narrative. Imagination is the source and narrative form is the 
structure of this meaning. He pays little attention to the source, to 
anything remotely like a doctrine of literary inspiration, but concentrates 
on .. the reader's experience of narr!=ttive, on the way we make connec-
tions between things and interpret contingency in significant patterns. 
He expands on this throughout .the rest of the book. At t~is point Of 
association with biblical categories he notes only the connection between 
literary and religious revelation in the peripeteia which is a discovery. 
When our expectations (ire upset we feel we are encountering something 
mor:-e 'real' . and that sort;~ething is being found out for us. But it is 
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interesting to note 9 again9 here 9 that Kermode's interest is not in 
whether what we encounter actually is more real 9 or what the status of 
the experience is, but only in the fact of our experience of it. This is 
typical of Kermode's literary critical position, to comment on our exper-
iencing of a piece of literature, not to engage in philosophy or in theol-
ogy. It would be fair to say that his perspective is largely reader-
based. In his second chapter Kermode attempts to justify the analogy 
. he has drawn between eschatological and literary fictions as he relates 
'fiction' and 'concordance' by a discussion of 'time'. Since Nietzsche9 he 
contends9 it has been possible to say with Stevens "the final belief must 
be a fiction". This postpones the End (when fiction may be said to co-
inci~e with reality) forever. Such a fiction is like 'infinity plus one' 
or imaginary numbers in mathematics; we know they do not exist · but 
they help us to make sense and to move. in the world. This is a funct-
ional satisfaction which ignores the problem of religious or philosophical 
truth. In its dependence on the analogy of science it is dangerously 
incomplete. Kermode registers this reservation in ethical terms (since 
ethics is nearer to his individual and social functionalism than ·eith~r 
religion or philosophy). According to Nietzsche "the falseness of an 
opinion is not ••• any objection to it" but "how far it is life-preserving'!; 
(9) On the scientific front this is the basis of the theoretical physicist's 
life when he aims at the experimental confirmation of his mathematics. 
On the political front, however 9 there are the gas-chambers; since if the 
value of an opinion is to be tested only by its success in the world the 
propositions of dementia are as valuable as other fictions. As Kermode 
puts it pithily· "if King Lear is an image of the promised end. so. is 
Buchenwald". ( 1 0) 
To deal with this ethical P,roblem Kermode makes a distinction 
between fiction and myth. The myth of anti-Semitism is a fiction of 
escape telling nothing about death but projecting it onto others; the 
fiction of King Lear inv.olves encounter with self and· the image of one's 
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end. Fictions degenerate into myths whenever they are not held consc-
iously to be fictive. Myth is ritual that presupposes a total 9 adequate 
explanation; fiction is for finding out. Myth is an agent of stability 
calling for absolute assent; fiction is an agent of change calling for con-
ditional assent. Myth makes sense in terms of a lost order of time; 
fictions make sense of the here and now. Thus, in Vaihinger 0s view, the 
. fictional 'as if 0 is distinguished from hypothesis because at the end of 
the finding out process it will be dropped. Literary fictions are not 
subject, like hypotheses, to proof or disconfirmation, only, if they lose 
their operational effectiveness, to neglect. You do not rearrange the 
worl~ to suit them, nor test them by experiment in gas chambers. It is 
I who am rearranged as I read them: they are tested in the process of 
reading. "<?f course" 7 Kermode adds, "it may be said that in changing 
ourselves we have, in the best possible indirect way, cnanged the world." 
( 1 1) 
This is a very important element in Kermode 0s perspective and 
there are considerable problems with it. The perspeCtive is reader-
based: fictions must satisfy us. They do not have to be true in the way 
mediaeval apocalyptic was believed to be true .but they must have the 
same function as a source cif satisfying and concordant ends. The scien-
tific. analogy confirms that this satisfaction in a fl}nction~l one. The 
function, according to Nietzsche, is to be life-preserving. Kermode 
takes this position because of. his general argumef)t. about fiction being 
a human way of self-preservation, of staving off death by the creation 
of. meaningful beginnings and en9s, and because it is a broadly adequate 
repr~senta:tion of the proposed · purpose of scientific study which is his 
analogy f()r the functional fiction.. The problem he identifies is that 
. . 
scientific hypotheses are satisfactory when there is a concordance bet-
ween th~m arid ·Jhe world of nature, but tha't tbis i$ not a reliable test 
for literary fictions. That the fiction of anti-Semitism was consonant 
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with Buchenwald is highly unsatisfactory. (This is? of course? a political 
fiction ,but the objection applies equally to literary ones). The example 
of Buchenwald ha.s reference to social ethics where? in this case at 
!east? there is a measure of agreement about what is intoler(lble. It is 
also clearly in conflict with the principle he takes from Nietzsche that 
our fictions should be life-preserving. Here is a fiction which clearly 
is not life-preserving and is, in fact? immoral. Kermode attempts to 
preserve his general thesis and yet account for this particular disconfirm-
ation by the theoretical distinction between fiction and myth. In a 
social context this distinction is satisfactory: literary fictions do? indeed, 
function in the way he describes: they are consciously false (for finding 
out) and caB for conditional assent. Political myth is quite different? in 
a way which is reprehensible. However, in an individual context there is 
no clear agreement about what is intolerable to prompt this kind of. dist-
inction. The individual reader may find almost anything life-preserving. 
Furthermore? the individual's relation with the literary fiction is quite 
diHerent from its social aspect. The best literature which does not aim 
to change society as if it were a political programme nevertheless does 
aim deeply to engage and perhaps to chang£! the individual reader. In the 
act of reading the reader does not consciously hold the fiction to be 
fictive but agrees to be overwhelmed by it so that it mJ3,y have its 
effect on him. Kermode allows that in changing the reader the fiction 
has indirectly changed the war ld. He considers this the "best possible 
way" to change the world. But what if this vision, caught from a lit-
erary fiction, produces Buchenwald? The distinction between myth and 
fiction has gone some way' towards excluding evil fictions · from this 
functional paradigm in a social context but it has not been able to 
accoiJilt for the individual. We may contrast this reader-based thesis 
that fietion~ SJ3,tisfy us with a Christian theological claiQ:l that they be 
true and good. This focuses attention on their origins and their essence. 
9.6 
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Thus an interpretative framework, a fictive paradigm 9 such as the 
Apocalypse, which is perceived as essentially true and good cannot be 
responsible for the evil of Buchenwald. Of course, evil has occurred in 
response to that good and true paradigm, but always due to those who 
have received and interpreted it and never because of its own theoret-
ical imperfection. So the Christian argument might run. It is Ker-
mode's functional paradigm, that fictions must only satisfy us, that 
leaves no theoretical defence against the development of evil and dest-
ructive fictions. 
However 9 Kermode continues to investigate the nature of the fie-
tions which satisfy us. 
. I They are, he suggests, far too elaborate and 
ingenious to be explained simply in terms of survival in a hostile 
environment, an analogy drawn in his final chapter from the experience 
of a prisoner in solitary confinement. The writing of history is part of 
the same process: the imposition of a plot on time is a substitute for 
myth. Thus there is no history, says Karl Popper, only histories. The 
satisfactions we require from our history and from our fictions are too 
subtle for the paradigms, and yet t~e paradigms survive. At root, 
Kermode argues, they must correspond to a basic human need, biological 
or psychological. At some very low level we all share certain fictions 
about time and we should expect to learn more a~out sense-making para-
digms from experimental psychologists than from scient-ists or philos-
ophers, from Augustine than from Einstein or Kant. Again this is 
characteristic of Kermode's functional approach. He concentrates on 
what it is to experience these fictions and is content to be both general 
and mystical about their origins. He goes on to use four ideas which 
develop the . apocalyptic significance of fiction. 
The 'tick-tock' of a clock, he asserts, is a model of plot. 
"It can be shown by experiment", he says, "that 
we can ea~lily gl,'H13P the il)terval between tick 
·and tock but not at all that between t'ock and 
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tick. In a novel, all that comes between tick 
and tack will have to maintain a lively expect-
ation of tack, that is, it must be purged of 
simple chronicity (the disorganized emptiness 
of tack-tick) a humanly uninteresting success-
iveness. It is a macroscopic example of wlH:it 
psychologists call 'temporal integration'. 
Within this organization that which was con-
ceived of as simply successive becomes charged 
with past and future; what was chronos becomes 
katros. This is the time of the novelist, a 
transformation of mere successiveness which has 
been likened, by writers as different as Forster 
and Musil, td the experience of love, the erotic 
consciousness which makes divinely satisfactory 
sense out of the commonplace person". (12) 
Tick-tock, this "transformation •.. which makes divinely satisfactory 
sense out of the commonplace" is clearly a concept with considerable 
' theological significance. The distinction between kairos and chronos is 
from 0,. CuUmann and J. Marsh. Chronos is 'passing time', 'waiting 
time' 9 the time that in Revelation shaJJ be no more. Kairos is a season, 
a significant crisis charged with 'end'. James Barr argues that this is 
unbibJical, but Kermode contends that theologians need this distinction 
and, in the manner of Wittgenstein, make up the rules as they go along. 
Norma,Jly, we associate 'reality' with chronos, and in every plot the 
escape from mere chronicity therefore involves also a retreat from 
'realjty'. But he argues that our minds work in ways that are not 
wholly successive and our· memory is able to retain impressions which we 
fail to 'take in' :consciously. This revalues temporal structure, memory 
and expectation as against the reduction of bibJiocosms to a merely 
spatial order.· As readers we share some of the· abnormally acute 
appetites for ends and ·crises that are associated with sc:hizophrenics, 
children, the elderly and the emotionally disturbed. In granting the 
· narrator something like total recall we move away. from normality into 
pathology. 
- '!-·.- _. 
"It seems that there is in narrative a~ atavism 
of. our temporal attitudes, modified always ,bY a 
refusa,l qu.tte to give up our 'rea_lism' · about 
time; so that a modern novel has ' to hoid· some 
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kind of balance between the two". (13) 
Kermode asserts that the form of the novel requires that the realism of 
the ego and the desires of the lower mind be simultaneously satisfied 
and therefore the paradigms must be modified, extensive middles given 
remote origins and ends in such a way as to preserve its difference from 
dreaming or some other fantasy gratifications. There must, also, be 
· some submission to fic~ive patterns involved in what we call 'form'. 
"As the theologians say, we 'live from the End' 9 
even if the war ld should be endless. We need 
ends and kairoi and the pleroma ••• we recreate 
the horizons we have abolished' the structures 
that have collapsed: and we do so in terms of 
the old patberns, adapting them to our new 
world. Ends, for example, become a: matter of 
images, figures for what does not exist except 
humanly". (14) 
Books may therefore be serviceable as fictive models of the temporal 
world only if they pay attention to this mixture of chron_os and kairos in 
'real' time. 
"Concord or consonance is really the root of the matter". ( 14) As 
the New Testament rewrites and requites another book and achieves 
harmony with it so .we achieve our secular concords of past and present 
and futurt7, modifying the past and allowing for the future without falsi-
fying our own moments of crisis. Continuing his use of a scientific 
analogy Kermode . alludes to the Principle of Complementarity which 
relates discrete events to an acceptable human pattern~ Light behaves 
like waves and like particles. They may be covered by a single set of 
equations and yet outside mathematics you could only speak of them as 
being 'c-omplementary' explanations. In classical physics uncertainty is 
an epistemological issue of the human mind;. in quantum physics it is 
part of nature9 a part of the world. Classical physics_ s_tiU 'works' over 
a huge area of nature and is not -therefore called· 'wrong' but a special 
case of modern phy§ics. The old law (expressed in a manner consistent 
with the observatiQnal situation at the time) with certain. qualifications 
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is still lawful 9 though not in accord with the facts. In this way the 
past is complementary with the present. Thus as Newtonian mechanics 
is to quantum mechanics so King Lear is to Endgame. We must not 
enjoy complementarity for its own sake9 
"playing fast and loose with the law of contra-
diction in the name of complementarity" ( 15) 
but the Stoic allegorists used such concord-fictions to close the gap 
between their world and Homer 9 as did Augustine in explaining, against 
the evidence, the concord of canonical scriptures. Later biblical sc:hol-
arship has sought a different explanation and more sophisticated 
concords. Yet when we have found 'what will suffice' the element of 
the paradigmatic will vary. Time seems ever more diverse9 the time of I 
the art-historian from that of the geologist, of the football coach from 
the anthropologist. Fictions change 
"because we no longer live in a world with a 
historical tick which will certainly be consumm-
ated by a definitive tack. And C!mong all the 
other changing fictions literary fictions take 
their place. They find out about the changing 
worJd on our behalf; they arrange our comptefu(m"-:-
tarities. They ~o this, for some of us, p~ihaps 
better than history, perhaps better than theol-
ogy, lar,ge-ly because th~.Y are consci_Qt.Jsly false; 
bt,Jt th'e way to understand their deve1opment is 
to, . see how they are related to those hth_f:!r 
f.lctidna.1 systems. It is not that" we are 
connoisseurs of chaos, but that we are surround-
ed by it, and equipped for coexistence with _it 
only by our ficf.Ive powers. !Ills riiay, in the 
absence of a supreme fiction or the pci~sibility 
of it, be a hard fate". (16) 
Finally, in this theoretical outline, Kermode introduces the term 
'aevum', a time-fiction coined by Aquinas which stands between time and 
eternity as the time of the angels. Kermode, however, -applies it to 
moments of 'temporal integration'. He argues that_ tragedy is the 
successor to apocalypse: deClining faith in the religious Apocalypse is 
replaced by the representative death of the tragic figure enacted before 
us, , a peripet~ia which ends, transforms and is concordant. In apocalypse 
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there are only two orders of time and the earthly runs to a stop; the 
cry of woe to the inhabitants of the earth means the end of their time. 
In tragedy the cry of woe does not end succession, and if we want the 
great crises and ends of human life to serve our needs as we stand 'in 
the middest' we must give them patterns that defy time. The concords 
of past, present and future towards which the soul extends itself are 
out of time and belong to the 'aevum', a duration which was invented 
for angels to bridge the dissonant gap between a finite world and eter-
nity. To close that great gap we use fictions of complementarity which 
now may be novels or poems, as they once were tragedies and, before 
that, angels. 
' 
By these four references, then, to tick-tock, chronoskairos, the 
Principle of Complementarity and the 'aevum', Kermode intends to 
develop and illuminate the connection he has tried to establish between 
the sense-making functions of religious apocalyptic and of literary fie-
tions. When men were able to understand themselves between a histor-
ical Genesis· and a predictable Apocalypse they posses~ed the ultimate, 
authoritative tick-tock Of organised time, chronos and kairos were essen-
tially one anq would soon be demonstrably so, the Apocalypse would 
achieve total consonarce with aH that had gone before, would be, in 
fact, the ultimate complementarity, and there would be no need of the 
'aevum'. In the absence of this Supreme Narrative the world appears to 
be eternal and merely contingent. Yet, as commentator on our literary 
. fictions, Kermode is forced to acknowledge our refusal· to accept that 
. we are limited to mere cpntingency. We continue to organise time, to 
create ou~ owh significance, in the ways he has outlined. He can only 
conclude that we need to do so, that it is an essential human activity, 
but he does not ask why it should be so or what implications that might 
have for our understanding of the human situation. 
Nevertheless; he insists that it is the patterns of apocalyptic which 
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are relevant to our own times. Crisis, a prominant feature of apocalyp-
tic is also a dominant feature of our modern cultural tradition, but it is 
not inherent in the moment. It is a way of thinking about it. To cope 
with this modern crisis we cannot create our new orders without refer-
ence to the past. New modernism, that of total contingency and 
shuffled pages, becomes merely a schismatic, private dialect. Novelty 
. in the arts, if it is to communicate and satisfy, is inescapably related to 
something older. On the other hand, Eliot, who 
"was ready to rewrite the history of all that 
interested him in order to have past and fut-
ure conform ... was a poet of apocalypse". ( 17) 
But, together with Yeats, Pound and Wyndham Lewis, he was an example 
of the correlation between early modernist literature and authoritarian 
politics. The eschatalogical fictions of modernism are innocent as ways 
of ordering the past and present of art, and prescribing for its future, 
but they are quite different when backed by a police and civil service 
devoted to a· Final Solution. (At this point Kermode makes the extra-
ordinary statement "people wi11 live by that which was designed only to 
know by". (17) We shall return to this very shortly.) The first of these 
two modernisms ignores the past, the second uses it as a source of 
order. Bcetween them Beckett's signs of order and form are almost 
continuaUy presented but with a sign of cailceUation: they are cheques 
that will bounce. However, even when ironized, the Christian paradigm 
gives Beckett the structural and Jingl.JiStic features that enable us to 
make sense of his work. Kermode concludes that the significance of 
apocalypse for Jlterature is two-fold. It is the justification of ideas of · 
order in terms of what survives, and in terms of what we can accept as 
valid in a world different from that out of which they come (resembling 
the earlier world only in some kind of biological and cultural continuity). 
FinaJly, in a study of Sartre, K,ermode highlights some of the a 
priori limitations of the novel. A novel must give a novel-shaped 
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account because it necessarily has a beginning, middle and end, cause 
and potentiality. A metaphysic will look different in the water of a 
novel. The hero will recur and is, in a way, a legislator for mankind. 
What is characteristically modern about Sartre is the treatment of 
fiction as deeply distrusted and yet humanly indispensible. The pressures 
which require the constant alteration of the novel are the need to mime 
. contingency and the power of form to console. This, of course, para-
llels apocalypse's inherited form but constant reapplication to a changing 
history. Thus, Kermode concludes of both apocalypse and fiction, that 
out of the experience of chaos grows a new form "that satisfies both by 
be in~ a repetition and by being new". ( 18) 
There are one or two things we can say in summary. In the first 
place Kermode is less a theorist than a literary critic, that is, a 
commentator on the experience of reading (or he"aring or seeing) liter-
ature. He observes what is the case with our fictions. Apparently we 
need to organise ourselves in these ways. He goes no further into an 
explanation of this than his historical perspective on the dominance of 
the Biblical model in our culture and tradition. This is the source of 
our 'paradigms', a word which refers both to general human sense-making 
and to the forms of literary fiction. Just as the dominant Biblical 
paradigm was the source of meaning in an age of faith, the secular 
critic uses the same paradigmatic elements to create a consciously fict-
ive order in a secular age. 
·But it is only an apparent parallel. If modern fictions are not 
held to be consciously fictive 'they become myth. As my.th they are 
both distorted as agents of know1e_dge arid dangerous as agents of action. 
IQ.deed, Kermode arg~es th9-t these modern fiCtions are not intended for 
us to "live by" they are ohly for us to ''know by". It is because they are 
false that we must not live by them; they are only for finding out. It 
is only necessary that they should satisfy us in the account they give of 
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the wor1d 9 satisfy us in the complementarities they arrange for us 9 
satisfy us in the way we used to be satisfied before we lost faith in the 
Biblical narrative. It is therefore only a functional parallel; it helps us 
to live in the world and to Jive with ourselves. 
It is the strict distinction between action and knowledge that 
seems to be most misguided in this view. The age of faith to which he 
refers certainly made no such distinction. It is almost inconceivable 
that any Christian theological system could fail to integrate knowledge 
and action. Even a functional parallel between the Biblical narrative 
and modern fictions is therefore impossible. It is also increasingly 
realised in the scientific world from which he draws his analogies, 
especiaJJy since the breakthrough to sub-atomic physics, that observation 
cannot be detached from participation, that knowledge and action are 
interdependent. Even if he were to claim (as, here, at least, he does 
not) that the critic is involved vicariously in the experiencing of the 
fictive world, so that in the process of reading he is assimilated into 
its confliCts, values and resolutions, nevertheless as he himself contends, 
when the reading is over the fiction must revert to being consciously 
false and the knowledge involved in the fiction must be distanced from 
any action the critic might take. Kermode's critic is therefore an 
entirely passive figure satisfying himself about the world in the privacy 
and inaction of his own study. · 
Kermode has chosen to use Apocalyptic to iJJuminate literary fic-
tions, but he has chosen ground which betrays. him. The student of the 
Christian story is· the theologian. The student of literary fictions is the 
literary critic. The theologian has the widest possible brief, embracing 
God and man, purpose and design, origins and final end, meaning and 
motivation, ethics and ideals, goods and greater goods and love and life 
itself. The critic qua literary critic is, on the whole, a commentator on 
texts9 an elucidator of the meaning of texts, an augmenter of the appeal 
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of texts. Of course, there is considerable debate about how closely the 
critic is limited to the text and those who argue for a wider brief do so 
in response to the very issues this study brings to light. But Kermode 
himself shrinks from the work of the philosopher, the historian and the 
theologian both in method and in range. In short, the account he gives 
is deficient because of its limited range. It is the literary critic's job 
. to ask if fictions satisfy. But the disciplinary boundary is artificial. 
The subject demands further questions: are these fictions true and what 
effect do they have? Is an understanding of the natural world (that is, 
a scientific hypothesis) an adequate model for an understanding of the 
life , of man? Is it acceptable to pursue falsehood as a guarantee of 
peace and functional behaviour? Is our society best erected on cons-
cious falsehood? These questions point beyond narrow disciplinary bound-
aries in the direction of philosophy and theology, and constitute evidence 
of the link between the two disciplines. However, they also uncover the 
frustration of Kermode's position. In his account literature may use the 
same paradigmatic elements to create order in a secular age as biblical 
paradigms provided in an age of faith, but the consequent ethical 
dilemma with which he wrestles exposes the need for some attention to 
truth instead of mere utility. 
Truth, however, as we have seen in Chapter Two, is an equivocal 
thing. Kermode develops his theory about the sense-making qualities of 
literature precisely because we have, in our century, lost our capacity to 
be certain about truth. It is precisely because there is no accepted 
truth that utilitarianism develops: whatever fits the facts as we see 
them will suffice. 
At this point we may return to the argument of The Classic. 
There Kermode analyses the nature of the continuity with the past 
which is involved in the concept of a literary classic; 
"It would not be read 9 and so would not be a 
classic, if we could not in some way believe it 
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to be capable of saying more than its author 
meant." ( 19) 
Yet the classic 
"cannot be, as the Bible had been, and Virgil 
too, a repository of unchanging truths. Truth 
in art - itself a dangerous and perhaps ambig-
uously evil activity - will have the hesitancy, 
the instability, of the attitude struck by the 
New World, provincial and unstable itself, 
towards the corrupt maturity of the metropolis". 
(20) 
Classic texts, Kermode argues, with their different voices and "contr-
olled lapses into inauthenticity" (20) are "invitations to co-production on 
the part of the reader". (20) Such accommodations needed after many 
years by old classics are required by modern classics from the very 
beginning, he adds, so that the modern classic 
"offers itself only to readings which are 
encouraged by its failure to give a definite 
account of itself. Unlike the old classic, 
which was expected to provide answers, this one 
poses a virtually infinite set of questions". 
( 21) 
Stated boldly this may appear more like an attempt to make black white 
than to resolve the question about truth. But the apparent paradox ref-
lects the complexity of the nature of truth and insight. The classic 
calls for us to respond creatively to the indeterminacies of meaning 
inherent in the text precisely because its "surplus of signifier" (22) allows 
it the possibility of transcending the limitations of specificity, the spec-
ificity of the individual, the culture, the language, even of the literary 
form itself. 
Kermode takes his analysis of the indeterminacies of the text to 
its limits in The Genesis of Secrecy. There he examines in great 
textual detail the ending of Mark's gospel and certain other relevant 
documents and demonstrates the many causes that act in concert to 
ensure that 
"texts are from the beginning and sometimes 
indeterminately studded with interpretations". (23) 
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and that they both demand and yet resist further interpretation. Inter-
pretation 9 he argues 9 begins so early in the development of narrative 
texts that 
"the recovery of the real 9 right, original thing 
is an illusory quest". (24) 
He draws very heavily on Kafka's parable of the entrance to the law: 
"No-one, however special his point of vantage, 
can get past all those doorkeepers into the 
shrine of the ·single sense. I make an allegory 9 
once more 9 of Kafka's parable; but some such 
position is the starting-point of all modern 
hermeneutics except those which are consciously 
reactionary. The pleasures of interpretation 
are henceforth linked to loss and disappoint-
ment9 so that most of us will find the task too 
hard 9 or simply repugnant; and then, abandoning 
meaning, we slip back into the old comfortable 
fictions of transparency, the single sense, 
the truth". (25) 
Once more, then, in this account of modern hermenautics we have 
a glimpse of two kinds of truth: as we noted in our discussion of Ryken 
and Gunn (26) there is static truth and a questioning truth, sterile faith 
and an existential, fluid faith. In our discussion of hermeneutics in 
Chapter One and of a common existential vocabulary (27) we drew the 
same distinction. Just as we were able to distinguish between modes 
and qualities appropriate to proclamation and search at the end of 
Chapter Two (26) so we may distinguish the same modes and qualities 
operating to cause narrative both to function as paradigm and also to 
question and reform those paradigms. The same modes and qualities 
qualify the determinacy of the text. Just as the dispute between Ryken 
and Gunn remains insoluble so there is no resolution of Kermode's. dual· 
dilemmas; the indeterminacy of the text and the paradigmatic, sense-
making function of narrative. The epistemological question concerning 
authority always remains and is acknowledged ·.by Kermode in his 
comments about 'insiders' and 'outsiders' 
"what is the interpreter to make of secrecy 
considered as a property of all narrative~ 
provided it is suitably attended to? Outsiders 
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see but do not perceive. Insiders read and 
perceive, but always in a different sense. We 
glimpse the secrecy through the meshes of a 
text; this is divination, but what is divined is 
what is visible from our angle". (28) 
Kermode is worried that Hermes1 the patron saint of interpreters, is also 
the patron of tricksters1 that the narratives which comfort us with under 
-stood relations 
"may be narratives only because of our impudent 
intervention, 'and susceptible of interpretation 
only by our hermetic tricks". (29) 
Thus, for Kermode1 a self-confessed outsider1 the pessimism of Kafka's 
parable comes to define all our attempts to make sense of our lives. 
And ,yet the religious truth which is tied to faith, which must face all 
I 
the problems of epistemology and hermeneutics and an uncertain world, 
this questing faith which is a laying of a hand to the plough (30) and 
therefore also a proclamation, this faith itself needs such insights as 
Kermode has given it to free it from proposition and dogma, from 
sterility and inauthenticity and to give it its life and hope and integrity. 
Once again, the theoretical framework has been made clear and the 
decisive factor in the establishment of worlds of meaning, the sense of 
an ending and of a beginning, is the mystery of religious faith. 
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Ch. 4 FAITH IN NARRATIVE 
Theological Elements in Narrative 
It has not escaped the notice of certain critics m this field that 
the Bible, the primary Christian source, is itself largely in narrative 
form. Certain books of the Old and New Testaments are straightforwar-
dly narrative, books like Genesis, Samuel, Ezra, Ruth, M<?-tthew, and 
Acts. In addition, in the light of modern critical techniques the books 
of the prophets and the epistles, and to some extent the books of the 
law, may be understood as elements of a larger implicit narrative. 
Furthermore, whether our focus is narrowly on the development of the 
Pauline Churches (understood from the Acts and the epistles) or more 
' ----
widely on the progress of the whole of Christianity to the present day 
there is about the Christian faith a single narrative character (I) which 
extends from Creation to Apocalpyse and which defines in a distinctively 
narrative manner the revelation of God of which it speaks. Christianity, 
then, is first of all a story. 
There are two directions of implication that arise from this ele-
ment of narrativity shared by the Christian religion and narrative liter-
ature. The literary critic, skilled in the elucidation of narrative, asks if 
his skills may be of more use in religious investigation than those of the 
historian or the philosopher. Is there a literary way of understanding 
the Bible and the Christian faith and, if so, what are its parameters? 
This is not just the concern of those who promote Bible-as-Literature 
courses as part of a humanist enterprise (2) but a genuinely theological 
line of enquiry pursued, for example, from a structuralist perspective by 
John Dominic Crossan. (3). Moving in the opposite direction the theol-
ogian asks lf the apparent fact that God reveals himself in stories has 
anything to teach us about the nature of God and his relationship with 
man, and the epistemology of religious faith? It is a potential escape 
route from the philosophical stranglehold of empiricism on the one hand 
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and a very anti-philosophical mysticism on the other. (4). Furthermore, 
it might not only provide an alternative or even complementary method-
ology for the theologian but it might also extend his scope beyond the 
Biblical texts. Accordingly modern literature may be investigated both 
for what it reveals of the human state and what it may contain, in 
narrative form, of God himself. 
However, there has not yet developed a systematic theory of the 
religious significance of narrative that traces its philosophical origins and 
assumptions. The language games of the later Wittgenstein must lie 
behind it to some extent, for it 1s observed that narrative creates and 
stabilises meaning by context and use rather than by a priori, formal 
linguistic theory. This is particularly appropriate to the discovery of 
religious meaning since language is at its least referrential when it rel-
ates to religion and there is a need to infer and suggest what is felt to 
be ultimately transcendent. Nevertheless, in the middle of the 1970•s 
there appeared a number of books and essays on various elements of 
narrative which stimulated critical discussion. In 1974 the Annual Meet-
ing of the American Academy of Religion and the Society for Biblical 
Literature devoted twelve sub-groups to the study of some aspect of the 
relation between religion and narrative and in 1979 the Conference on 
Christianity and Literature convened a seminar on •The Word in Space 
and Time: Theological Implications of the Narrative Mode•. In its report 
on this Christianity and Literature (No. · 5) called for more work on 
the prolegomena to the subject, especially on the relation of this ques-
tion to philosophies of language and the nature of religious knowledge, 
to an incarnational view of the world and the Judea-Christian view of 
history. A further session was devoted to this subject in 1980 but failed 
to address this philosophical background. The discussion therefore rem-
ains for the moment in a fractured state: there is considerable insight 
but no unifying vision. Accordingly we shall impose our own order: we 
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shall discuss first some insights about narrative itself, and then consider 
what has been argued about individual elements of narrative and about 
various specific genres, and finally weigh the unfinished work of Wesley 
Kort. 
In the first of the papers delivered at the 1979 Conference (5) 
Lyle Smith takes as his starting-point one of the conclusions we recog-
nised in Ch 1 that 
"narrative is simply words doing a certain 
thing. The thing the words do may, or may not 
be religious in orientation. If the narrative 
mode can be said to have theological implicat-
ions it will have them precisely to the extent 
that the writer or reader projects them." (6) 
Religion inheres in the man. And yet the question about the religious 
significance of narrative resists such apparent solutions, largely, Smith 
argues, because of "what imaginative narrative implies about the nature 
of reality". (6) The appeal of narrative to the imagination, may, he 
contends, be interpreted in two ways. It may be that it satisfies a 
psychological need, the objectification of some element in our common 
humanity. He connects this with a formalist aesthetic and with the 
"simple-minded materialism" (7) of B.F. Skinner that "describes all 
cognitive responses to stimuli as electro-chemical events occuring in the 
central nervous system". (7) However, since this makes the world and 
art ultimately meaningless he inclines towards the other way of interpre-
tation, that the appeal of narrative is "evidence of a more than strictly 
material component in the make-up of man and of the universe in which 
he lives". (8) Such genuine transcendences as that to which such a view 
points must assume the~.t a reality outside the limits of space and time 
exists. Now and again, he asserts, a novelist will set up a system of 
symbolic sign-ificance that depends on an emotional response originating 
from the reader's sense that the world is finite and has an edge, and 
that something might lie beyond that edge. "This is usually described as 
a response to an archetypal symbol". (9) For Smith there is no great 
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problem in accepting this 'transcendence' v1ew rather than the formalist 
or materialist one. If we are living in a closed universe of merely 
psychological events9 he asks, "how do we account for the power of art 
to move us?" (7) This is something that literary theory itself cannot 
settle but it may 
"force us to consider other questions which are 
not literary at all but which, if considered, 
will bring us to literature from a different 
angle of approach". (10) 
This is a very defensive opening to the discussion and one which 
relies heavily on creating a dichotomy between an austere formalism and 
an inherently Platonic appeal to transcendence through the use of the 
symblol. It offers no systematic argument in support of a prior religious 
commitment. However, it does establish that the religious character of 
narrative is not direct but indirect. As Ted Estess says, "Several relig-
ionists have located in narrative structure a significant hermeneutic 
device by which to interrogate the nature of human meaning". ( 11) It is 
at the level of human meaning9 our interpretation of ourselves and our 
reality, that narrative may make a contribution of theological signifi-
cance. 
Estess gives three examples of his contention in Sam Keen, 
Michael Novak and Stephen Crites. Sam Keen, he says, 
"has been interested in the heuristic possibil-
ities residing in the metaphor of story for the 
discovery and creation of personal identity". 
( 11) 
Keen's is a somewhat individualistic interest which emphasises the 
primacy of the experiencing subject: 
"Our starting-point must be individual biography 
and history. If I am to discover the holy, it 
mu·st be in my biography and not in the history 
of Israe~ •... I have a story''. ( 12) 
Michael Novak's starting-point is social and historical rather than indi-
vidual when he advances story as a model by which to understand the 
"logic of political action". ( 11) Stephen Crites underpins both perspec-
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tives when he claims that 11 the forms of possible experience are narrat-
ive11 and that stories are able to 11give qualitative substanr:e to the form 
of experience11 because experience is 11 itself an incipient story11 • ( 13) 
Genuine stories, Crites argues, are always primary sources wh1ch invite 
inil!erpretation as secondary. Interpretation cannot make any story super-
fluous since its validity does not depend on its explanatory power. Story 
1s 'populated': 11 Persons are incarnate in the action of stories11 . (14) This 
1s a crucial insight. It accounts for the inevitably hermeneutical func-
tion of abstract language. Narrative form, like personhood, is irreduc-
ible. Memory and anticipation are joined to present experience to 
create an incipient narrative form of which story is the linguistic expr-
ession. Thus the narrative quality of experience makes narrative a 
particularly potent expression of human meaning. But this insight about 
'person' and the argued primacy of story over abstract language has, as 
we concluded in Ch. 1, (I 5) considerable significance for theology. As we 
have seen, the Bible itself, in narrative form, is the major source of 
Christian faith: perhaps it is important that its narrative form is organ-
ically revelatory of personhood. In The Uses of Scripture in Recent 
Theology Kelsey selects seven theologians' uses of scripture to illustrate 
possible approaches. Of these, only two, Warfield and Bartsch, who 
take scripture as systematic doctrine and a lexicon of technical terms 
respectively, propose an abstract function for scripture. The other 
five make appeals which Crites would call primary, to the Bible as the 
narrative of a nation's history (Wright), as the revelation of the central 
figure in a novel (Barth), as a complex poem (Thornton), an expressionist 
icon (Tillich) and the possibility of authentic existence (Bultmann). ( 16) 
Thus there is considerable evidence that the sources of Christian faith 
only yield their revelation according to the peculiar powers of narrative 
and that the substance of Christian faith and revelation is that Person-
hood which narrative is almost exclusively equipped to contain. In 
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addition to this theological perspective we can refine the conclusions of 
Ingli James' work which we examined earlier ( 17). Not only must theol-
ogy manage the ambiguity and paradoxes of metaphorical and symbolic 
language: it must also face the irreducible mystery of personhood in 
narrative itself. It is an intermingling of narratives which can relate 
persons to God. (I 8) There is more work to be done on this aspect of 
. narrative theology but Crites' observations on the primacy of narrative 
experience and the inherence of personhood in it are clearly seminal. 
"We awaken to ourselves as persons in a story-
like situation, already involved for all we are 
worth with the other personae in our incipient 
drama. They become 'visible to us' as persons 
precisely to the extent that our transactions 
with them begin to take on a narrative shape. 
But we also come to self-awareness in so far as 
our role in the story gets clarified in relation 
to them. Yet neither we nor they can simply 
make up or impose a piot on the story. The 
plot unfolds, partly, to be sure, of our own 
doing, but it is something we must struggle to 
comprehend, and indeed sometimes comically mis-
perceive. For precisely as persons, mysterious 
and whole, who materialize in the story, each of 
us has an existential density that keeps him 
from being entirely transparent to the others or 
entirely malleable at their hands. He cannot be 
reduced to a character in a story someone else 
has made up. The rest of us must contend with 
him; the story is ours only insofar as it is 
also his. Even in a work of narrative art the 
storyteller must respect this density in his 
characters thatmakes the story theirs as well as 
his. The story makes its own demand to be 
told". ( 19) 
Crites has one further observation to offer, on the subject of 
angels. He reflects on the appearances of God in Old Testament narra-
tives, especially in the stories of the wrestling Jacob and the visitors to 
Abraham's tent. The narrative ambiguity introduced by. angels was later 
resolved theologically as the figures were rationalised into intermediate 
beings, instruments of the divine wi11. But· it could not be resolved 
within the narrative frame whose continuities of space and time are 
shattered when a numinous figure advances the action in a marvellous 
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manner precisely by breaking those narrative continuities. Crites argues 
that when an angel appears something like the squaring of a circle must 
occur: narrative temporarily converges with a more lyrical form in which 
a pattern of sound and rhythm gain the ascendency. 
"When the musical presence of an angel sounds in 
a story it, too, is a kind of fragment, but of 
another sphere of existence that is otherwise 
unseen and unheard here below". (20) 
·This is another approach to transcendence such as we have seen already 
in the symbol and now in the structure of narrative itself. But there is 
a little more here too. Crites is inclined towards the need for mystery, 
though this inclination may be an evasion. Narrative ambiguity is a 
feat11re of the story-"like quality of experience, he says, al'ld unambiguous 
discrimination of sacred powers distances them from their narrative 
sources - people are never clear what prayer is to! Similarly he cont-
ends that monotheism is a secondary-order language, that 
"nothing so abstract as the absolute monad can 
figure in concrete imagery and first-order 
language of immediate experience and praxis. It 
cannot, for example, appear in stories or be 
expressed in narrative language". (21) 
This may appear a little doctrinaire. The essential point about angels, 
however is that they exist in narratives as a musical presence which 
breaks open the narrative continuity in space and time and cannot be 
reduced conceptually to a general theory of human behaviour or relig-
iously to a closed, motionless archetype. Thus, from a different persp-
ective Crites agrees with Smith that narrative may contain transcen-
dence which will exist in an irreducibly narratiVe form, its tensions pres-
erved, its evocation guarded. The •musical presence• of God may 
emerge from the concrete materialism of the narrative or it may not: 
however, narrative will always incarnate persons and be an irreducible 
but vital source of human meaning. 
There are two more introductory perspectives to narrative, the 
first of which is the work of James Hillman, a psychologist writing m 
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Wiggin's collection of essays. A point of departure for psychology, he 
claims, may be brain physiology, structural linguistics, analyses of beha-
vi our or 1 as here, the imagination, assuming a poetic basis of mind. Thus 
the 'plot' of Freud's case histories was 'repression' and that of Jung his 
theory of archetypes. Case histories are fictions to which the therapist 
gives a new plot. He describes four narrative genres that occuq the 
epic, the comic, the detective and social realism. The relation between 
archetype and genre has been worked out by Northrop Frye in Anatomy 
of Criticism and it is only necessary here to quote the words of Patricia 
Berry 
"The way we tell our story is the way we form 
our therapy. The way we imagine our lives is the 
I 
way we are going to go on living our lives. For 
the manner in which we tell ourselves about what 
is going on is the genre through which events 
become experiences". (22) 
Thus the rhetoric of the archetype is the 'god' that persuades us to 
believe in the myth that is the plot in our case history. To find the 
'gods' in psychology, he argues, we ought to look first at the genres of 
our case-history writing as literature. This is not merely an internal 
campaign about psychological methods. It confirms the inherently 
literary-narrative quality of experience, for psychology attempts a scien-
tific analysis of experience and yet, in Hillman's estimation, it is the 
narrative genre implicit in the particular approach which is the most 
formative element in the analysis. He goes on to explain soul-history 
(best represented by dreams, emotions and fantasies) as composed of 
psychic events not ego events, for reflection not control, to be pondered 
over but not identified. with. (23) ·Thus it is this psychic imagination 
that gives distance and allows us to see events as images. An image, he 
contends, is 
"not a content that we see but a way in which we 
see. The essence of word-images is that they 
are free from the perceptible world and free one 
from it. They take the mind home to its poetic 
base". (24) 
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Case histories are therefore fundamental to depth psychology not as 
empirical fundamentals or paradigmatic examples of theorists' plots but 
as soul stories which give us a narrative 
"that deliteralizes our life from its projective 
obsession with outwardness by putting it into a 
story. They move us from the fiction of reality 
to the reality of fiction. They present us with 
the chance to recognise ourselves in the mess of 
the world as having been engaged and always 
being engaged in soul-making, where 'making' 
returns to its original meaning of poesis 
Perhaps our age has gone to analysis not to be 
loved or get cured, or even to 'know thyself'. 
Perhaps we go to be given a case history, to be 
told into a soul story and given a plot to live 
by. This is the gift of case history, the gift 
of finding oneself in myth. In myths gods and 
humans meet". (25) 
This is an expert witness, strictly outside the literary-theological debate, 
and yet it is easy to see why his observations are included in Wicker's 
collection of essays about story. They underline the significance of 
narrative in the formation of human meaning and in doing so make a 
glancing reference to theology. Hillman's 'image' defined not by content 
but as a way of seeing mirrors the conclusions of Paul Ricoeur on 
symbol as a perspective of faith. (26) His reference to the soul, whilst 
not intending any metaphysical significance, pierces beneath the surface 
of contingency to the dimension of depth in which theology functions. 
Finally, his identification of myth as the place both of human self-
discovery and discovery of God further cements the link between the 
narrativity of meaning and theological significance, a link which has 
already been implied. The logic of narrative, then, is at the very centre 
of human meaning, indeed it is at the centre of our psychological devel-
opment, and we must look for the 'musical presence' of God in the 
peculiar qualities of the narrative mode. 
In addition to the psychological perspective there is the linguistic 
argument. In The Story Shaped World Brian Wicker argues at length 
that metaphor is endemic in all communication since it is simply one 
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of the two 'poles' of language and that metaphor is never an 'innocent' 
figure but always implies a subterranean metaphysic. He draws on the 
legacy of Coleridge in emphasising that "to make and to understand a 
metaphor are alike acts of the creative imagination" (27) but the subst-
ance of his argument 9 based on the linguistics of Saussure and Jakobson, 
is that language itself is an agent in the creation of meaning. Thus 
language involves the two acts of choosing and combining which form 
the axes of language. Leaving aside the complexities of the structuralist 
argument about paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations it is sufficient 
to quote certain illustrations by which Wicker carries his argument. The 
analogies Shakespeare used between an eagle and a king and between a 
schoolboy and a snail were only available to him because of the under-
lying analogical 'great chain of being' which Lovejoy describes. (28) By 
virtue of its place in the hierarchy a particular species could serve the 
philosopher or poet as a reliable sign of some other level in the hier-
archy. Underlying this particular hierarchy was the concept of creation 9 
a causal concept. Similarly, in God's Grandeur, when Hopkins says that 
"the Holy Ghost broods" we must deny the literal truth of the metaphor 
- God is not a broody bird - but we may not deny the analogy's literal 
truth: the statement is true as long as we understand it analogica11y. 
Thus metaphor is more than the simple perception of similarity; it is 
always the perception of likeness within a larger dissimilarity. Levi-
Strauss reveals that tolemic societies are governed by gigantic metaphors 
of the animal kingdom to make tolerable the tensions of the human 
community. The two axes of language function in this case as fo11ows: 
by choice of metaphor a father-in-law is compared to an eagle-hawk and 
a son-in-law to a crow, but the logic of these choices relies on the axis 
of combination, that is, on the relation of eagle-hawk to crow. Eagle-
hawks are hunters and crows are merely thieves: the crow must forever 
submit as stealer to the true hunter. Both axes are necessary to 'think 
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with'. 
This linguistic analysis of metaphor and analogy has implications 
for 'Nature' and 'God'. "Metaphor", Wicker argues, 
"exerts a relation between man and a world which 
is properly called 'Nature', that is to say, a 
world ordered and intelligible and subject to 
discernable natural tendencies inherent in 
things themselves". (29) 
Similarly metaphor in theology works by taking it for granted that it is 
possible to affirm certain human characteristics of God and in this way 
brings God into direct contact with the world. 
"But it does so only because it presupposes that 
we already know that these characteristics are 
not literally true of God. Somehow therefore we 
have to know already that God is not literally 
what the metaphor affirms him to be". (30) 
Wicker suggests that~ historically, the result of failing to appreciate the 
true nature of the relationship between analogy and metaphor is the root 
cause of the profound divorce between the God of the philosophers and 
the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob which Pascal diagnosed. Whitehead 
and Teilhard de Chardin, he says, assume that the tension is between 
the God of religion and the God of philosophy and must be resolved by a 
theory about God. But Wicker proposes that it be solved only by a 
theory about the way we speak about God: this, he feels, his use of 
analogy and metaphor according to structural linguistics achieves. 
"An analogical conception of Goc! must accompany, 
and even precede, any metaphysical speech, and 
indeed any religious under$tanding of him". ( 31) 
Thus, he argues, we have a conception of God as Creator and Most High 
before we read the metaphor of Yahweh. 
"The only person who can tell us what Yahweh 
tho8ght is Yahweh - ~o God is in the stories of 
Yahweh, but not as character, or as part of 
wh;:~t is told, but as the implied teller". 02) 
However we evaluate the detail of this argument it is clear that there 
is considerable linguistic evidence that narrative, which thrives on meta-
phor, must have metaphysical implications about the world and even 
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about God. It is appropriate now to examine the narrative mode itself 
to see where these theologically significant elements lie. 
As the title of the American seminars (5) makes clear narrative 
is essentially an occupant of space and time: a combination of these 
elements constitutes the form or the shape of a narrative. Consequently 
some attention has been given to the space 7 time and form of narrative. 
As might be expected there are some impulsive and unreflective state-
ments made, not least by John Reist. He begins by drawing our atten-
tion to the intimate relationship of theme and form within narrative: 
"the story does not simply 'contain' a dictum, 
or truth about life; it incarnates it. The 
narrative is that truth. Thus, narrative is 
moved out -:-of the · rational discourse of the 
courts into an aesthetic mimesis of experience, 
and instead of Q.E.D. the more appropriate con-
clusion is Q.E.C. or Quod erat carnificiendum". 
(33) 
Despite the flourish this is, of course, an essential point, but he goes on 
to speak about form as if the only form by which we preserve ourselves 
against the flux of existence is literary and narrative, as if narrative is 
necessarily a container of truth and as if the Eucharist is the only narr-
ative shaping of life. "I think it is not excessive to claim", he says, 
"that whenever the desire for narrative form exists (tell me a story .... 
listen, children!) there you have a longing for the truth about human 
kind". There are perhaps few child psychologists who would agree with 
this interpretation of such a child's request. It is also the substance of 
his argument that the Eucharist may be considered as a narrative struc-
ture of events which re-orders both space and time. "The bread and 
wine (phenomena in space) become symbols of transcendent realities; and 
this happens through an action in time where Jesus reconstitutes histor-
ical reality into a powerful representation of all of life". (34) Similarly, 
he argues, the narrative mode itself takes the world of flesh and bone 
and transforms it: 
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"narrative provides a formal structure in which 
historical reality may be distilled into an 
enduring whole revelatory of our immanent sin 
and possible salvation". (35) 
But 7 of course7 narrative may be revelatory of anything else as Robbe-
Grillet has ably demonstrated; has it contributed very much to our under 
-standing either of narrative or of theology to point out that both the 
eucharist (understood as narrative) and narrative itself transform space 
and time? Reist indeed shows how a Christian may impose the narrative 
'form' of Christianity on the world in the eucharist and in the novel 7 
but not why 'form' itself (any form) is connected with truth nor 7 there-
fore 7 has he said anything about secular art and hence about art in 
itself. 
Jo Turk draws attention to the double perspective on time in 
Forster's A Passage to India. This split between the cyclical time of 
primitive and oriental man and the linear time of Western man gives 
evidence, she argues, of his dual perspective on religion. (36) John Cox 
explores this relation between attitudes to time and religious orientation 
in relation to the contrast between Greek and Hebrew narratives. 
"Aristotle", he argues, 
"is the critic who first thought of a process 
that unfolds in time (that is, narrative or 
dramatic action) as if it were a static object 
in space with an identifiable, integrated 
structure". (37) 
This underlies the Greek assumption of a military principle behind the 
apparent flux of visible reality. As J.J. Pollitt observes: 
"If the apparent mutability of the physical 
world and of the human condition was a source of 
pain and bewilderment to the Greeks, the discov-
ery of a permanent pat tern or an unchanging 
substratum by which apparently chaotic exper-
ience could be measured and explained was a 
source of satisfaction, even joy, which had 
something of a religious nature". (38) 
In contrast to the unitary explanation favoured by the Greeks the 
Hebrew scriptures are multigeneric and episodic. They are most sharply 
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distinguished from Homer by their history-likeness. Their adaptation of 
remembered events to a sequential, chronological narrative points to a 
paradoxical affirmation of 'profane' time as the locus of sacred action. 
In the mythic view of the Greeks 
"profane time must be abolished periodically 
because of its uncertainty and vicissitudes: 
only in such abolition can one re-enter an un-
changing sacred time. Mythic narratives of the 
human past therefore aspire to (even when they 
do not achieve) the kind of timeless design 
that Homer perfected, and they do so by contin-
ual readaption of past events to the timeless 
patterns of myth. But Israel's sacred history 
lacks a mythic shape 1 in spite of the strong 
influence that Near Eastern mythology always 
exerted on her. Her narrative of the human 
past depicts Yahweh as sponsoring and partic-
ipating in the on-going, open-ended sequence of 
profane time". (39) 
Thus, "if Yahweh does not act in history, as the advocates of Biblical 
theology claimed, he certainly acts in history-like narratives, whose 
structure is therefore a divine revelation of peculiar character and 
power". (40) Thus narratives are the products of particular cultures and 
reflect different religious visions in their form and shape. 
However, as Ted Estess observes, 
"it is deeply ironic that while some humanists 
engage in a concerted effort to resurrect the 
metaphor of story as a way of understanding the 
deepest matters of human existence, many liter-
ary artists speak of the death of the novel and 
despair over the story- form itself". ( 41) 
In a study of Beckett Estess traces a movement from an active to a 
contemplative stance toward the desire for stories, and identifies four 
factors involved. First, Beckett wants to admit chaos into art since he 
fails "to surprise any principle of right order submerged in the contrar-
ieties of experience". (42) Story, however, has an order-giving intent, 
establishing linkage among various incidents in time which may be 
casual, logical or teleological. "To construct a plot is to perceive in 
narrative incidents either the cradle or the grave of something else". 
(43) Second, Beckett is caught in a dialectic between fidelity to 
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finitude and fascination with the infinite. Thus his characters experience 
failure and impotence against the grain of story's implied ability to 
transcend momentary experience m a more comprehensive perspective. 
"His characters, either crawling in the mud or closeted in a small room, 
are powerless to view the horizons of life". (4-4-) And yet the refusal of 
story equally relates to fidelity to infinitude. Beckett's narrators resist 
the finality of an ending with a premonition of beginning over again in a 
new cycle. Thus 
"Beckett's characters abdicate incarnate exist-
ence, they deny the limits of temporality impl-
icit in an interpretation of life through the 
metaphor of story". (45) 
Third, Beckett's characters' descent into the private world of the self 
runs counter to narrative's shared fabric of many destinies and defeats 
itself, for the nominative 'I' can only speak about itself by becoming 
other than itself as the accusative 'me': thus the 'I' is not said by tell-
ing a story about the 'me' and story itself, therefore, prevents an 
adequate account of the self. Last of all, Beckett's characters are 
bound to inaction and cannot be, as in a myth, in a story in which some 
-thing happens, for story affirms implicitly that something significant has 
been done. 
Thus, if we suppose that artists are to be of some assistance in 
forging new metaphors of meaning we need to be aware of the disrup-
tion of the form of story in modern literature if we are meaningfully to 
engage contemporary consciousness. Estess alerts us to two challenges. 
Firstly, we must understand story in such a way as not to exclude 
chaos. Religionists, he argues, 
"tend to make much of the necessity for cosmo-
cizing -human experience in a syntactical fash-
ion,· indeed the word re-ligio connotes tying 
things together in a meaningful whole". ( 46) 
This is exactly the failing of Reist's comments about the inherent 
narratability of the world, whose order is given anticipative realization 
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m narrative art. He errs because of pnor dogmatic convictions about 
order~ but it is equally possible~ as we have seen from Wicker's work on 
linguistics, that the disorder of life might be compromised by the syn-
tactical order of narrative. Secondly, "religionists interested in story"~ 
as Estess calls them~ must carefully attend to the relation of life and 
literature. "One sometimes receives the impression that instead of lit-
erature imitating life the religionists interested in story want life to 
imitate literature". (47) There is, of course, room for a difference of 
opinion here. As Reist's arguments about the eucharist amply illustrate 
there is a real theological interest in the function of a religious narra-
tive (even one as ritual and contextual as the eucharist) in transforming 
the flux of contingent life. The flavour of this concern may be caught 
in the Pauline injunctions to "put off the old man" and "put on Christ". 
(48) Nevertheless, Estess intends to alert us to the falsification which 
may occur in this process, not merely at the religious level of substi-
tuting idols for God, but at the methodological level of discrimination 
between a legitimately religious function (which he defines as allegiance 
to life) and the ritual function of a definitive religious myth within the 
religious community which it constitutes. There is also variance among 
theoreticians about the relation of narrative structure and human 
existence. Barbara Hardy and Stephen Crites maintain that story corres-
ponds to a fundamental structure of consciousness whilst Frank Kermode 
sees narrative as an aesthetic structure imposed upon life events. (49) 
Finally, however, Estess cautions us that "Life is distinguishable Jrom 
literature, and the aesthetic categories applicable to storied literature do 
not exhaust human reality". (49) 
Thus it is clear that though narrative literature in its form and 
shape has broad theological implications it is necessary for us to be very 
discriminating about the kind of meaning that is and is not involved in 
narrative. In Beckett Estess has studied the battle of narrative against 
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its own characteristics9 but there are forms of narrative whose particular 
shapes are at one with the kinds of meanings they each carry. These1 
according to some of the papers which have been produced, are folk 
narrative, romance1 epic1 parable and rnyth. 
In a study of one of Grimm's tales called Our Lad¥_'~ Child 
Nicolaisen demonstrates that the motifs of folk-narrative are well suited 
to convey the deepest human meanings. The particular motif to which 
he draws our attention is the 'unique prohibition' motif. In this folk-tale 
the child is forbidden to open the thirteenth door though she may open 
the others. This is a direct parallel with the Garden of Eden prohibition 
about eating fruit. Both encapsulate one of the most basic human 
dilemmas; extensive1 but ultimately severely limited 1 freedom of choice. 
"Our Lady's Child is"1 he argues, 
"a highly persuasive example of the folk-
narrative modey with all its familiar, expected 
attributes 1 having been conveniently and without 
much strain pressed into divine service". (50) 
Thus he concludes in two ways. 
"Just as the song 1 the proverb, the riddle, the 
gnomic saying and other genres of verbal folk-
art can be, and have been, filled with theolog-
ical significance when the word is to be the 
Lord's, so the sub-genres of the folk-narrative 
mode, with its peculiar, linear, two-dimension-
al, stark, precise, selectively highlighting 
style, its structuring, frequently incremental 
repetitativeness, and especially its notable 
embeddedness in time, lend themselves with 
humble ease to something more demanding, more 
transcending, more sublimating than the stories 
of Lazy Jack, Tom-Tit-Tot, of The Well at the 
World's End 1 even of Our Lady's Child". (51) 
But equally narration did not begin as divine discourse and in fact "shies 
away from the religious domain". (51) Of course, the folk-tale knows of 
the numinous and otherworldly but 
"the supernatural representatives of the other 
world with whom folk-tale protagonists come in-
to contact as both helpers and adversaries in-
habit a zone of folk-belief far removed from 
the realms of theology. Their advice, their 
tricks, their magic objects are fundamentally 
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wishful projections derived from the condit-
ions, desires and demands of this world and 
from a direct response required on the folk-
cultural level to the natural habitat". ,(51) 
This separation between folk hP-1 ief and theology is clearly the result of 
Nicolaisen's own perspective on theology (51) but it is clear that folk-
narrative deals only with human meaning even though this may coincide 
with religious meaning. The 'unique prohibition' motif with which he 
deals in this tale encapsulates the limitation of human freedom: this 
knowledge is clearly something that needs no specifically religious origin 
though it may be of great religious significance. Thus the wisdom of 
folk-narrative is world-orientated and to do with human wishes, project-
ions' and demands. However, the fact that it has been so successfully 
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pressed into divine service, as Nicolaisen admits, begs the question about 
the theological status of this human wisdom, (52) a question Nicolaisen's 
own theological perspective excludes. 
Jeanne Murray Walker describes George MacDonald's turning from 
realistic novel to romance at the end of his career as a strategy design-
ed to reawaken awareness of the transcendent in an age dulled by values 
rooted in the commonplace. Lilith is a particularly illuminating romance 
because through the portrayal of the central character as an inept 
reader the image of reading becomes a metaphor for construing the 
traditions of the past and, more precisely, an analogy for the efforts of 
a Victorian to grasp and place himself within the Christian tradition. 
Romances, as Northrop Frye defines them, are organised by laws other 
than the ordinary laws of nature. 
"The hero of romance moves in a world·in which 
the ordinary la~s of natute are slightly susp-
ended: prodigies of courage and endurance, un-
natural tb us, are natural to him, and enchant-
ed weapons, talking animals, terryfying ogres 
and witches, and talismans of miraculous power 
violate no rul~ of probability once the postul-
ates of romance have been established". (53) 
Thus the very form itself escapes from any implied naturalism or mere 
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mimesis of contingency with the religious meaning implied in those 
emphases and unashamedly invokes the function of perspective in the 
discernment of metaphorical meaning. To understand metaphor requires 
stereoscopic vision, to preserve a tension between the two· referents of 
the metaphor and so to comprehend a meaning which resides in neither 
alone. As David Tracy asserts "claims of metaphor are central to" des-
criptions of religious meaning. Western religions are "religions of the 
book", he argues, of "books which codify root metaphors through various 
linguistic and generic strategies". (54) One of the key insights, there-
fore, of Walker's study is that the references to readings scattered 
throughout Lilith "caH attention to the fact and process of metaphor in 
order to argue that our way of understanding religious meaning is similar 
to our way of perceiving meaning when we read". (55) Thus 
"MacDonald wishes to turn his readers' minds to 
the uses and limits of metaphor in the search 
not merely for literary but also for religious 
meaning. On the one hand Lilith argues that 
individual redemption and cultural renewal can 
come about only through means described by 
traditional religious metaphors. On the other 
hand it pictures the Christian tradition through 
metaphors so difficult, because they are dis-
junct, that the search for meaning must become 
a painful, idiosyncratic, and threatening 
journey".(56) 
By caJling attention to his metaphors rather than making them invisible, 
and by defying the pretense to fictional realism of the contemporary 
Victorian literary scene MacDonald "threw in his lot with the theological 
profession" of his day, declaring that the way to truth lay through 
metaphor. Clearly this is of historical importance, but for our purpose 
it draws attention to possibilities of religious meaning inherent in the 
metaphoric nature of romance. It is what Ian Ramsey ca11s the "odd 
logic" (57) of religious metaphor that MacDonald has pressed in his 
romance. 
Of the third literary genre considered in these papers we shall say 
very little. Mario di Cesare (58) calls for a renewed appreciation of the 
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religious dimension of epic as an essential incredient in that genre. He 
defines a characteristic "epic irony" which arises out of the fundamental 
incongruence between the hero's actions and the epic context of hi's 
actions. It comes out of the coexistence of gods and men, a coexist-
ence central to epic, and out of the divergent interests and diverse 
moralities appropriate to gods and heroes. Thus epic irony ordinarily 
occurs at the intersection of the divine and the human. In the Iliad 
epic irony consists in Achilles not achieving the promised glory, for the 
heroic choice is brushed aside by the very force that sanctioned it and 
the blessing he receives becomes a kind of curse. Because the gods are 
taken with full seriousness epic irony releases the most profoundly relig-
ious significance. In some critical' opinion the gods are made to dis-
appear from view or are labelled as ornamental m an attempt to evade 
theological, anthropological or religious problems. The stress is also 
one-sidedly placed on an anthropomorphism which obscures the gods' 
function within the epic and hides a subtler element, "the theomorphic 
movement (as Goethe called it)", the figure of men striving to be "as 
gods". But it is in the interplay of the divine and the human within 
epic that man's religious perceptions are tested against the tradition he 
inherits. 
Thus m these three highly stylized genres, in folk-narrative, in 
romance and in epic, we have varied examples of specifically literary 
ways of containing and developing human, and almost inevitably relig-
lOus, meaning. They are, however, distinct genres. In myth and parable 
we have narrative modes which function within many genres as the est-
ablishment and subversion of worlds of meaning. Ulreich attempts to 
illustrate this in a study of Spenser as iconic and Milton as. iconoclastic. 
Spenser, he argues, is a maker of religious mythic images, hierarchical 
in structure and sacramental in imagery: to read his poetry is to share 
his values. Milton's poetry is radically iconoclastic, its form anarchic, 
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its imagery secular9 its tone prophetic and disturbing. This is a dog-
matic contrast which he goes on to soften by recognising in each traces 
of the other 9 but he makes two general conclusions. Firstly9 Ulreich 
claims that the religious imagination is characterised by this polarity 
between iconic and iconoclastic vision. Secondly9 the 'religious' nature 
of poetry Jies not in its subject but in the formal relation between poet 
and his audience "to whom he needs must appear as in some sort a 
spiritual guide". (59) Even though he is describing specifically religious 
poetry we may not wish to agree with the note of spiritual didacticism 
implicit here 9 but whatever the nature of the relationship it will become 
clear that where myth and parable function the audience is actively 
engaged in religious experience and response. 
John Dominic Crossan offers a systematic theory of myth and 
parable from a structuralist perspective. Thus he believes that reality 
is structure, especially linguistic structure, and he therefore rejects three 
conventional assumptions about reality. Neither art nor science is the 
fount of truth and location of reality: both are successive ways of 
knowledge. Progress is not necessarily amelioration. Reality is not 
objectively observed 'out there', for "theory precedes observation". 
Having rejected these three assumptions he concludes that "there is only 
story". 
"If there is only story, then God, or the ref-
erent of transcendental experience, is either 
inside my story and, in that case, at least in 
the Judea-Christian tradition I know best, God 
is merely an idol I have created; or, God is 
outside my story, and I have just argued that 
what is 'out there' is completely unknowable. 
So it would seem that any transcendental exper-
ience has been ruled out, if we can only live 
in story. In all of this I admit most openly a 
rooted prejudice against worshipping my own im-
agination and genuflecting before my own mind." 
(60) 
He tries to illuminate contemporary atheism with an aJlegory of a raft. 
People were adrift on the raft but in contact with a lighthouse-keeper 
ashore who knew their position and could always guide them. But the 
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dry land itself has been removed, and with it has gone the lighthouse 
and its keeper and has left the people alone on the raft at sea. This 
corresponds to the failure of belief in a fixed centre of reality 'out 
there', independent of us, that guaranteed our existence and our know-
ledge. The raft is language itself. 
If, then, there is only story, the raft adrift on the sea, and God is 
either within language and therefore an idol or outside it and therefore 
unknown, there is only one possibility left to the theologian; this is what 
we may experience in the movement of the raft, in the breaks of the 
raft's structure and above all what can be experienced at the edges of 
the, raft. We cannot talk of the sea itself but only of that which is 
experienced at the edges of the raft. Thus the "excit'ement of trans-
cendental experience is found only at the edges of language and the 
limits of story" (61) and to find that excitement we must test those 
edges and limits; this is the work of parable. 
It has been necessary to make dear the philosophical background 
to Crossan's work in order to appreciate his comments on myth and, 
particularly, parable. It is unnecessary to render in full his application 
to literature of the techniques of structural anthropology culled from 
Levi-Strauss and based on "a persistent series of binary discriminations". 
(62) It is sufficient to refer to his categories of story and the qualities 
he attaches to them. 
"Story establishes world in myth, defends such 
established world in apologue, discu~ses ~nd 
describes world in action, attacks world in 
satire and subverts world in parable". ( 63) 
Parable is his main concern. He demonstrates how it undermines our 
complacent security wi"th reference to the books of Jonah and Ruth and 
the works of Kafka and Borges. 
"In the parabolic book of.Jonah there is again 
no destruction of the magnificent traditions 
of election, covenant and prophecy. All that 
happens is what always happens in parable. 
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God is given a little room in which to be God 
and we are reminded of our finitude and our 
humanity... The question posed by the books of 
Ruth and Jonah is this. What if God does not 
play the game by our rules?" (64) 
The same is true of the secular parables of Kafka and l:)orges. 
"Parables serve 
ology of loss. 
to enhance our 
but that is the 
what might be called an epistem-
Their value, as knowledge, is 
'consciousness of ignorance' 
beginning of philosophy". (65) 
Crossan suggests that it is also the beginning of religious experience. 
Crossan's main concern seems to be epistemological: how is it 
possible to know God? We might wish to speak of the limits of human 
perception where he speaks only of the limits of language for it is pass-
ible ·to experience in a non-linguistic way. However it is very clear in 
this work on parable that he associates religious experience with the 
experience of human limitation. As in the work of Brian Wicker there 
are two Gods, the God who is within human myth and therefore, in 
Crossan's terms, an idol and the God who is 'out there' and therefore 
outside human knowledge. It is Crossan's argument that parable, in 
questioning the God of our myths, creates an area of indeterminacy in 
which the real God 'out there' can make himself known to us. In its 
allegiance to the principles of linguistic structuralism as a basis for 
human knowledge this is itself a rather limited view of God and man. 
It lacks an adequate understanding of the Incarnation and of the imman-
ence of God in the Holy Spirit. Epistemological doubt - 'we might be 
wrong' - is in itself no substitute for the redemptive presence of God. 
In confining itself to the structure of reversal in parable structuralism 
fails to allow for the content of the parable which may have a positive 
as well as a negative intent. 
Janet Larsbn, however, articulates from Crossan's analysis a: saving 
balance between myth and parable. As Crossan says we are open to 
transcendence when we "dwell in the tension of myth and parable", but 
as Tillich also says in Dynamics of Faith myths cannot be removed for 
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they form the "language of faith". Thus, in Crossan's words, 
"To break free of idolatrous faith the believer 
must recognise the myth as a story which is not 
in itself sacred but points beyond itself as a 
provisional symbol of his ultimate concern". 
(66) 
Thus myth and parable are equally concerned with human meaning at a 
point where in its gesture towards transcendence it becomes most nearly 
religious meaning. 
Finally, having considered many separate contributions to theory 
about theology and 'narrative we turn to the single perspective and ded-
ication of Wesley Kart. He warns against four critical mistakes in this 
field; of dividing religious meaning from literary form, of addressing 
narrative with a re!Rgious problem and measuring it by the problem, of 
limiting attention to narratives containing religious words, and of desc-
ribing anything aesthetic as religiously important. Rather, he argues, 
modern narratives are often found to carry or imply religious or relig-
iously important meanings because the elements of narrative have a 
natural relation to corresponding moments in religious life and thought. 
Thus he isolates the elements of narrative, atmosphere, character, plot 
and tone, demonstrates the kind of religious meaning each draws to 
itself or by which each tends to be complicated and enriched, and ext-
ends his consideration of that element to its moment in religious life 
and thought. His is a text-centred approach, though he acknowledges 
the work done on the author by Nathan Scott and on the reader by 
Sallie TeSeHe. (67) 
Atmosphere establishes the boundaries of the world of a narrative, 
what can and cannot be expected to occur. It is more than setting 
(time and place) for similar settings could be quite different in· atmos-
phere. In some modern novels atmosphere assumes the role of an 
antagonist when, for example, the hero is diminished in his fight against 
impersonal, anti-human powers. Atmosphere suggests otherness and 
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otherness1 as we have seen (68) ~ is a religiously significant category. 
"Atmosphere is an image within a narrative of 
possibilities or powers beyond the borders of 
human alteration, understanding and control, 
and a religious man is a person who, among 
other things, is primarily oriented to what 
lies beyond human understanding and control". 
(69) 
Kart acknowledges that confrontation with what is beyond human under-
standing and control should not by itself be called religious but argues 
that 
"the more a character becomes aware of other-
ness, the more he allows it to preoccupy him, 
the more oriented he becomes to it, the more it 
displaces in power and worth what he can under-
stand and control, the more he becomes like a 
religious person . . . who should be understood, 
among other things, as one to whom, to use a 
marketplace expression, the transcendent is 
primary." ( 70) 
Kart assembles several expert witnesses: Karl Jaspers (71) describes a 
consciousness of limiting situations as man's gratuitous housing which is 
the source of his "philosophical faith", Gordon Kaufman argues that 
behind the specific limiter is absolute, universal limitation, Martin Buber 
(72) that the Eternal Thou hovers at the fringes of each I-Thou relation-
ship and Paul van Buren (73) describes the limits of our inadequate lang-
uage and concludes that God is a limit-word. Thus the context and the 
weight of Kart's case is clear: atmosphere is related to limitation and 
otherness which is the orientation of; a religious person. 
Kart's second element, character, is, he suggests, paradigmatic of 
human possibilities. 
"It is often the dominant element in modern 
n~rrative because the modern period is obs~ss­
ively oriented towards individual human exist-
ence, resourcefulness for creativity or destr-
uction and position in relation to society and 
nature". (74) 
Neo-Aristotelians will object, he admits, that character is subservient to 
plot and those sympathetic to the New Criticism will object that the 
power of fiction comes from the 'voice' within it, but Kart maintains 
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that there are four levels on which the power and meaning of character 
may be generated. It always operates on a literal level in relation to 
the other fictional e·Jements. It may operate in relation to extra-literary 
counterparts by forcing us to acknowledge 'this is what people are like;. 
A character may rise above its literary context and become paradigmatic 
of some style, problem, perversity or virtue as Captain Ahab or Don 
Quixote do. Finally, it may open up something beyond itself as Paul 
does in Sons and Lovers and thus be tropological. 
"It is in the process of actualizing possible 
meanings at these levels that character be-
comes a dominant element in a narrative, and, 
as it increasingly does so, becomes paradig-
matic for human nature as it is, could, or even 
should or should not be. The position character 
gains as it becomes important in a narrative is 
religiously suggestive because character as 
paradigm takes on a kind of exemplary and even 
revealing role, one similar to the force felt 
by a religious community from its authoritative 
figures". (75) 
We may be less willing than Kart is here to emphasise the 'paradig-
matic' as exemplary. In his 1980 paper (76) he himself replaces the term 
'paradigmatic' with the word "potential" which is perhaps more acceptable. 
Otherwise we might wish to exclude the didactic emphasis with the 
words 'focus' or 'model' or even 'example'. With this revaluation would 
have to go a modified appeal to the function within religious communities 
of the lives of heroes and saints. Such communities do not characterise 
only exemplary conduct but also that which is to be avoided and many 
delicate positions between these extremes. Indeed, we conduct our 
discrimination about potential human behaviour in narrative terms by 
use of such models of character as are relevant, from saints and tyrants 
to figures of mythology and literature. The appeal to the function · 
of exemplary saints in religious communities is therefore a little weak. 
However, character remains inherently suggestive of religious value 
in the terms of Kart's later paper: "whether human nature is mean 
or worthy, whether it is in a state of decline or ascent, whether 
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it is principally individual or communal"9 such questions as these 
"Cannot be answered with certainty, do not yield 
to answers open to verification, and they are 
questions which people either consciously or not 
answer di ffercntly from one another." ( 77) 
Kart's analysis of the third element9 plot, becomes a discussion of 
time. Narrative time, he argues, is meaningful movement and thus leads 
to belief. But the question which results concerns the relation of narr-
ative time to human time: "is human time at once both movement and 
meaning?" (77) Kart contends that this is the most important issue em-
bedded in modernism. Cyclical time, which is repeated myths and rituals 
that returns linear time, returning people to their origins, has been super-
ceded by linear time since the divine revelation is located in history. 
This has resulted in an imputation of novelty and of irreversibility to all 
actions, a temporal definition of man, the dissociation of time from nat-
ure and the separation of public and external from private and internal 
time. These problems, of the meaning and coherence of history, are 
examples of the way in which time is a matter of major modern uncer-
tainty which unsettles the discussion of plot in narrative. There are 
equa11y difficult formal concerns, especia11y of the spatialization of 
narrative. (78) Yet Kart is able to draw on the myth critics in arguing 
the cyclical character of plot-time. Cassirer and Jung assert that art is 
expressive of human relationships to the world, and not, as Kermode 
would have it, an imposition of alien forms on it. Northrop Frye also 
integrates plot and the cycle of nature. In his 1980 paper Kart describes 
the time of narrative as rhythmic, human time as repetition, polyphonic 
time as the consequence of contrary forces or factors interacting with 
one another, and melodic time as a line of internal development. Thus he 
is able to argue that the element of plot has religious associations der-
ived from ritual and the rehearsal of great events in religious life. 
Fina11y, tone, the image of the teller in the tale, has three 
aspects, material selection, an attitude towards that material and 
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language use, Sometimes referred to as 'world-view' or 'vision' or even 
'intention' 1 tone has been subject to attack when it is felt that the ill-
usion of reality is threatened by authorial presence. Equally, it has its 
defenders, notably Walter Ong who insists that the relation between 
reader and author is the principle aesthetic matter. Kort's synthesis is 
that "tone is an image of the creative act, and the creative act is the 
moment in which material, language and attitude arise as one thing". 
(79) This has associations with relation and wholeness, affirmation and 
belief, above all, with value. 
"When reflected upon, then, tone naturally 
takes to itself enrichments and complications 
from that moment of religious life and thought 
having to do with religious experience, orient-
ation and response." (80) 
Clearly Kort's argument can be opposed 9 especially by those who 
wish to insist on the mere contingency of the world and of human exp-
erience. However, it is not the burden of Kort's argument to prove 
that narrative 12_ religious: it is his concern to demonstrate how and why 
it may be religious. Atmosphere, character, plot and tone, that is to 
say, boundaries, human nature, time and value constitute the four cor-
ners of an ordered human world. This is unavoidably intertwined with 
belief, Fiction thus has in common with religion a fund of resources 
to constitute an entire world. Kort is ready to acknowledge that the 
otherness of fiction is not the same as the 'transcendence' of religion: 
but what can be said of transcendence by a religious person can be said 
of those forms through which the transcendent is made accessible to 
him. It is "mistaken to call the imagined . world of a narrative relig-
ious"9 he claims, but 
"narratives do help clarify and give, so to 
spe~k, concrete instances of those major matteis 
of which a religious man's life are consti t-
uted . . . . Although they stand as well at some 
distance from one another, the elements of 
narrative are correlatives of the character-
istics of religion." (81) 
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Furthermore, 
"the 'ordered world' of narrative is a reflec-
tion of that ordered world which is pre-supp-
osed by any ongoing human life. The matters of 
belief to which the elements of narrative lead 
us are not casual or optional matters for human 
existence and experience." (82) 
In life as in fiction we need beliefs about what is possible, about human 
nature, about the movement and meaning of time, and about value. 
Finally, in his 1980 paper Kart gives the preliminary results of 
some unfinished analysis of modern religious systems. The general sense 
of distance between modern narrative and belief implied by specialists in 
the field is, he argues, inappropriate. It is his "working hypothesis that 
modern narrative is related to beliefs which arise from a religious system 
by which modern narrative is enfolded." (83) A religious system, he 
argues, gives rise to beliefs concerning three matters: that which cannot 
be understood or controlled; the form of what cannot be understood or 
controlled in the human world; and the spiritual and moral needs of a 
person or people and the satisfaction of those needs. All three need to 
be present m a religious system and one of them will dominate. It fall-
ows, then, that there are three kinds of religious system; the 'prophetic' 
in which what cannot be understood or controlled IS dominant, the 
'priestly' in which the form in the human world of what cannot be under-
stood or controlled is dominant, and the 'sapiential', in which the moral 
and spiritual needs of a person or people and the satisfaction of those 
needs is dominant. Kort sees mediaeval Europe as having been enfolded 
by a 'priestly' system, the movements that led up to the Reformation as 
expressive of a 'prophetic' system and the system that has been most 
prominent since the seventeenth century as a 's~piential' system. 
"The conclusion which may now be drawn suggests 
that the beliefs to which the elements of narr-
ative lead us in the modern situation are bel-
iefs that must be appropriately studied first 
of all in relation to a sapiential religious 
system and not to a system of a prophetic or a 
priestly kind." (84) · 
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Thus in his studies of character in recent American fiction he has seen 
the nature and status of human experiences and their relation to nature9 
to cultural conflict and to transcendent ideals as beliefs related to a 
sapiential religious anthropology. He even hints that the principle source 
of the sapiential system is not classical or pagan but Biblical. This is 
unfinished and awaits detailed application, but it confirms that the dis-
cussion of Chapter 2 is a crucial one to the prospect of progress in this 
field. He suggests further work on whether narrative is more suited to 
a sapiential system and drama or the lyric to priestly and prophetic sys-
terns than any other combination. In this perspective, however, the 
'moral and spiritual needs of a person' and 'belief in an ordered world' 
imply each other and we can understand some of Kort's reasoning about 
the four narrative elements, particularly why he is prepared to accept as 
'religious' what other critics might call 'human'. We must await further 
analysis of this issue which may prove most fruitful. 
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Ch. 5 FINDING FAITH 
Readings of Henderson the Rain King 
Two broad arguments seem to emerge from these investigations and 
each indicates a certain circularity. The first is that theology and 
literature are, indeed, bound together. On one hand, theological concerns 
are implicit in literature. On the other, theology must accept the quest-
ing, testing and forging of new currencies of meaning that goes on within 
the • literary mode. 
The second is rather more difficult to express. On the one hand, we 
are forced to concede that certain forms of literary creativity (like myth 
or parable) contain or shape meaning (especially religious meaning) in 
certain ways, and that certain qualities of literary fiction (for example, 
the incarnation of persons) give power to religious themes and such aware-
ness as no discursive method could attain. Yet nevertheless, on the 
other hand, we are compelled to recognise that vision inheres m the 
writer or reader: the medium is dependent on the participants and what 
they bring to it. Within both arguments the circularity is important, for 
each endlessly refines and complements the other. 
To weigh these and earlier arguments against a piece of fiction is 
not to attempt to prove anything, but it may bring extra clarity and 
focus, and it does seem appropriate to conclude with a discussion of a 
piece of creative fiction itself rather than with parasitic, analytical 
documents. ·Henderson the Rain King by Saul Bellow is a relatively 
arbitrary choice. It is revealing to compare ·two quite different critical 
readings, by Tony Tanner and Ruth Etchells. 
Tony Tanner ( 1) relates his study of Henderson the Rain King to an 
account of the major concerns of Bellow's fiction, and his 
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development 
throughout his literary career, within the context of the contemporary 
American world. Thus he begins with the immigrant and urban exper-
iences of moderr American life of which Bellow, the writer, is a part. 
With the aid of Bellow's own autobiographical and critical comments on 
his surroundings Tanner broadly sketches the world of Bellow's fiction and 
consciousness. Thus 
"Bellow admits that society with its increasing 
materialism threatens to suffocate the soul 
with its profusion of things. But, he asserts, 
the human spirit is inextinguishable." (2) 
He outlines how Bellow draws on the great Russian writers and on 
Whitman and Dreiser 1 and passes into a general outline of Bellow's 
enduring concerns as they appear in his fiction. There is, for example, 
I 
the problem of reconciling individual freedom with a mode of social life 
to which the individual can give his allegiance without impairing his 
moral, spiritual or psychological integrity. 
This is not an accidental method but intrinsic to Tanner's approach. 
In terms of the categories Giles Gunn outlines (3) Tanner concentrates on 
the artist and thus on what calls for 'expression', the values and insights 
that are felt to be significant, in a manner that goes back to the 
Romantics. This relates to his perception of the artist contributing to 
the possession and development of meaning within our world, the artist 
as 'seer' or visionary, by his special sensitivity and technical skill deliver-
ing himself of what a Biblical theologian might call prophetic vision (4). 
Thus, it also involves him in speaking about Gunri's category 'world', and 
therefore in a mimetic concern, a clear-sightedness that is also, in theo-
logical terms, prophetic. 
Henderson is a strong, rich man of "mad habits", drinking· sacrileg-
iously, raising pigs in the ancestral home, flailing around with his 
inordinate strength and wealth, and 
"shouting out at life in a voice loud enough to 
bring sudden death to an old servant. His 
great tradition cannot provide him with a 
function, a satisfying role, a mode of self-
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realisation. His violence is really a forrn of 
immense, brooding frustration .... He feels the 
need to find out some basic truths about the 
self and its destiny before he can make terms 
with society. For like most Bellow characters 
he does not know how to relate himself to other 
people .... He is too rich and strony lo submit 
to society's net .... He is the quintessence of 
ignorant, questing, well-intentioned individ-
ualism... his prime need is to release that 
vehemence and waken to reality.... All of 
which qualifies him as a member of that rare 
class of people that Dahfu characterises as 
'the fighting Lazaruses' ." (5) 
Tanner accounts for Henderson's trip to Africa on two grounds. Firstly, 
there are the two rooms, his own insulated, carpeted, "swept and 
garnished" (6) until he feels like a "trophy": and there is his daily help's 
room packed with the accumulated junk of ages reminding him of the 
grave. These are symbols of his pointlessness and fear of death, 
especially a meaningless death, the death of a person who has not sign-
ificantJy 'been' anyone. Secondly, there is the inner voice "i want", an 
"extreme manifestation of boundless desire, 
that longing without focus which Bellow has 
described as particular 1 y American. And what 
Henderson wants, as he gasps or bellows his 
needs, turns into a sort of anthology not only 
of all the desires of all the other characters 
in Bellow's work, but of the vast range of 
romantic and post-romantic aspirations in 
general. • . . Almost, one might say, he acts 
out •.. a whole chapter in the history of 
Western sensibility." ( 7) 
Henderson plants himself in Africa, "the ancient bed of mankind" 
(8) where his life becomes harsher and more rigorous until he approaches 
the ultimate secrets of savagery and annihilation. · With the gentle, 
peaceful, animal-loving Arnewi, whose Queen WiJJatele is the. incarnation 
of stability, Henderson recognises the "grun-tu-molani. Man want to live." 
(9) But he is too much the restless, over-dynamic interferer to be able 
to evaluate their acceptance and offering of their sufferings: he fights, 
with ail the self-confidence of alien technology to remove suffering, and 
failing again, is again forced to flee. He goes on beyond "man-want-to-live" to 
face how to die: 
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"instead of coming to Henderson in tears, the 
Wariri approach with guns; they use his 
tactics". (10) 
They are "chillen dahkness" as Romilayu puts it; they greet Henderson 
with an ambush, a celi with a corpse, scenes of drinkilig, quareHing, 
abuse, human bones worn as ornaments, and bodies hanging from a 
scaffold. Yet there is also the calm of the BeJlovian guide, in this novel 
Dahfu, gleaming with some unusual intensity of life, himself a bringer of 
chaos, Henderson learns "what savagery can be" and comes "nearer to a 
proper confrontation of what he calls "the biggest problem" the 
encounter with death". (II) Dahfu is an equivocal figure, 
"a potential redeemer of mankind but not 
without a hint of Faustian over-reaching .... 
His ideas often threaten to topple over into 
absurdity". ( 12) 
But here Henderson comes to a clearer understanding of his main problem 
which is, Tanner argues, 
"how should a man properly submit to reality 
and at the same time how can he attempt to 
transcend himself and slough off hampering 
limitations?" ( 13) 
Through the imagination Dahfu suggests Henderson can transform himself 
and need not be locked in a meaningless cycle of "fearing and desiring". 
Yet when Dahfu is killed by a real wild lion, not a tame one, reality 
"turns out to be more a ferocious, alien thing 
than he had realised; while the effort to break 
out of the cycle of endless Becoming seems 
doomed to remain the dream of the advanced 
imagination". ( 14) 
Tanner's assessment of the novel is equivocal. He feels that 
Henderson "has no new solutions perhaps, but he does have some convict-
ions" ( 14 ), notably that nobility and human greatness are no illusion. He 
judges that much of Henderson's ranting, insatiable egotism has fallen 
from him and at least his life promises to exhibit more peace and 
purpose, but that this stops short of any concept of _salvation. He 
concedes that, in a sense, the ending is an evasion, "We never see 
Henderson back in the United States". (14) But he feels that "the basic 
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drive and effort of the book is sincere and convincing''. ( 15) The "vital 
experience", when Henderson feels flooded by the possible poetry of 
existence, as he does before the octopus or the beauty of the sunlight on 
a wall in an African morning, gives embodiment to the positive potent-
ialities of life, before death robs him, and us, of all chance to experience 
them. "Humankind has to sway itself more intentionally towards beauty": 
( 16) this is the gesture the book makes. On the other hand, the supreme 
importance of love is, he feels, only asserted; Henderson's relationship 
with Lily is"amiable burlesque" and it is hard to see him ever having real 
relationships with anyone, or ever transcending his ebullient and 
tormented individualism. 
We shall return to Tanner's evaluation and other relevant elements 
of Henderson the Rain King_. At this point it is clear that Tanner has no 
religious or theological presuppositions beyond his general observations 
on contemporary human spirituality. This may, indeed, be another form 
of dogmatism, but nevertheless it contrasts strongly with the assumptions 
of another critical reading by Ruth Etchells. (17) Drawing, likewise, on 
Bellow's own essays, she identifies the thrust of his concern as a moral 
question, "in what form shall life be justified?" ( 18) She sees 
Henderson's quest as a gradual recognition of the place of 'justice' and 
'mercy' within the concept 'truth'. Although she does not herself use the 
phrase it would be appropriate to hint that she means something .like 
'God's truth', that is, not 'reality' as Tanner would understand it, but 
something to do with the framework and values of revealed Christian 
religion. She identifies the incessant 'I want' as a desire for justice. 
She would agree with Tanner that it is a universalised quest, represent-
ative, in some sense, of Western man in the mid-twentieth century. She 
traces the stages of the quest and the "clusters of images and allusions, 
some Biblical, some literary" which help us to make sense of what the 
quest finally achieves. The recognition of "grun-tu-molany" she takes as 
the first time the "I want" within him takes a form, that of the desire 
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to live. Undeserving as he is, however 9 he must alter his views of 
himself as a self-appointed Messiah who wins love by the success of his 
operations; thus his attempts to deal with the "plague" end in disaster. 
He is forced out again into the "wilderness", 
When he is with the Wariri she sees the incident of the corpse in 
the hut as an ordeal testing Henderson's suitability for a new role, not 
only overtly in terms of whether he is strong enough to lift Mummah and 
become Rain-King, but whether he can accept his own death in the 
royalty of nature which she detects coming upon him. 
involved in a kind of substitute death: 
"As if dressed in a second man and groaning .... 
I stumbled and went down under the burden of 
the corpse. This was a hard fall and I lay 
caught in the dusty sand ... something within me 
begged the dead man for his forgiveness". ( 19) 
She sees him 
This, she argues, is another stage in his search. "Faced with a substitute 
death he has begged forgiveness." (20) Presumably she is here glancing 
at the substitutionary death of Christ as she does at Christian baptism in 
commenting on the rain ceremony -
"He is, as it were, baptised into a new name 
and role, 'Henderson-Sungo', the Rain-King. He 
enters, that is, upon royalty." (21) 
In both cases we may feel the allusion is ill-fitting or over-stretched, but 
it forms part of the web of meaning she detects (and helps to construct). 
Dahfu's task, she argues, is to "convert" Henderson's nature to the role 
to which he is summoned (she might almost have said 'predestined', 
since there is, in the novel, a strong sense of compulsion which controls 
Henderson's destiny). His assumption of royalty grows, in Miss Etchell's 
reading, through the letter to Lily asking her to enrol him for ·a course 
in medical · studies under the name of Leo Henderson, and through a 
series of allusions to the life, death and resurrection of Jesus and to the 
ministry of the Church. Thus his assumption of royalty continues through 
the experience of sharing with his friend the King the treason and 
disloyalty of men who plot the King's death (like the disciple, Judas, who 
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betrayed Christ and the other disciples who abandoned him), and through 
entombment with the King after the King's death until he should emerge 
resurrected as, the new King (which glances at St Paul's teaching about 
being buried with Christ in baptism so that we might "rise to newness of 
life" (22) and to the formal Christian doctrine of baptismal regeneration). 
Thus renewed in understanding, Henderson is Jed to return to his own 
world and put his new royalty of nature to the service of others (which 
parallels much of the teaching of the New Testament and is 
~ncapsulated in the final response of the modern Anglican Eucharistic 
rite, "Go in peace to love and serve the Lord. In the name of Christ, 
Amen." (23) In a ritual of resurrection Henderson carries away the lion 
' 
cub embodying the dead King's spirit (like the Holy Spirit) and wanders 
through a purgatorial wilderness (the scene of Jesus' temptation and the 
classic spiritual experience often called "the dark night of the soul")~ 
Finally transformed he runs with lion's grace in royalty of nature round 
the plane which has brought him to the northern environment where he 
will serve as did his model Wilfred Grenfell. Pausing in her argument she 
gathers this together: 
"It is also clear that Henderson's quest is a 
religious one: even at this stage we may note 
in passing how many biblical themes are picked 
up and re-arranged, re-explored, re-defined 
in this book. Such elements are the essential 
royalty of redeemed man, of the potential for 
'becoming' of the inheritance to be entered 
upon, of the infusion of old ritual with new 
life, of the necessary period in the wilder-
ness, of the terror and solemnity of the 'holy 
place' wh~re the implications of the new under-
standing of 'justice' are learnt. So many of 
the concepts, images and themes of the 'new 
contract' in Christ as affirmed ~n the New 
Testament are discoverable in an entirely new 
setting and with a different emphasis in a 
novel concerned with the relation between 
justice and mercy and the means by which a 
human life may be justified". ( 24) 
The "quest" narrative gives unity, she argues, but other patterns 
render it more dense and subtle. Firstly, there are the overt Biblical 
strands such as the controlling image of the prophecy of Daniel, the 
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Messiah, the "day of tears and madness", and images such as deluge 9 
rainbow, desert, plague of frogs, the burning bush, the lion's den and the 
risen Lazarus whose 'sleep' has burst. Secondly, there is the progress 
towards salvation of such books as The Pilgrim's Progress. 
Thirdly, there is the pattern of 'service-motivation' where knighthood is 
associated with chivalry, purity and service, and is achieved through 
ordeal, struggle and commitment. Of the image of Nebuchadnezzar she 
says, 
"Supposing the beast whose nature is cultivated 
is a royal one? Then that which is a curse may 
indeed become a blessing". (25) 
Thus she suggests an elision of a number of Christian ideas, amongst 
them the prophecy of· Daniel, the 'fortunate fall', the 'cursed' cross of 
Christ and St. Paul's notion of identification with the death and resurrec-
tion- of Christ. For her, Africa becomes "the primeval landscape", in 
fact, "Eden lost", allowing "so conte:nporary a figure" as 
"to work out there the implications of the 
justice at the heart of man's moral situation". 
(26) 
Henderson 
The "bursting of the spirit's sleep" she sees as the awareness gained of 
forgiveness, awareness that comes through commitment to suffering ("a 
brave man will try to make the evil stop 
"It's too bad, but suffering is about the only 
reliable burster of the spirit's sleep. There 
is a rumour of long standing that love also 
does it". ( 27) 
with him"). 
He comes to an understanding of love, she contends, when the inner vo1ce 
"I want" has ceased to be selfish -
II I had a voice that said' I want! I wa'nt? I? 
It should have toid me she wants, he wants, 
they want. And, moreover, it's love that makes 
reality reality". (28) 
- and when, "now that the sleep is burst", he longs to see his wife and 
children, "I love them very much - I think". 
Ruth Etchell's critical account is clearly m contrast to that of Tony 
Tanner, and to be fair, it is not designed to stand alongside his account. 
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In the reading she offers she makes the fullest use of Biblical references 
and allusions which are clearly present in the text, and she weaves them 
into a coherent framework of meaning. Is that meaning superimposed or 
is it a valid eluciclation of the main thrust of the novel? 
conclusion she argues, 
"Bellow has avoided, as he must by the very 
terms of the definition of his art to which he 
is committed, any message to be extrapolated 
from Henderson the Rain King. What he has done 
is to invest with imaginative force the 
question he proposed, 'in what form shall life 
be justified?"'. (29) 
Has she extrapolated a message in this reading? 
In her 
She certainly seems to stand between Ryken and Gunn in the terms 
alre'ady outlined. (30) Like Ryken, her reading is clearly dependent on 
revealed Christianity. It must, of course, be admitted that symbols and 
motifs like the burning bush and Daniel's prophecy are part of the tex.t: 
she does not import them. But Tanner's reading makes little of these 
same features. For him they are one of a number of possible signifiers, 
but presented as cheques that may bounce. Nietzsche offers other 
meanings in Thus Spake Zarathustra, ideas and images of nobility and 
transformation, of "metamorphoses of the spirit" into a camel, a lion and 
a child (as in Zarathustra's first discourse). "Now, of course, there is no 
exact copying11 , Tanner concedes, 
11or even a direct parallel; but there are hints 
and clues that Bellow has included some delib-
erate echoes of Nietzsche's work". (31) 
Thus one of the tasks of the spirit is to 
"enter the foul waters if these be the waters 
of truth, and not to repulse the chilly hogs 
and hot toads therein''. (31) 
Again, the lion can "create freedom for new creation" as Dahfu taught 
in the pit. Finally though, 
"the lion must 
lion can only 
restrictions, 
saying'". (31) 
become a child, for whereas the 
say 'nay' to false duties and 
the child is 'an holy yea-
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Henderson does repulse the frogs, does learn something of the recreation 
of himself with the lion 1 and his last act of unqualified affirmation is 
Nietzsche's 'holy joy' achieved by literally embracing a, child. "This is 
clearly not mere borrowing on Bellow's part". (31) Another critic, in 
sympathy with Tanner's approach, Clayton 9 goes even further in placing 
Henderson the Rain King alongside some of the other twentieth century 
novels of personal or mythic quest into dark regions, novels like Lord Jim 
and Kerouac's Big Sur, 
"in which his King of the Beatniks tries to 
find ;·his salvation in a Thoreau-like Eden on 
the Californian coast". ( 32) 
The reading Ruth Etchells offers ignores these competing systems of 
allusion and potential, significance. For her the Christian signifiers of 
meaning offered are valid: her reading is therefore dependent on them 
and evades the others. She has brought her assumptions about truth to 
the text. Perhaps for that reason she has not commented on the tone of 
the novel. Tanner detects the satirical, parodic style but is himself 
unsure what to make of it. How much is Bellow committed to his story, 
he wonders? "Is it an allegory, a parody, a romance, a fantasy?" (33) 
As we have argued, (34) each mode has its own relation to its proclam-
mation and search for truth or meaning. For his part Clayton is quite 
certain, 
"we are to laugh at Henderson's quest •..• 
Critics have tried to apologise for Bellow, not 
seeing that the symbolism of the novel is a 
put...;on. Of course the novel is symbolic. Of 
course there are patterns of Freud, Jung, 
Fraser; but we should see the patterns as 
parody". (32) 
Malcolm Bradbury argues that the· myth of· Henderson the Rain King 
"both asserts arid mocks itself, takes on a neo-
parodic form; and it is the method of comic 
fabulation, of expansive and pyrotechnic farce, 
of absurdity finding a path to human measure-
ment". (35) 
It teases the imagination. This self-critical tone resists any Henderson-
like certainties; it affirms the value of the quest and the pursuit of 
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meaning but resists all the meanings that pose as truth. In a world 
where meanings have been lost, Bellow seems to ask, how can we live 
with the threat of meaninglessness: how shall we relate to the meanings 
which are less than convincing and yet stave off death? Perhaps the 
only way is a self-conscious quest that is always aware of its own 
potential absurdity and yet launches out in the hope of stumbling upon 
something valuable. As Bradbury concludes, 
"the mythic intent makes it very much a book of 
the fifties: a decade obsessed with the hope 
that the imagination might generate at last the 
saving fable, the tale of the wasteland redeem-
ed, the desert of civilisation watered by some 
humanist or metaphysical discovery". (35) 
Bradbury would therefore not admit a reading such as Ruth Etchells 
gives us which is so partial in both senses of the word. 
However, by placing a hero in a scene of competing meanings Bellow has 
created the possibility of an even deeper accomplishment than that to 
which Bradbury alludes. In an essay a week before Henderson the Rain 
King was published Bellow gives a warning about systems of meaning: 
"Novels are being published today which consist 
entirely of abstractions, meanings, and while 
our need for meanings is certainly great, our 
need for concreteness, for particulars is even 
greater. We need to see how human beings act 
after they have appropriated or assimilated 
the meanings. Meanings themselves are a dime 
a dozen". (36) 
With respect to Henderson the Rain King this may mean that, more 
important than affirmation of any particular system of meaning, it is 
authentic existence within certain moments that is valuable. Thus 
Henderson's dance around the stationary plane is the achievement of a 
· moment, at least, (if not a life) of integration and joy that contrasts so 
strongly with the intensely negative moments before the octopus or with 
the cat or in the daily help's room. Perhaps Bellow is suggesting that 
the novel functions on this level first, less as a quest for general, 
systematic meaning, the testing, proving and refining of it, and rather 
more at the level of an existential revelation and achievement, the 
149 
particularity and concreteness of an experience of value and significance 
(and humanity). This is like the contrast between the propositional and 
creedal faith of the Church and a more dynamic and personal act of 
faith (like Abraham's in attempting to offer his Son). It is the convict-
ion of Giles Gunn outlined earlier, 
"We are driven back to that in both literature 
and religion which is prior to creed and 
conviction", 
he argues, and we are presented with 
"felt possibility and the imagination of 
desire". (37) 
This is not like "an expressed article of faith or principle of doctrine'\ 
religious (as in Ruth E tchell' s reading), nor psychological (as Clayton 
presents), nor literary (as Tanner suggests), but is rather 
"a mode of experience where, in all our 
unexpectedness, the act of belief suddenly 
becomes again an authentic form of response". 
( 37) 
Belief produces integration which allows the possibility of the joy we see 
in Henderson around the plane. 
Finally, in this context, Gunn's argument about 'otherness' also 
applies. Tanner concludes his brief study, 
"when the book reaches away from negation 
towards celebration: when we feel the full 
force of Bellow's refusal to accept despair, 
then it takes hold of us in a positive way 
beyond the scope of mere parody.... Henderson 
is a kind of fool, but persistent enough in his 
folly to reach the threshold of wisdom, and 
when he struggles to grasp and hold the notion 
of a new nobility attainable by men, then, 
whether he is waking or ·sleeping, comic or 
profound, we listen to him; and listening we 
suddenly seem to glimpse what it might mean to 
burst the spirit's sleep". (38) 
In Gunn's terms, therefore, the novel creates the 'otherness' that is 
Henderson, whose experience of anxiety and moments of integration we 
share empathicaJly, and thereby we are stretched and our vision is 
illuminated to the point where we may ourselves experience our own 
authentic response, and in fact, in a manner of speaking, be inspired into 
our own faithl But clearly, the experience of Henderson the Rain King 
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does not necessarily lead to an intuition of the 'Otherness of God' 1 
indeed, it is difficult to see how it could do so. Even Ruth Etchell's 
reading, making full use of all the Christian allusions in the novel, is 
theologically anthropocentric: it is about what man may learn and how he 
may develop in Christian terms, but it stops short of invoking God. This 
is inev i table9 for the horizon of the novel does not in its imagery or 
argument stretch to the perception of God. 
At this point we may return to Ruth Etchell's reading. We have noted 
various alternative systems of meaning implicit in the text and the 
parodic tone of the novel, and we have accepted the possibility of at 
least a humanist act of faith, "an authentic response", as one of the 
positive affirmations of the novel in place of the underwriting, of a whole 
system of meaning. We must, however, pay more attention to the 
function of the symbol. In conceding the absence of "message" from 
Henderson the Rain King she focuses attention on the way Bellow is able 
to "invest with imaginative force the question he proposed". (29) The 
symbol is a focus of this imaginative force. We saw, earlier, Lewis' 
argument that religious sense is conveyed by "intensifying the human 
drama to the point where it gives off intimations of the sacred". (39) In 
Henderson the Rain King Africa is clearly rich with symbols: the burning 
bush is a symbol of Henderson's hubris (4-0) and his bomb a symbol of 
his relianc~ on technological solutions within situations that are more 
complex both spiritually and sociaJJy. There is nothing specificaJJy sacred 
about these. The rain-making ceremony, the lion's den and the King's 
tomb contain more ·that is imaginatively 'sacred'. The final scene of 
joy 1 . however 1 running round the plane, though. symbolically dense, seems 
to have little of the sacred about it, at least overtly, in terms of 
imagery. Yet what ~uth EtcheJJs has offered is an interpretation of 
that final moment whose implications are sacred, that Henderson is set 
free to serve others, and by implication, God. 
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At this stage we may draw on Paul Ricoeur's essay, The symbol 
gives rise to thought. (41) Firstly, he admits that presuppositions such as 
Ruth Etche11s and Tony Tanner bring to the text are implicit in language 
itself and in the seeing eye. We must therefore be cautious in criticis-
ing presuppositions. Secondly, we cannot have symbolic language without 
hermeneutics: 
"though the immediacy of belief in the symbol 
has been lost we aim at a second naivety, which 
is that by interpreting we may hear again". 
(42) 
Thirdly, the interpreter never gets near to what his text says unless he 
has a vital relationship to the thing about which the text speaks, a 
"kin'ship of thought" with the thing in question. The question of truth, he 
argues, 
"cannot be raised as long as one remains at the 
level of comparativism, running from one symbol 
to another, without onesself being anywhere .... 
It has been necessary to enter into passionate, 
though critical relation with the truth-value 
of each symbol". (43) 
As we have argued, this is what Ruth Etchells has done in offering 
a Christian interpretation. The risk she takes, however, in the emphasis 
given tcb BibliCal allusion, is to treat the symbol as allegory. Allegory is a 
form of hermaneutics (44) in which the interpretation is so precise that 
the richness and liveliness of the symbol may be lost. Ruth Etchell's 
reading is decisive: m the light of Ricoeur's reminder, that it is by 
interpreting that we are able to understand, we may find it both percept-
ive and illuminating. Yet. we may feel that it is unreasonable to accept 
one framework of meaning when there is evidence in the text that the 
power of the work arises from the ·ironic· juxtap~sition of competing 
meanings, and that such a state reflects the confused. nature of the 
world to which the novel is addressed. 
One of the problems of interpretation confronted by all the critics 
of Henderson the Rain King concerns the future we might expect for 
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Henderson. Is he redeemed1 with a new royalty of nature and a service 
motivation9 as Ruth Etchells argues, is he a modified Henderson, slightly 
quieter and more peaceful, as Tanner suspects, but not qualitatively 
different, or is there no indication of any substantial change? These 
questions are closely related to what we understand to have happened 
during the novel, what 'events' have taken place. It is part of his 
presentation of ambiguity that Bellow has stopped short of a fictional, 
narrative solution to this problem: we do not, indeed, see Henderson 
back in the United States. But that directs us back into the novel in 
search of our own hermaneutics: the very absence of narrative resolution 
focuses our attention on the qualities of the experiences that come 
before the ending. This confirms Kermode's arguments earlier (45) about 
modern literature as apocalyptic9 not in the narrative ending it is able to 
supply but in the eschatalogical depths of the moment of crisis. Perhaps 
Bellow hints at this when Henderson says that truth comes "in blows". 
(46) In a sense, demythologisation must come to literary hermaneutics 
as it has in the Biblical world. Narrative gives us the opportunity, with 
the aid of symbol and myth, to' P'lul:ITI:b the present crisis. Certainly 9 the 
whole energy of the novel, as well as that of Henderson within the novel 
(and sometimes it seems doubtful if there is any difference between these 
two) is directed towards what Kermode calls turning chronos into kairos. 
(47) Chronos is 'waiting time', simple successiveness: it is this which 
makes Henderson so restless and frustrated, it is this from which he 
flees to Africa. There he expects and finds significant time, charged 
with past and future, a crisis in which he may cease 'becoming' and 
discover 'Being': this is kairos. From another angle9 therefore, the 
reader is involved in the creation of the text's meaning, since Tanner and 
Ruth Etchells interpret the crisis in such different ways. As Kermode 
argues the modern classic provides no answers 
"but calls for us to respond creatively to the 
indeterminacies of meaning inherent in the 
text". (48) 
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This argument may be taken too far: it is perhaps more appropriate to 
Ulyss~~ than to Henderson the Rain King_, but even in Bellow's work 
indeterminacy gives" room for a critical act of faith on the part of the 
interpreter. 
Thus, in conclusion, it is evident that a novel of serious intent 1 like 
Henderson the Rain King1 may give rise to questions which have religious 
significance, but it is equally clear that it does so only in accordance 
with the author's creative control and the reader's critical presupposit-
ions. In itself it offers no dogmatic faith, but it is "an oriented trap for 
meditation" (49), drawing the reader towards the release of sympathy, the 
recognition of truth and the emergence of an existential faith (50). The 
discovery of meaning, however, is not necessarily the discovery of 
religious meaning. 
Discrimination of meanings is aided by the concreteness of creative 
literature (51) but literature per se is not the servant of any particular 
theology. We must look within a work itself for a definition of the kind 
of meaning it offers, and the meaning, whatever it is, has still to be 
tested against the world which it addresses. Henderson the Rain King 
is potent. Its symbols may ring true in our world; yet Henderson's 
possible salvation is the servant of our own salvation: his story is for us 
to "know by" (52). What we "live by" is in the pages of our own story. 
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Epilogue 
At the end of this work it is clear to me that I find most stimulating 
and of interest for further study those arguments which give literary 
method a place within the whole sense-making experience of man. This 
is reflected in the work of Gunn and Kermode, and the work on narra-
tive. Perhaps I have been hard on the earlier writers in the field and 
not allowed enough for the strengths of some of their theories: it is easy 
with hindsight to be over-critical. Their work was embryonic and others 
built on it. But it is the quest for the hermaneutical function of 
literature for the individual and for society, the refinement of old 
meanings and the forging of new meaning, which seems to me to offer 
most in this field. Thus have been less concerned with why a 
Christian may be interested in literature which expresses contrary beliefs 
or no beliefs at all ( 1), and I have been rather more fascinated by 
Gunn's discovery, in literature, of faith and existential belief as an 
authentic response (2). 
Gunn argues that transcending the self in the imagination of "otherness" 
can never save us but can make us more human (3): nevertheless, I think 
I am, indeed, feeling after our salvation. I sense in the cumulative 
argument of the thesis, the choices I have made and the focus I have 
had, that I want to push the argument further and ask whether liter-
ature is part of God's movement towards us to save us? In 
literature, we are drawn into a mode of experience where,· as we have 
seen in the chapter on narrative, the complexities of our lives may be 
incarnated, given life, set against each other, without any need for the 
kind of resolution which is often a falsification, such falsification as may 
often be the by-product of abstract language. "Persons are incarnate in 
the action of stories" (4), and we need to see how they act (5) if we are 
to recognise ourselves and make choices, not least, of faith. And ·the 
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way to this kind of faith is 9 itself1 through faith 9 a literary faith kept by 
author and reader with the world of the fiction 1 which is also our world. 
In this "oriented trap" (6) where ''the symbol gives rise to thought" (7) 
we may "find the courage to be" (8). Thus I am interested in literature 
as religious not because of its content but because of its form 1 not 
because it tells us something but because of the nature of our experience 
of it (9). It seems to me that there is more work to be done to clarify 
our response to fiction in the context of Hillman's references to our 
"soul story" ( 1 O): there is a creative mingling of stories that takes place 
imaginatively in that "willing suspension of disbelief" ( 11) that is partic-
ipation in fiction, and there is great theological significance in this, for 
God' himself is also revealed in stories. Stories motivate, stories have 
competing meanings, stories live and grow, stories mingle, stories inspire 
and recreate. Henderson's struggle with the. symbols of the wilderness 
may be as much a part of our religious life as Agamemnon's first step 
onto the carpet ( 12), the temptation of Jesus and the dark night of the 
soul (13). For a Christian, the Biblical story will have special authority, 
but Henderson the Rain King may have a balancing, contemporary 
spiritual realism. 
Poetry may no longer be the handmaiden of Piety ( 14); perhaps, in 
the twentieth century, they have become lovers. It is the union of these 
two disciplines, each retaining its integrity, that may give birth to a 
most promising faith. 
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